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General introduction
10 | Chapter 1
In everyday life attitudes play a major role in helping us to make sense of the 
environment, helping us to determine how we think and feel about things, and 
influencing the decisions we make. For instance, our attitudes influence which 
political party we vote for, which car we buy, and whether or not we accept a new 
technology. Attitudes are of great interest to psychologists and decision researchers 
because they provide information on how people make evaluative judgements and 
contribute to better understanding of judgement and decision making processes. 
Although central to research on judgement and decision making and to social 
psychology, attitudes are still a poorly understood concept deserving further 
exploration (Gawronski, 2007). 
To a large extent, attitudes are memory traces from the past built on earlier 
experiences and further refined after repeatedly encountering the attitude object in 
the environment (Eiser, Fazio, Stafford, & Prescott, 2003; Fazio, 2007). Consequently, 
most commonly used attitudinal models apply very well to situations where people 
have experience with the attitude object (Plessner & Czenna, 2008). If such earlier 
experiences are not available, such as in the case of new technologies, people are 
still somehow able to construct attitudes on the spot (Schwarz, 2007). How this is 
done and which factors are important in the process of attitude formation towards 
unfamiliar attitude objects will be investigated in this thesis. Therefore, the central 
question in this thesis is:
How do people form attitudes towards unfamiliar attitude objects? 
What is an attitude?
The starting point in understanding attitudes is defining what an attitude is and 
where attitudes stem from. It is generally accepted that attitudes represent summary 
evaluations and can be viewed as “associations between a given object and one’s 
evaluation of that object” (Ajzen, 2001; Fazio, 2007). A dominant approach within 
the attitude research tradition is that of the expectancy-value model (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975), which states that a person’s overall attitude is determined by the sum 
of subjective values of the attributes related to the object, in combination with the 
strength of these values. 
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Attitudes are multi-faceted with a complex layered structure consisting of 
multiple object-associated attributes, attribute-evaluations, and object-evaluation 
linkages (van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005). Object-associated attributes are specific 
characteristics of the attitude object that become salient when the attitude 
object is perceived. For example, encountering a yogurt, might activate attributes 
like: “organic”, “milk”, “cow” (see figure 1.1). These attributes can be evaluated 
individually (e.g. the attribute-evaluation: “I don’t like milk”), or all attribute-
evaluations can be integrated into a single evaluation towards the attitude object 
(e.g. “I don’t like milk-based yogurt”). At the higher-order level, attitude objects are 
represented as a collection of integrated attribute-evaluations that are summarized 
into an overall attitude towards the object. At the lower-order level, attitude objects 
are represented as evaluations of attributes related to the attitude object (Ajzen, 
2001). Depending on the familiarity with the attitude object the attitude structure 
can be extensive and well-developed, or it can have a superficial structure (fewer 
linkages and associations) when less is known about the attitude object. When the 
mental process:
affect / cognition
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milk
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yoghurt
hunger
$$
cognitionaffect
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Figure 1.1 from perception to evaluation of an attitude object
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attitude object is familiar, attitudes can be retrieved from memory, whereas when 
the attitude object is unfamiliar the attitude needs to be created on the spot (Olson 
& Zanna, 1993; Wood, 1982).
Attitude evaluations can stem from a combination of affective reactions that the 
object evokes and cognitive beliefs that characterize the attitude object (Breckler 
& Wiggins, 1989; Fazio, 2007). Affect has been used to describe the positive and 
negative feelings that one holds towards an attitude object (Eagly & Chaiken, 
2007). Cognition refers to the positive or negative beliefs one holds about the 
attitude object (Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). Eventually, evaluations are summarized as 
affective and cognitive attitude components of the overall attitude (Edwards, 1990; 
Giner-Sorolla, 2004). At the lower-order level the underlying attitude structure is 
composed of different affective object-association linkages and cognitive object-
association linkages related to the attitude object (Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Chang 
& Pham, 2013; Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994; Verplanken, Hofstee, & Janssen, 
1998). In attitude expression, both individual attributes of the attitude object can 
be evaluated in a more cognitive or affective way, as well as the attitude object in 
its entirety. 
In most situations no pure affect-based or cognition-based attitudes will be formed 
but the attitude will jointly be determined by affect and cognition (Edwards, 1990). 
However, depending on the context within which judgements are made, the focus in 
attitude expressions may shift either to a stronger focus on cognitive or on affective 
factors. 
Underlying processes
Besides understanding what attitudes are and where they stem from, it is also 
necessary to understand the underlying processes leading to the attitude formation 
and expression, because different underlying processes might lead to different 
attitude outcomes. This is, for instance, dependent on the amount of accessible 
information that is taken into account to express the attitude (Hogarth, 2002). In 
terms of underlying processes, attitudes can be the outcome of a retrieval process 
or a more active integration process (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Attitudes 
that are well-learned and easily retrieved from memory arise spontaneously. Such 
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attitudes can be expressed without conscious effort and awareness, and they are 
based on accessible cognitive beliefs or affect. Attitudes can also be a result of a more 
elaborate and analytic process, which requires integration of several associations.
 
All dual-process models share the common distinction between the processing 
modes, but use different names for these processes and ascribe some specific 
characteristics to these processes (Evans, 2008). Within this thesis, a distinction 
is made between intuitive versus deliberative processes. Deliberative reasoning is 
described as a conscious, controlled, and analytic process. Intuition is described as 
the automatic, unconscious, and fast process. The intuitive process relies heavily 
on prior experience and requires less processing time, whereas the deliberate 
process consumes processing time (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). People usually rely 
on a combination of intuition and deliberative reasoning, each of which may have 
precedence in specific situations (Hogarth, 2002). 
Intuitive processes hold a sense of ‘knowing without knowing how one knows’, 
based on unconscious information processing (Epstein, 2010; Evans, 2010). Intuitive 
processes help people to structure information from the environment and rapidly 
come to reasonable interpretations which can constitute an adequate basis for 
judgements and decisions (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). It is generally accepted that 
intuition is acquired through learning (Chaiken, 1980). Intuition can thus be seen 
as a process that somehow produces a learned answer, solution, or idea without 
the use of a conscious, logically defensible step-by-step process (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). 
Deliberative processing allows people to think at high and complex levels of 
abstraction (Epstein, 2010). This process is based on experiential cues signalling 
that more deliberate processes are required to arrive at a more accurate evaluation 
(Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). People will constitute a more deliberate 
process when the attitude object is personally relevant or when their judgements and 
decisions have important consequences to themselves or for others (Chaiken, 1980).
To summarize, the attitude process can be the result of a more intuitive or 
deliberative process, whereas the attitude itself can stem from more affective or 
cognitive evaluations. This results in a multidimensional view on attitudes (see figure 
1.2), with one axis representing the affective-cognitive dimension and the other axis 
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the depth of processing dimension. Combination of the intuitive-deliberative and 
affective-cognitive dimensions results in different strategies to arrive at attitudes. 
People can use relatively more cognitive or affective input strategies in evaluation, 
while their processing mode can be relatively more intuitive or deliberate, where 
the deliberate process requires more elaboration.
Affect ranges across a continuum from an immediate, intuitive process, and a 
deliberate process, arising in a relatively controlled manner as a result of higher 
order-processing (Giner-Sorolla, 2001; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Affective feelings 
are often seen as automatic and primary, and more rapidly activated than non-
emotional associations (Hansen & Wänke, 2009; Zajonc, 1980). The affective system 
is fast and might be characterized as the default source underpinning attitudes 
(Zajonc & Markus, 1982). Affect can however occur in the forms of both primary 
Figure. 1.2 Underlying processes in attitude formation
affect
deliberation
cognition
intuition
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affect and more elaborated affect. Primary affect constitutes the “gut” feelings which 
comprise a valence component (positive / negative) that serves as information in 
the further decision process (affect as information). A more elaborate affect, in the 
form of emotions, is however broader and reflects conscious anticipated emotional 
associations with the object. This more developed form of affect reflects deliberation 
and insight, especially when it comes to evaluative judgements (Frijda, 1986). 
Cognition can be placed on a similar continuum ranging from intuitive cognition to 
deliberate cognition (Hannond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987). On one end of 
the continuum are the cognitive heuristics, which often seem to be simplifications 
of analytic thought (Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). Cognitive heuristics reflect solutions 
which are not guaranteed to be optimal, but good enough for a given set of goals 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). On the other end of the continuum are cognitive 
thoughts based on an elaborate process, which rely heavily on in-depth researched 
and weighted information, and are related to elaborate thinking and memory 
processes (Gigerenzer, 2007). 
Cognition and affect can thus both be relatively more intuitive or more elaborate. 
People are flexible in their thinking and can switch between the intuitive- deliberate 
processing modes depending on contextual factors (such as message framing) and 
motivational factors (such as motivation and personal relevance) (Petty, Wegener, 
& Fabrigar, 1997). In addition, people have strong individual preferences for certain 
ways of thinking. Some people have an urge to understand how things exactly work 
and like to think about this. The tendency to rely more on cognitive and analytic 
information indicates that those people have a high Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982; Epstein, Pacini, DenesRaj, & Heier, 1996). Others trust their gut feelings 
most and tend to rely more on affective intuitive information, which indicates a 
high Faith in Intuition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Epstein et al., 1996). In this thesis 
individual differences in thinking styles on attitude formation will also be taken into 
account. 
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Familiarity with the attitude object
The influence of affect and cognition on overall attitude and processing strategies 
also varies with the type of attitude object being evaluated and the familiarity 
with the attitude object. As an object-evaluation association, attitude represents 
a knowledge structure, which can be retrieved from memory when the attitude 
object is familiar or created at the time of judgement when the attitude object 
is unfamiliar. Attitudes are part of a larger set of knowledge structures which are 
organized into categories, represented by schemata in the brain (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1995; Pavelchak, 1989). Schemata represent organized experiences with attitude 
objects, ranging from separate attributes to general attitude categories, and are 
built up in the course of interaction with the attitude object (Mandler, 1982). 
With repeated exposure to and experience with attitude objects, the strength of 
attribute-evaluation and object-evaluation linkages is affected. Evidence that is 
consistent with prior knowledge will strengthen the associations through a process 
of conditioning (de Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, de Houwer, 
Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). 
Expressing attitudes is relatively straightforward when people are familiar with and 
have knowledge about the attitude object. People automatically recognize and 
categorize the attitude object as familiar, as it will only be meaningful to them if 
it evokes associations known to them. This also means that while expressing their 
attitudes towards familiar attitude objects, people can draw upon these established 
knowledge structures and schemata that are already build up over the course 
of time (Tourangeau, Rasinski, D’Andrade, 1991). For familiar attitude objects, 
the associated knowledge structures can easily be activated, and individuals can 
effortlessly infer self-relevant benefits, producing an overall positive or negative 
attitude (Ajzen, 2001). Having an established knowledge base also means that 
relevant affective and cognitive information and experiences are available, which 
allows the recollection of attitudes based on both cognitions and affect (Edwards, 
1990; Plessner & Czenna, 2008). When a fit between the perceived attitude 
object and the existing knowledge structure is experienced, the stage is set for 
a fast and easy evaluation (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987; Mandler, 
1982). This type of fast evaluation can be along the intuitive-affective or intuitive-
cognitive dimension (left part of figure 1.2). It should be kept in mind that although 
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evaluation might be fast and easy and therefore more intuitive, people are also able 
to reconstruct inferences when required or forced to do so. People can thus shift to 
a more deliberative approach when asked to do so. 
Attitude expression becomes more challenging when the attitude object is 
completely unfamiliar to people or when it contains attributes that are unfamiliar. 
This is for instance the case when asked to evaluate a new technology or a 
product containing an unfamiliar technology. For instance, when an unfamiliar 
nano-attribute (the buckyball1) is added to a yogurt, it is not part of the existing 
knowledge structure (figure 1.3). In this case the attitude object is not recognized 
as a prototypical category member as people do not expect nano-particles in their 
yogurt and might wonder: “Is this still a natural yogurt?” For individuals confronted 
with unfamiliar attitude objects or attributes their current knowledge structures 
will fall short. As a consequence, no directly relevant representations are available 
in memory as evaluation-linkages are not established yet, and no fully-fledged 
evaluation is stored in memory. 
1 The discovery of the buckyball (a fullerene structure) gave rise to much of nanotechnology’s 
foundation. The buckyball is often used to depict nanotechnology. This is why a buckyball is used to 
represent a nano attribute in the picture.
Figure 1.3. An unfamiliar nanotechnology attribute (buckyball) added to a familiar attitude object.
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People might be motivated to evaluate the unfamiliar attitude object, but they often 
lack the ability to do so because of their incomplete information about the attitude 
object. Nevertheless, people are somehow able to express attitudes towards the 
unfamiliar attitude object, although this requires a more active integrative process 
as new connections between the unfamiliar attitude object and existing knowledge 
structures need to be created (Fazio, 2007; Fazio, Eiser, & Shook, 2004; Schwarz, 
2007; Zajonc, 1980). When constructing an evaluation of an unfamiliar object, 
usually some resemblances can be drawn with existing attitude objects. Individuals 
may try to fit the unfamiliar attribute within the knowledge structure of a familiar 
attitude object to reach a better understanding of the unfamiliar attitude object 
(Peracchio & Tybout, 1996). In this case, a process of accommodation takes place 
by stretching the existing knowledge structure, which requires a more deliberate 
process (Mandler, 1982). The constructed evaluation is then based on resemblance 
to schema for which one already has attitudes represented in memory (e.g. 
Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 
1995). Eventually, over time, the newly developed object-attribute-evaluation 
chains can evolve to immediate object-evaluation linkages (van Overwalle & Siebler, 
2005). Linkages are then further updated and incorporated in the schema (Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000), until a new schema is formed that represents the now no longer 
unfamiliar attitude object. When this new schema is established evaluation will be 
fast and easy. 
Adjustment of existing schemata into new schemata can be based on feelings that 
are used as information inputs in the judgement (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007), or from 
mere exposure where repeated stimulus exposure leads to incorporation of the 
unfamiliar attributes in the knowledge structure and increased liking (Zajonc, 1980). 
People can easily access the broader range of feelings (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; 
Clore & Schnall, 2005). Affective responses do not necessarily require conscious 
elaboration and can therefore be created more quickly (Bornstein, 1989; Hansen 
& Wänke, 2009; Zajonc, 1980). By serving as information regarding how one feels 
about the attitude object, a decision based on affect is often more informative 
than one based on cognition, as people can more easily access the broader range 
of feelings than the few available cognitive associations (Clore & Schnall, 2005). 
Information that fosters cognitive connections can, for instance, be derived from 
imagined experience with the attitude object or attribute, or from analogical 
reasoning (Cohen & Reed II, 2006).
General introduction | 19
1
In this thesis both affective and cognitive processes in attitude formation and 
expression, and underlying mental processing strategies are investigated and 
compared for familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects. By comparing attitude 
formation for familiar and unfamiliar attitude-objects this research contributes 
to understanding situations in which affect or cognition is the better predictor of 
overall attitudes. Moreover, by taking into account personality differences, and by 
changing the amount of available context information, it is investigated how the 
relative influence of affect and cognition changes between a more affect-driven 
process or a more cognitive-driven process. In addition, changes in the relative 
influence of affect and cognition over time are investigated when more context 
information becomes available to people. In this way a better understanding is 
reached of how attitudes towards unfamiliar attitude objects evolve.
By connecting the affective-cognitive and the intuitive-deliberative dimension, 
this thesis brings new insights about underlying attitude formation processes. By 
exposing people to attitude-objects with different strengths, differences in the 
elaborateness of affective and cognitive processing can be investigated. In this way 
it can be investigated whether the component which is decisive in the attitude 
formation process requires the least elaborate process, as this could explain why 
people prefer to rely more on one of the attitude components in attitude expression. 
Measuring attitudes
Insight into attitudes is traditionally inferred from self-report measures reflecting 
positive or negative evaluations of the attitude object. Most often attitudes have 
been represented by a single numerical index, reflecting the position of an attitude 
object on an evaluative continuum (Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 2005). 
Frequently, a distinction is made between overall attitudes and affective and 
cognitive attitudes (Crites et al., 1994). In this way also, differences in the relative 
importance of affect and cognition on overall attitudes can be identified (Pham, 
2007). 
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Attitudes derived from associative networks in memory constitute a dynamic 
phenomenon where both object-evaluations and attribute-evaluation linkages 
can be constructed on the spot. These linkages can either be instrumental in 
attitude expression, or can be post-hoc rationalizations of how the attitude came 
about. A focus on attitude outcomes by means of a single numerical index cannot 
explain the underlying structures and processes. For a fuller understanding, it is 
therefore necessary, in addition to outcome-based research, to focus directly on 
the psychological processes underlying the attitudes and the extensiveness of 
these processes for different attitude objects. (Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kuehberger, 
& Ranyard, 2011; Topolinski, 2011). Understanding when and why a task elicits a 
particular process to arrive at an evaluation will be facilitated by data that reflect 
the process and not just the outcomes of the process (Payne, 2010). 
Previous research has usually focused on either the intuitive or deliberative process, 
typically by constraining the other process. For instance, putting respondents under 
time pressure or providing them with a distracting task, are research approaches 
applied to the study of intuitive processes as these make deliberate thinking difficult, 
given that our conscious attention can only focus at one thing at a time (Glöckner & 
Witteman, 2010b). People then can only switch to a more intuitive processing style. 
On the contrary, asking for justifications or increasing the incentives to arrive at an 
accurate answer may elicit more deliberative thinking (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002). In 
practice, however, these processes almost always work together and rely on the same 
principles (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). By constraining 
one of the processes, boundary conditions are imposed on how the attitude process 
naturally evolves, so then only partial insight in underlying process can be derived. 
When it comes to studying unfamiliar (hypothesized) attitude objects in particular, 
more insight is needed about how evaluations arise. When the attitude object under 
study is unfamiliar, it is also unclear which of the processes should be constrained. 
For instance, it can be assumed that for unfamiliar attitude objects affective 
information is more helpful than cognitive information in the judgement process 
as affect can reach a judgement with far less information (Clore & Schnall, 2005). 
At the same time, it is often assumed that affective processes equate to intuitive 
processes (Hansen & Wänke, 2009). This would imply that for unfamiliar attitude 
objects, affect is relatively more important, and the process would be an intuitive 
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process. Intuition is however acquired through learning, which requires some form 
of internalized knowledge about the attitude object (Chaiken, 1980), which is not 
likely when it comes to unfamiliar attitude objects. Thus, to further investigate 
these underlying processes, it is important that both intuitive-deliberative and 
affective-cognitive processes can be simultaneously investigated. Therefore, there 
is a need to map better the underlying process without putting constraints, so that 
both attitude dimensions can simultaneously be addressed. 
Eye-tracking is one of the promising tools which provide insights into underlying 
psychological processes, in conjunction with outcome measures and, without 
constraining any of the involved processes (Glöckner & Witteman, 2010b). An eye-
tracker is a device for measuring eye positions and eye movements (eye-gazes). Eye-
gaze is an unobtrusive measure, allowing for more information about the processes 
that are at work while making (affective and cognitive) judgements and decisions, 
and without interfering in the research context. From fixation durations and the total 
number of fixations that respondents make prior to their attitude judgement, the 
extensiveness of processing prior to making a judgement or decision can be derived. 
Fixation duration and number of fixations increase with increasing levels of processing 
and should go along with longer fixations (Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 2009).
In the current thesis, both outcome measures and process measures will be used 
to understand more about the affective-cognitive and the intuitive-deliberative 
dimension. Outcome measures will be used to understand, whether compared with 
familiar attitude objects, attitudes towards unfamiliar attitude objects are based 
more in affect or cognition. In addition, by means of a novel eye-tracking approach 
the underlying intuitive and deliberative processes in conjunction with affect and 
cognition will be studied. 
Nanotechnology applications 
In this thesis the attitude formation process towards nanotechnology applications 
is studied whilst comparing this with similar conventional technology applications. 
Nanotechnology is an existing yet little known novel technology. It provides a 
good example of unfamiliar attitude objects, because at the beginning of this 
project, people had limited knowledge about nanotechnology and its applications 
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(Stijnen et al., 2011). Nanotechnology concerns the manipulation of materials at 
the smallest possible physical levels (i.e. molecular or atomic levels). It enables 
the creation of completely new products, as well as the substantial improvement 
of properties of existing products (Borisenko & Ossicini, 2012). In this way, a new 
generation of technological applications is formed, opening up new possibilities 
in a wide range of fields, varying from health care and food to environment and 
agriculture (RIVM, 2012). By focussing on nanotechnology-facilitated improvement 
of existing products, nanotechnology does not only provide a good research context 
to investigate realistic unfamiliar attitude objects but also allows for comparison 
between similar unfamiliar and familiar attitude objects as many nanotechnology 
applications have conventional counterparts. Nanotechnology also allows selection 
from a broad range of applications, which may be associated with different potential 
advantages and disadvantages, helping to show robustness of results. 
With a variety of potential applications, nanotechnology is a key technology for 
the future and governments have invested billions of dollars in its research. 
Nanotechnology raises concerns about the toxicity and environmental impact of 
nanomaterials (Borm et al., 2006; O’Brien & Cummins, 2008). Nanotechnology 
also leads to speculations about various doomsday scenarios, such as the grey goo 
(where a large mass of self-replicating nanomachines covers the earth, for instance 
in the novel ‘Prey’, by Michael Crichton (2002)). In some cases, negative public 
opinion caused by such concerns has led to failure or at least considerable cost and 
delay to the introduction of a technology. Previous technologies, such as genetic 
modification, biotechnology and nuclear energy have met with considerable 
resistance from the public, leading to categorical rejection of these technologies 
(Currall, King, Lane, Madera, & Turner, 2006; Einsiedel & Goldenberg, 2004). 
Nanotechnology may face similar issues (Frewer, Fischer, & van Trijp, 2011; Gupta, 
Fischer, & Frewer, 2012). Prior to developing strategies for gaining acceptance of 
new technologies, it is therefore essential to understand attitudes towards the new 
technology, how such attitudes are established, and how such attitudes develop 
over the time while technology matures. Thus, the ideas developed in this thesis 
are both relevant to understanding public response to nanotechnology and can be 
validated for broader applications using nanotechnology as a case study. 
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Overview of the studies
The central research question in this thesis is: 
How do people form attitudes towards unfamiliar attitude objects?
As people have limited knowledge available in evaluating unfamiliar attitude objects 
such as nanotechnologies, a better understanding of the factors and processes 
leading to attitude evaluation is necessary. In order to achieve this, both outcome 
measures and process measures will be used to capture both the affective-cognitive 
and the intuitive-deliberative dimension. 
The affective-cognitive dimension is studied by means of survey data to answer the 
specific research question:
RQ1: How does attitude formation towards familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects 
differ in terms of the relative influence of affect and cognition on overall attitudes?
 
Chapter 2 provides insight into this research question based on the results of 
a survey study with a cross-section of Dutch consumers. Consumers judged 
different applications of nanotechnology and conventional technology. From these 
evaluations it is investigated whether compared with familiar attitude objects, for 
unfamiliar attitude objects (e.g. nanotechnologies) people rely more on affect than 
cognition. Individual differences are taken into account to investigate whether 
differences in thinking style are also applicable to situations in which unfamiliar 
attitude objects are being evaluated. 
By taking into account the affective-cognitive and intuitive-deliberative dimensions, 
the underlying process mechanisms in attitude formation were explored. This part 
of the thesis answers the specific research question:
RQ2: In terms of elaborateness of processing of affective and cognitive attitudes, 
to what extent are underlying processes different for attitude objects with varying 
strength of object-evaluations? 
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Chapter 3 starts answering this research question by taking a process-approach 
to the exploration of underlying affective and cognitive processes in attitude 
expression, while at the same time studying how much elaboration was necessary 
to arrive at the attitude judgement. A novel eye-tracking procedure was developed 
which allows monitoring of attitude formation processes during attitude response 
formation, thereby circumventing limitations to which self-reported outcome 
measures are prone. In chapter 3, familiar attitude objects differing in strength 
of object-evaluations (i.e. univalent, neutral, ambivalent) were evaluated on 
affective and cognitive scales while at the same time the eye-tracker recorded the 
extensiveness of this process. 
Chapter 4 combines insights from chapter 2 and chapter 3. Chapter 4 extends 
chapter 2 by varying the amount of available context information to investigate how 
the attitude formation process changes when people have more or less context 
information available, as it might be easier to integrate an unfamiliar attribute into 
existing knowledge structures when more cues are available. Chapter 4 also adopts 
the methods from chapter 3 by investigating the underlying processes for attitude 
objects with weak object-evaluations, in this case nanotechnology compared with 
conventional technology. 
Chapter 2-4 compared unfamiliar with familiar attitude objects, but this does not 
say anything about changes over time for the unfamiliar attitude objects. When 
people become more familiar with an unfamiliar attitude object over time, they 
are more and more able to integrate unfamiliar attitude objects and associated 
attributes in their existing knowledge structures. This means that the influence of 
affect on overall attitude might change over time as cognitive inferences are more 
and more available. This part of the thesis follows on the first research question 
and studies changes in the affective-cognitive dimension over time, by means of 
self-reported data:
RQ3: How do affect and cognition in attitude formation towards unfamiliar attitude 
objects evolve over time as a function of growing familiarity with the attitude object 
and knowledge growth of consumers?
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Chapter 5 reports on a longitudinal survey study in which consumers judged at 
three different time points (with 10-11 months in between) the same applications 
of nanotechnology and conventional technology as in chapter 2. From these 
evaluations it is investigated whether there are changes over time in reliance on 
affect or cognition. 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and reflects on the question of how people 
form attitudes towards unfamiliar attitude objects. Chapter 6 also provides 
theoretical implications on process tracing research, and practical implications 
on communication about new technologies, and nanotechnology in particular. It 
is concluded that although the default is to rely on affect, in attitude formation 
toward unfamiliar attitude objects, people are able to draw on cognitive inferences 
provided that there are enough cues available (e.g. product context, high need for 
cognition, or being more often exposed). Whether people rely on affect or cognition 
also depends on which process is the easiest. The attitude component which is 
decisive in the attitude formation process requires the least elaborate process. This 
thesis contributes in a better process understanding as both affective-cognitive 
and deliberative-intuitive dimensions were simultaneously studied. Finally, it 
is concluded that attitudes toward unfamiliar attitude objects are still subject to 
change. This has implications for communication about new technologies, as it is 
important to address both affective and cognitive aspects. 
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Affect and cognition in attitude 
formation towards familiar and 
unfamiliar attitude objects
This chapter is based on: Giesen, R.I. van, Fischer, A.R.H., 
Dijk, H. van, & Trijp, J.C.M. van. Affect and cognition in attitude 
formation towards familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects.
Manuscript under review
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Abstract
Attitudes are built on earlier experiences with the attitude object. If earlier 
experiences are not available, as is the case for unfamiliar attitude objects 
such as new technologies, no stored evaluations exist. Yet, people are 
still somehow able to construct attitudes on the spot. Depending on the 
familiarity of the attitude object, attitudes may find their basis more in 
affect or cognition. In the current chapter differences in reliance on affect 
or cognition in attitude formation towards familiar and unfamiliar realistic 
attitude objects are investigated. In addition, individual differences in reliance 
on affect (high faith in intuition) or cognition (high need for cognition) are 
taken into account. In an experimental survey among Dutch consumers 
(N = 1870), it is shown that, for unfamiliar realistic attitude objects, people 
rely more on affect than cognition. For familiar attitude objects where both 
affective and cognitive evaluations are available, high need for cognition 
leads to more reliance on cognition, and high faith in intuition leads to 
more reliance on affect, reflecting the influence of individually preferred 
thinking style. For people with high need for cognition, cognition has a higher 
influence on overall attitude for both familiar and unfamiliar realistic attitude 
objects. On the other hand, affect is important for people with high faith in 
intuition for both familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects and for people with 
low faith in intuition for unfamiliar attitude objects; this shows that preferred 
thinking style is less influential for unfamiliar objects. By comparing attitude 
formation for familiar and unfamiliar realistic attitude objects, this research 
contributes to understanding situations in which affect or cognition is the 
better predictor of overall attitudes.
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Affect and cognition in attitude formation towards familiar and 
unfamiliar attitude objects
Attitudes are built on earlier experience and help people to make sense of their 
environment (Fazio, 2007). As such, attitudes play a central role in life, and make 
up a large part of our daily thoughts, emotions, and behavioural processes (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 2007). If earlier experiences are not available, as is the case for unfamiliar 
attitude objects, people still construct attitudes on the spot in order to respond 
to unfamiliar situations or attitude objects (Schwarz, 2007). While attitudes are 
formed for both familiar and unfamiliar objects, the way in which these attitudes 
are formed can be different. In the current chapter differences between attitude 
formation towards familiar and unfamiliar realistic attitude objects are investigated.
Individuals confronted with familiar attitude objects, have stored evaluations 
in memory. If we consider attitudes as summary object-evaluation linkages and/
or object-attribute-evaluation linkages (van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005) that find 
their basis in cognitive and affective associations in memory (Ajzen, 2001; Chaiken, 
Duckworth, & Darke, 1999; Fazio, 2007), there are extensive object-evaluation 
linkages available for familiar objects. After individuals have been repeatedly 
exposed to attitude objects additional exposures have reinforced such associations 
through a process of conditioning, especially if accumulating evidence has been 
consistent with prior knowledge (de Houwer et al., 2001; Hofmann et al., 2010). 
This results in a stable, crystallised attitude (Schwarz, 2007) that can draw upon 
learned cognitions such as facts and statements (Edwards, 1990) but also in 
learned emotional responses such as somatic markers that are associated with past 
outcomes (Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop, 1996) and learned regulation of emotion 
(Gross, 2002). Having an established knowledge base, consisting of relevant affective 
and cognitive information and experience, allows the formation of attitudes based 
on both cognition and affect (Edwards, 1990; Plessner & Czenna, 2008).
Individuals confronted with unfamiliar attitude objects, however, do not have a 
fully-fledged evaluation of that object stored in memory. People are, nevertheless, 
somehow able to construct attitudes towards unfamiliar attitudes on the spot, 
based on whatever relevant associations are available in the current context (Fazio, 
2007; Fazio et al., 2004; Schwarz, 2007; Zajonc, 1980). This raises the question what 
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object-attribute linkages will become available while constructing attitudes towards 
unfamiliar attitude objects. It is consistently found that, after repeated exposure 
to a stimulus, people will begin to react more positively to a once-novel attitude 
object, even without conscious evaluation (Bornstein, 1989; Hansen & Wänke, 
2009; Zajonc, 1980). This provides evidence that affective responses happen more 
quickly and possibly do not even require cognitive evaluations of attitude objects. 
In this way, affective object-attribute linkages towards unfamiliar attitude objects 
can rapidly emerge. 
In realistic contexts, new attitude objects will rarely exist in complete isolation 
from anything encountered before, since attitude objects generally do not exist 
independently of social processes and other contextual factors (Stern, Kalof, Dietz, 
& Guagnano, 1995). Hence, in a realistic context, people will have been exposed 
(unconsciously or otherwise) to some features around the unfamiliar attitude object 
and can infer meaning from existing knowledge about related familiar attitude 
objects (Loken, 2006). Therefore, some object-attribute linkages for unfamiliar 
attitude-objects will become activated, even if no cognitive elaboration on the new 
object has ever taken place. In such cases, where no cognitive inferences have yet 
been developed, affective responses can already be mobilised (Bechara & Damasio, 
2005; Zajonc, 1980). This could explain why affect consistently contributes to 
attitude formation of unfamiliar realistic attitude objects such as, for example, 
carbon dioxide storage, genetic modification of food products and nanotechnology 
(e.g. Midden & Huijts, 2009; Scheufele & Lewenstein, 2005). Supporting this line of 
reasoning is previous research which has shown that attitudes in cases characterized 
by a lack of concrete factual information are often based on affect (Lee, Scheufele, & 
Lewenstein, 2005; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004), which, compared 
with cognitive weighing of pros and cons, requires less formal information in decision 
making (Slovic et al., 2002). By serving as information regarding how one feels about 
the attitude object, these affective associations are able to influence judgements 
even in the absense of crystallised cognitive or affective object-attribute-evaluation 
linkages. In the absensce of clear object-evaluation linkages, a decision based on 
affect is often more informative than one based on cognition, as people can more 
easily access the broader range of affective feelings than the few available cognitive 
associations (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Clore & Schnall, 2005). Hence, in situations 
of limited knowledge, it is more likely that people will access affective assocations 
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towards an unfamiliar object than construct cognitive object linkages.
In this way, depending on familiarity, attitudes may find their basis in more or less 
elaborate affective object-linkages (feelings and emotions) and/or cognitive object-
linkages (beliefs and thoughts) (Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Verplanken et al., 1998), 
which represent the affective and cognitive attitude components of the overall 
attitude (Edwards, 1990; Giner-Sorolla, 2004).
Therefore the first hypothesis is:
• H1: Affect will have a relatively stronger association with overall attitude for 
unfamiliar than for familiar attitude objects, whereas cognition will have a 
relatively weaker association with overall attitude for unfamiliar than for 
familiar attitude objects.
Although, in the process of attitude formation, people in principle have access to a 
rich network of cognitive and affective attribute-evaluations, in most daily decisions 
they are unlikely to access all of that information. If the object is familiar, that is in 
cases where both cognitive and affective object-evaluation linkages are available, 
individuals are at liberty to use any combination of affective object-evaluation 
linkages or cognitive object-evaluation linkages, that leads to a clear evaluation. 
Differences in individual preferences for affect or cognition will play an important 
role in determining to what extent people rely more on affect or cognition in attitude 
formation in this type of situation. People with a high need for cognition rely on 
the cognitive system, making cognitive beliefs important in forming judgements 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Epstein, 2010; Epstein et al., 1996). People with a high 
faith in intuition om the other hand rely on the intuitive system and show a strong 
reliance on feelings in their judgements (Epstein, 2010; Epstein et al., 1996; Keller 
& Bless, 2009). People with a clear preferred thinking style (high need for cognition 
and low faith in intuition or vice versa) will rely on either cognition or on affect, 
depending on their preference.
If the object is unfamiliar, cognitive object-evaluation linkages are hardly available, 
while affective-evaluation linkages remain to a larger extent available. For unfamiliar 
attitude objects, individuals are restricted in relying on cognitive evaluations 
and therefore can only fall back on more intuitive and affective processes. Thus, 
even when individuals have a high need for cognition, an analytical approach to 
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information processing might fall short for unfamiliar objects (Pretz & Totz, 2007). 
It is therefore expected that, for unfamiliar attitude objects, a preference for a 
cognitive thinking style will not relevantly shift the process to a more cognition-
driven process. As affect is less dependent on information, affect will have a similarly 
high influence on the overall attitude for both familiar and unfamiliar attitude 
objects, for people having a high faith in intuition. A high influence of affect on 
overall attitude is expected even in the case of low faith in intuition for unfamiliar 
attitude objects. 
Hence, it is hypothesized that:
• H2a: For familiar attitude objects cognition will have a relatively stronger 
association with overall attitude for individuals with high need for cognition, 
compared with low need for cognition.
• H2b: For unfamiliar attitude objects, cognition will not have a relatively 
stronger association with overall attitude for individuals with high need for 
cognition, compared with low need for cognition.
• H3a: For familiar attitude objects affect will have a relatively stronger 
association with overall attitude for individuals with high faith in intuition, 
compared with low faith in intuition.
• H3b: For unfamiliar attitude objects affect will have a relatively stronger 
association with overall attitude for individuals with both high and low faith 
in intuition. 
Study
The hypotheses were tested in an experimental survey in the Netherlands in the 
context of technological applications. Nanotechnology, an existing yet little known 
novel technology, was used to study a range of unfamiliar attitude objects. The 
range of unfamiliar nanotechnology attitude objects was compared with a similar 
range of familiar variants. Nanotechnology provides a good research context to 
operationalise unfamiliar realistic attitude objects as, at the time of the study, 
people had limited knowledge about nanotechnology and its applications (Stijnen 
et al., 2011). Nanotechnology is involved with the manipulation of materials at 
the smallest possible physical levels (i.e. molecular or atomic levels). It enables 
the creation of completely new products, as well as the substantial improvement 
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of properties of existing products (Borisenko & Ossicini, 2012). By focusing on 
nanotechnology-facilitated improvement of existing products, nanotechnology 
not only provides a good research context to operationalise realistic unfamiliar 
attitude objects but also allows for comparison between similar unfamiliar and 
familiar attitude objects. Nanotechnology also allows to select from a broad range 
of applications, which may be associated with different potential advantages and 
disadvantages, helping to show robustness of results.
Method
Respondents 
Data were collected by a commercial market research agency (GfK; see www.gfk.
com), as the first wave in a longitudinal study. Respondents were drawn from an 
existing panel for which respondents voluntarily registered. The research complies 
with the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice and the Social Sciences 
Ethics Committee of Wageningen University waived the need for ethical consent. 
There were no misleading questions in the survey, and the questions did not cause 
discomfort to respondents. GfK anonymized and de-identified all data prior to 
author access, so there was no access to any identifying information about the 
participants. 
As the socio-demographic information of panel members is known, the panel allows 
for stratified random sampling of a nationally representative sample on gender, 
age, and education level of the Netherlands. The panel consists of approximately 
12,000 respondents, who are repeatedly invited to participate in studies. The panel 
is maintained through a range of sampling techniques, taking care that the panel 
remains representative for the population. Agreement to join the panel is between 
10% and 35% among those invited; about 20% of panel members are replaced each 
year. Data were collected in the Netherlands between 16 October and 6 November 
2012. The research agency approached a gross sample of 2500 respondents from 
their panel, of whom 1907 participated (response rate of 76%). Of these 51% were 
male, 28% have a low education level (primary school, vocational education), 
45% have an intermediate (secondary vocational education), and 27% have a high 
education level (university of applied sciences, or university). The mean age of 
respondents was 43 years (SD = 13.2 years, age range 18-65 years). 
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Inspection of responses on all variables showed highly unlikely response patterns 
for 37 respondents, who had zero variance on all variables. These 37 respondents 
were removed prior to analyses (valid N = 1870). After removing these respondents, 
no further univariate and multivariate outliers were detected.
Design
Respondents judged a total of four applications. Each respondent was asked to 
rate both familiar (non-nanotechnology) applications and the related unfamiliar 
(nanotechnology) applications. In addition, each respondent was asked to judge 
applications from two out of four application domains (either water and energy, or 
medicine and food). Within each application domain, two different applications were 
specified. Each respondent judged in total four of the sixteen available applications, 
as an incomplete repeated measures factor across four domains. The combinations 
of stimuli as presented to groups of respondents can be found in table 2.1. 
Stimuli 
Technological applications 
Stimuli were 16 vignettes of technological applications. These consisted of a set of 
eight familiar and eight unfamiliar (nano) applications with the same purpose, to 
operationalise different levels of familiarity. For example, a conventional solar panel 
was included as a familiar attitude object and a nano-based solar panel was included 
as an unfamiliar attitude object. Four application domains were included that cover 
the key areas of nanotechnology research and development: food, water, medicine, 
and energy (NWO. EC/TKI, 2012). For each domain, two different applications were 
selected – food additives and food supplements, water purification and water quality 
monitoring, medical home tests and drugs, solar energy and batteries – to provide 
replications, allowing to control for specific application and domain associations.
Respondents received a short description of an application, consisting of some 
information about the technology behind the application, examples in which the 
application can be used, and some advantages and disadvantages of the application. 
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The order of the information on advantages and disadvantages was randomised. 
Descriptions were checked by an expert on nanotechnology for realism of content. 
Scenarios of pairs of applications (familiar versus unfamiliar) were matched as much 
as possible in content and length. An example of a scenario is provided in appendix 
2.1 (translated from Dutch). 
Four sequential pilot studies were conducted to improve the materials iteratively. 
The first three pilot studies were conducted with students from Wageningen 
University, and the final pilot study was conducted on a more diversified sample. 
Scenarios were adapted until comprehensibility, credibility, and emotional 
neutrality, as well as the purpose, advantage, and disadvantage of the familiar and 
unfamiliar applications, were comparable; at the same time, the nano-applications 
remained less familiar compared with corresponding alternatives (see Appendix 2.2 
for details).
Measures
Data were collected as part of a larger study. Respondents were asked whether 
they had heard of nanotechnology (‘yes/no’) and whether they knew what 
nanotechnology means (‘yes/no’). To assess whether familiarity with the selected 
applications differed between the nano and the conventional applications, 
respondents were asked to indicate for each application whether they had heard 
of the application. 
Affective attitude
The affective attitude component was measured with an affective judgement scale, 
consisting of four items measuring positive emotions (joy, desire, fascination, 
satisfaction) and four items measuring negative emotions (fear, boredom, sadness, 
and disgust) (see Desmet, 2003; Russell, 1980). Respondents were asked to indicate 
to what degree they experienced each of the emotions when reading about the 
application, on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = ‘not at all’, 7 = ‘very much’).
Cognitive attitude
The cognitive attitude component was measured with a cognitive judgement 
scale, consisting of four items measuring positive cognition (useful, functional, 
beneficial, nice) and four items measuring negative cognition (useless, harmful, 
disadvantageous, unusable) (based on Crites et al., 1994). Respondents were asked 
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to indicate to what degree they think each of the cognitions applied when reading 
about the application on a seven-point Likert scale (ranging from ‘not at all’ to ‘very 
much’).
Scale dimensions  
In order to verify that the cognitive and affective items tapped into different attitude 
components, a hierarchical confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted with 
maximum likelihood in SPSS AMOS. Goodness of fit index (GFI) and comparative 
fit index (CFI) values above .90 and root mean square error of estimation (RMSEA) 
below .10 were adopted as indication of good fit. χ² is reported as customary, but 
not indicative of model fit with large samples (Kline, 2005). Affective and cognitive 
items were loaded on cognitive positive, cognitive negative, affective positive, and 
affective negative factors. After removal of the ‘boredom’ (affective negative) and 
‘nice’ (cognitive positive) items, which did not load onto their respective factor, 
and allowing error-term correlation within subscales (between affective positive: 
‘joy’ and ‘desire’; cognitive negative: ‘unusable’ and ‘useless’; and ‘harmful’ and 
‘disadvantageous’), the hierarchical CFA resulted in an acceptable fit confirming 
that affective and cognitive items tapped distinct underlying constructs: χ² (69) = 
4510.66, p < . 001; GFI = .92; CFI = .93; and RMSEA= .093 [.090 to .095]. Remaining 
items were then recoded where needed and averaged to form reliable affective 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .78; M = 4.83, SD = 1.07) and cognitive (Cronbach’s alpha = .86; 
M = 4.45, SD = 1.01) attitude scales. 
Overall attitude1 
Overall attitude was measured with one item: ‘What is your overall opinion towards 
the application?’, measured on a seven-point scale (1 = ‘very negative’ and 7 = ‘very 
positive’). 
1 In this chapter a single item construct was used to measure overall attitude. A single item construct 
can be considered a relevant alternative for multi-item constructs in many cases (Bergkvist & Rossiter, 
2007; Rossiter, 2002). In chapter 5 a multiple-item construct is used, showing similar results as when 
only the single-item construct is used. 
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Need for cognition and faith in intuition
Respondents’ need for cognition and faith in intuition were measured using a Dutch 
translation of the short version of the Cognitive-Experiential Inventory (for the REI 
see Epstein et al., 1996). After recoding negative items, internal scale reliability 
of the need for cognition scale and faith in intuition scale were high (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .77 and .88, respectively). There is a negligible correlation between need for 
cognition and faith in intuition, r (1873) = .046, p < .001, and a moderate correlation 
between education level and need for cognition, r (1873) = .328, p < .001.
Procedure
Respondents started the online-survey in their own home at their own time and were 
presented with an introduction to the study. Next, all respondents answered two 
questions about their knowledge about nanotechnology in general, before reading 
a general description of nanotechnology in order to create a basic understanding 
about nanotechnology. Respondents were then randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions (see table 2.1). After reading the general description respondents were 
asked to carefully read an information scenario of one of the four applications. 
After they read the information, respondents’ affective attitude, cognitive attitude, 
overall attitude, and familiarity with the application were measured. This process 
was repeated for all four applications in randomised order. At the end of the survey, 
respondents were asked to complete the REI questionnaire and to provide some 
other background variables. Respondents were thanked for their participation 
and debriefed. In the debriefing, the respondents were told that the majority of 
nanotechnology applications used for the survey are still under development and 
therefore non-existent at this time. Following their participation, the respondents 
received credits from the research agency that could be accumulated towards a gift 
voucher. On average, it took about 22 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
Data analysis
To assess the impact of affect and cognition, familiarity of the technology/application, 
and need for cognition and faith in intuition on overall attitude, attitude scores 
were subjected to a repeated-measures mixed linear model using SPSS 19. Mixed 
linear models can deal with incomplete repeated measures (respondents rated 
four out of sixteen applications). Application was entered as a repeated variable 
in the model. A simple-structure variance–covariance matrix was set. Familiarity 
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was operationalised as comparison between nano applications (unfamiliar) and 
conventional applications (familiar). Familiarity with the technology was effect 
coded (familiar = –1; unfamiliar = 1). In addition to the variables of interest, the 
eight application types were included in the model as effect-coded covariates to 
control for associations with the specific application. Scores on the continuous 
independent variables (affective and cognitive attitude, need for cognition and 
faith in intuition) were grand mean centred to control for collinearity between main 
effects and interaction effects (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). 
A model was estimated with all main effects, and the two- and three-way interactions 
of interest. Unstandardized betas are reported in the results. To interpret three-way 
interaction effects, simple slope analysis was used2 (see Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991). 
Results 
While 71.9% of respondents recalled having heard of the term nanotechnology only 
39% of respondents reported knowing its meaning. Thus, in general knowledge 
about nanotechnology is low. In addition, the proportion of respondents indicating 
knowledge about the selected nanotechnology applications was lower (27%) than 
the proportion of respondents indicating knowledge about their conventional 
counterpart (55%), χ² (7) = 93.71, p < . 05, Cramer’s V = .12. This confirmed the 
successful operationalization of familiarity by presenting respondents with 
conventional versus nano-based applications. 
Model tests
Affect, cognition, familiarity
The results show that affect and cognition both have a positive main effect on the 
overall attitude, F
affect 
(1, 7473) = 1594.73, p < .001; F
cognition 
(1, 7473) = 1359.27, p 
< .001 (see table 2.2 for details). The regression coefficient of affect is .59 and of 
cognition .52. Familiarity has a positive main effect on overall attitude, 
2 Simple slope analyses are used to illustrate the interaction effect, with one standard deviation below 
the mean, and above the mean of the predictor. Effect size measures for mixed linear models were not 
readily available at the time of writing.
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Table 2.2 
Results General Linear Mixed Model Analysis 
 
 Variable t b p CI95 
lower 
CI95 
upper 
H1 Affect 39.93  .585 <.001***   .557  .614 
 Cognition 36.87  .518 <.001***   .490  .545 
 Familiarity (familiar = -1; 
unfamiliar =1) 
-3.11 -.035 .002** -.057 -.013 
 Familiarity*affect  3.08  .045 .002**  .016  .073 
 Familiarity*cognition -2.65 -.037 .008** -.064 -.010 
       
H2 Need for cognition (nCog) -4.42 -.048 <.001*** -.068 -.027 
 nCog*affect -1.01 -.015 .31 -.043  .014 
 nCog*cognition  4.70  .065 <.001***  .038  .093 
 nCog*familiarity   0.75  .008 .46 -.013  .029 
 nCog* familiarity*affect  1.25  .018 .21 -.010  .047 
 nCog*familiarity* 
cognition 
-1.51 -.021 .13 -.048  .006 
       
H3 Faith in intuition (FI)  4.09  .034 <.001***   .018  .051 
 FI*affect  2.37  .026 .02*   .005  .048 
 FI*cognition -3.25 -.035 .001** -.056 -.014 
 FI*familiarity   0.43  .004 .67 -.013  .020 
 FI*familiarity*affect -2.15 -.024 .03* -.046 -.002 
 FI* familiarity*cognition  2.51  .027 .01*   .006  .048 
 
Note. * <.05; ** <.01; *** <.001. Application type was controlled for and entered as covariate, F (7, 7466) = 21.27, 
p < .001. nCog is the abbreviation of need for cognition; FI for faith in intuition. 
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F (1, 7473) = 9.65, p = .002. The interaction between familiarity and affect has an 
effect on the overall attitude, F (1, 7473) = 9.47, p = .002, in such a way that affect 
has a higher association with overall attitude towards unfamiliar technologies 
than familiar technologies. The interaction between familiarity and cognition has 
an effect on overall attitude, F (1, 7473) = 7.02, p = .008, showing that cognition 
has a higher association with overall attitude towards familiar technologies than 
unfamiliar technologies. Thus, as predicted in hypothesis 1, there is a relatively 
stronger association between affect and overall attitude for unfamiliar attitude 
objects and a relatively stronger association between cognition and overall attitude 
for familiar attitude objects.
Need for cognition
Need for cognition had a negative main effect on overall attitude, F (1, 7473) = 19.56, 
p < .001. In addition, the significant two-way interaction between need for cognition 
and cognition shows that higher need for cognition has stronger associations with 
cognition on overall attitudes, F (1, 7473) = 22.11, p = .006. The non-significant 
three-way interaction of need for cognition, cognition, and familiarity shows that 
this effect is similar for familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects (see table 2.2). These 
results confirm that there are stronger associations between cognition and overall 
attitude for high need for cognition for familiar attitude objects, which is in line with 
H2a. However, this is also the case for unfamiliar attitude objects, and not only for 
familiar objects, which does not confirm H2b. The same pattern is also reflected 
in the simple slope analyses, which show that cognition has a stronger association 
with the overall attitude for high need for cognition compared with low need for 
cognition, for familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects (see table 2.3). 
The influence of need for cognition on affect was investigated and showed no 
significant interaction between need for cognition and affect. In addition, there 
is no significant three-way interaction between familiarity, need for cognition and 
affect. Thus, as expected, need for cognition does not influence the role of affect in 
overall attitude.
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Faith in intuition
Faith in intuition has a positive effect on overall attitude, F (1, 7473) = 16.75, p < .001. 
In addition, the interaction between faith in intuition and affect shows that higher 
faith in intuition creates stronger associations between affect and overall attitude, 
F (1, 7473) = 5.62, p = .018. More importantly, the interaction between familiarity, 
faith in intuition, and affect on overall attitude is significant, F (1, 7473) = 4.64, p 
= .031. Simple slope analyses show that affect has a stronger association with the 
overall attitude with high faith in intuition compared with low faith in intuition for 
familiar attitude objects, which is in line with H3a. In addition, it is shown that high 
and low faith in intuition do not influence the importance of affect for unfamiliar 
attitude objects, which is in line with H3b (see table 2.3).
The influence of faith in intuition on cognition shows a significant interaction 
between faith in intuition and cognition, F (1, 7473) = 10.57, p < .001. In addition, 
there was a significant three-way interaction between familiarity, faith in intuition 
and cognition on overall attitude, F (1, 7473) = 6.30, p = .012. Simple slope analyses 
show that cognition has a stronger association on the overall attitude for people 
with low faith in intuition compared with high faith in intuition for familiar attitude 
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Table 2.3 
Regression coefficients for nCog and FI1 (H2; H3) for familiar and 
unfamiliar applications 
 
Variable 
Familiar2 Unfamiliar3 
Affect Cognition Affect Cognition 
High nCog1 .51 .63 .62 .52 
Low nCog .57 .47 .62 .43 
     
High FI .60 .48 .63 .46 
Low FI .48 .62 .62 .48 
 
Note. 1 nCog is the abbreviation of need for cognition; FI for faith in intuition. 2Baseline for familiar: regression 
coefficient affect = .54; regression coefficient cognition = .55; 3 Baseline for unfamiliar: regression coefficient 
affect = .63; regression coefficient cognition = .47. High and low relate to simple slope analyses centring that 
variable at one SD above the mean and one SD below the mean, for significance levels see table 2.2. 
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objects (see table 2.3). Faith in intuition does not alter the influence of cognition for 
unfamiliar attitude objects. Thus, for familiar attitude objects only, for people with 
high faith in intuition affect has a stronger association with the overall attitude and 
at the same time the association of cognition with the overall attitude is reduced.
General discussion
This study showed that attitude formation processes for realistic unfamiliar attitude 
objects rely more on affect than is the case for realistic familiar attitude objects. 
By focusing on unfamiliar realistic attitude objects, where some knowledge in the 
context can be expected, the current study addresses the gap between attitude 
research that either focused on attitude objects where a meaningful reference point 
is lacking (e.g. fictitious attitude objects) or focused on familiar attitude objects. The 
present study achieved this by presenting similar applications with and without the 
use of a new unfamiliar technology: nanotechnology.
The results showed that, for the more familiar attitude objects, cognition is more 
predictive for the overall attitude. On the other hand, for realistic unfamiliar 
attitude objects, affect is more predictive for the overall attitude. This supports the 
proposition that, in attitude formation towards familiar attitude objects, people in 
principle have access to a rich network of affective and cognitive associations and 
attribute-evaluations. For familiar attitude objects, evaluation (the extent to which 
people rely on affect or cognition) is guided by people’s preferred thinking style. 
Consistent with previous research in attitude formation, people with high need for 
cognition rely more on cognition and people with high faith in intuition rely more 
on affect (Epstein et al., 1996). 
It is shown that people with high need for cognition rely more on cognition when 
expressing overall attitude, both for familiar and (contrary to the expectations) 
also for unfamiliar attitude objects. Previous research showed that, for unfamiliar 
attitude objects without meaningful reference points, repeated exposure leads to 
positive affective feelings in the lack of a solid knowledge base (Hansen & Wänke, 
2009; Zajonc, 1980). This study shows that, with realistic unfamiliar attitude objects, 
cognitions can be constructed or derived from the realistic context if individuals 
have a high need for cognition. Thus, cognitions can be used to some extent towards 
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unfamiliar attitude objects. The current study extends previous research on faith in 
intuition in relation to affective focus for unfamiliar attitude objects. For unfamiliar 
attitude objects, both high- and low-intuitive people rely on affect, while for familiar 
attitude objects in particular, people with high faith in intuition rely on affect. This 
implies that, for people with low faith in intuition, affect can still be considered as a 
default heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007), making best sense 
of unfamiliar realistic attitude objects. 
Respondents were presented with unfamiliar realistic attitude objects delivering 
potential benefits in an unfamiliar way (based on nanotechnology). As the selected 
attitude object is a technology application, and the unfamiliar variant is a similar 
application based on a novel technology, technophobia or consumer resistance 
against technology may play a role (Mukherjee & Hoyer, 2001). Specifically, with new 
technologies, ‘unknown’ can quickly turn into ‘unloved’, as happened for instance 
in the case of genetically modified food (Frewer, Bergmann, et al., 2011). Yet, as the 
technology context brings in specific characteristics for nanotechnology, most will 
also be applicable for their conventional alternatives. Nevertheless, future research 
should focus on other unfamiliar attitude objects that deliver familiar benefits in an 
unfamiliar way (for instance when smartphones just came onto the market). Hence, 
research should be extended to include different unfamiliar objects to generalise 
these findings and to control for specific context-dependent effects. 
Respondents were provided descriptions about the attitude objects in order to 
make any sense of the stimuli. Careful pilot testing confirmed that the scenarios 
were emotionally neutral. The elaborateness of information of the scenarios may 
however have contributed to a factual basis, necessary to construct cognitive 
attitudes, and thus may have reduced hypothesised effects that were nevertheless 
observed. Providing a short scenario only once will do little to support the creation 
of lasting cognitive or affective associations. Research following longitudinal 
exposure to the technology in real-life context would be a more relevant way to 
study familiarisation with the new technology. In addition, in future research it is 
also important to investigate whether the relative influence of affect and cognition 
on overall attitudes hold when the available context information changes. For 
instance when there is little or no information about unfamiliar objects presented, 
as is often the case in real life. 
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Attitudes were assessed in a representative adult sample of the Netherlands (i.e. 
as opposed to a student sample), less familiar with technological innovations. 
This supports the predictive and explanatory value of the cognitive–affective 
attitude structure for the general population. A disadvantage of survey research is 
however that it is not possible to disentangle the underlying processes in attitude 
formation (Neys, 2006) or biases observed with self-report measures (Glöckner 
& Herbold, 2008). In order to get a deeper understanding of how affective and 
cognitive processes influence the attitude formation process, additional methods 
that do not rely (completely or partially) on self-reports should be used in future 
research. Techniques such as time-pressured answering or psychophysiological 
measures, such as heart rate variability, galvanic skin response, eye-tracking, 
or fMRI, extend the possibility to study the actual processes without interfering 
in the research context, and provide deeper insights about underlying processes 
(Glöckner & Witteman, 2010b). It is pragmatically impossible to apply these to large 
representative samples; hence, a combination of large-scale population-based 
surveys, with focused experiments to further understand the underlying processes, 
is recommended for future research.
As a final remark, it should be emphasised that communication towards the general 
public is often cognitive in nature, with a focus explaining and rationalising new 
things and innovations (Dudo, 2013). The present study shows that it is important (or 
even essential) to anticipate emotions and address people’s affect in communication 
towards the general public. This study shows that, in order to understand how 
the public will respond to real-life innovations, in-depth understanding of the 
formation of attitudes and of the balance of affect and cognition towards unfamiliar 
but realistic attitude objects is necessary. While cognition plays a role in attitude 
formation towards unfamiliar realistic attitude objects when people have a high 
need for cognition, in general, affect is the more influential predictor of attitudes 
towards unfamiliar realistic objects. 
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Appendix 2.1. Example scenarios (translated from Dutch) 
Scenario 1: Water filtration using a nano-membrane
Water purification and desalination by means of ultra-fine nano-membranes
The water industry is working on the development of ultra-fine membranes with 
nano-materials for water purification. This membrane acts like a coffee filter for 
molecules, ensuring that water is purified for drinking. Certain substances can 
pass through the membrane and other substances are stopped. An example is the 
desalination and disinfection of water for drinking. 
Because the nanoparticles in the membrane change the properties of the 
membrane, they ensure that the membrane draws in water. As a result, the water 
can easily go through the membrane. With the same amount of pressure, twice 
as much water can be purified. The nano-membranes can therefore increase the 
efficiency of purification and desalination of water for drinking.
People use water and can therefore be exposed to released nanoparticles. For 
instance, some of the nanoparticles can penetrate into the brain and into cells, 
where larger particles cannot pervade. It is not yet known what the consequences 
are to humans. The nanoparticles could potentially cause damage. 
Scenario 2: Water filtration using sand filtration
Water purification by means of sand filtration
In the water sector, sand filtration is used for water purification. With sand filtration, 
the water flows through a bed of fine sand and/or gravel. When water flows through 
this filter, dirty particles in the water are retained. Water itself can flow through 
the filter. An example is removing waste from water for drinking or deferrisation of 
groundwater by sand filtration.
Because a sand filter is easy to install, sand filtration can be easily used in many 
places in water-management systems. Sand filters can be used as pre-treatment 
and post-treatment methods. Thus, water can be purified efficiently and cheaply. 
People use water for instance for showering and drinking. Sand filtration is not 
a total disinfection method. Thus, nematodes and viruses are in some cases 
insufficiently filtered, so that they can enter the body. People could be exposed to 
these nematodes and viruses and consequently become ill. 
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Abstract
Attitudes represent object-evaluations, comprising complex underlying 
cognitive and affective knowledge structures. People have access to 
immediate object-evaluation linkages and a rich network of cognitive and 
affective attribute-evaluations. In most daily decisions they are likely to 
stick to their primary response based on object-evaluation linkages. More 
elaboration is required if the primary response is less satisfactory or less 
informative. In attitude research much focus is on attitudes as outcomes, 
ignoring underlying processes in attitude expression. Eye-tracking is used to 
provide insights in such processes. A procedure was developed which allows 
monitoring of underlying processes during attitude expression, thereby 
avoiding problems to which self-reported outcome measures are prone. 
This procedure is applied in three studies to identify the extent to which 
elaboration on underlying attribute-evaluations differs for attitude objects 
differing in strength of object-evaluations (i.e. univalent, neutral, ambivalent). 
In study 1 the primary response precedes processing of more specific affective 
and cognitive linkage-evaluations. In study 2 and 3, the order is reversed 
and attitudinal bases were assessed prior to overall attitude outcomes. For 
attitude objects with strong univalent or mixed object-evaluations similar 
outcomes on underlying processes appear independent whether attitudinal 
bases are assessed prior or after overall attitudes, whereas for weak object-
evaluations these processes differ depending on the order. Both affective and 
cognitive attitudes may require substantial elaboration, albeit for different 
types of attitude objects. By giving insight in these processes the current 
chapter shows the usefulness of eye-tracker methods to further attitude 
research.
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Tracing attitude expressions: An eye-tracking study
Attitudes, as a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular 
entity with some degree of favour or disfavour (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) are a 
central, yet poorly understood concept in judgement and decision making and 
social psychology research (Gawronski, 2007). Attitudes are central because 
they are believed to guide object categorization, interpretation and behavioural 
tendencies (Glasman & Albarracín, 2006). Understanding attitudes is the first step 
to understanding human judgements and behaviour (Conrey & Smith, 2007). 
Attitude research is grounded in two important traditions: attitudes as temporary 
judgements based on on the spot constructed evaluations, and attitudes as stable 
entities stored in memory (Olson & Zanna, 1993; Wood, 1982). Besides models that 
clearly adopt either a stable-entity or a constructionist view, other models take a 
more intermediate position (Bohner & Dickel, 2011). In the constructivist tradition 
it is assumed that people often do not have direct access to the relevant evaluation 
in memory. Evaluations are therefore created on the spot, based on current 
contextual cues and existing knowledge (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Schwarz, 2007). In 
the stable-entity tradition, attitude judgements can be seen as a function of one’s 
learned response to the attitude object (Bohner & Dickel, 2011; Fazio, 2007; van 
Overwalle & Siebler, 2005). In this view relevant information is stored in memory 
as associations and eventually as knowledge structures. These associations and 
knowledge structures can be accessed during the judgement process whenever an 
attitude object is perceived (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Thus, once associations are 
formed in memory and they are accumulated and stored in a memory structure, 
they can easily be retrieved (Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gutig, 2001). The 
current chapter addresses the retrieval process of existing attitudes towards familiar 
attitude objects. Following this approach it is assumed that associations have been 
created in the past and that stored knowledge structures are available in memory 
for attitude retrieval. The salience of information stored in memory may vary, 
sometimes strongly linked with the attitude object, and sometimes more affective 
or more cognitive in nature.
In terms of structure attitudes represent summary evaluations and can be viewed 
as “associations in memory between a given object and one’s evaluation of that 
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object” (Ajzen, 2001; Fazio, 2007). Attitudes consist of a layered structure of object-
associations and, at a deeper level, object attribute-evaluations (van Overwalle & 
Siebler, 2005). During the process of attitude expression people can draw upon 
cognitive and affective components from memory that shape the object-evaluation. 
Attitudes are therefore not only represented as mere object-evaluation linkages, but 
also in more complex, structural form wherein cognitive and affective knowledge 
structures also appear as “object-association linkages” in memory (Chaiken et al., 
1999). 
Several theorists emphasize that attitudes find their base in object-attribute affect 
linkages (including feeling and emotions) and object-attribute cognition linkages 
(including beliefs and thoughts) (Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Chang & Pham, 2013; 
Crites et al., 1994; Verplanken et al., 1998). These linkages can be summarized 
in affective and cognitive attitude components of the overall attitude (Edwards, 
1990; Giner-Sorolla, 2004). Depending on the context, overall attitude expressions 
will find their base more in cognition (reason), or in feelings and other affective 
factors (Edwards, 1990). In this chapter a distinction is made between affect-
based and cognition-based attitude expressions, which are assumed to differ 
in precedence depending on the attitude object. The process by which different 
evaluative responses to an attitude object are integrated in an overall attitude, or 
the process by which detailed affective and cognitive evaluations are derived from 
overall attitudes, is often left vague (van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005). Understanding 
underlying processes of attitude expression provides evidence on which attitude 
base prevails and explains how the judgement process evolves, to derive at a more 
salient affective or cognitive attitude expression. 
In the process of attitude expression the strength of object-evaluation and object-
attribute linkages, be it cognitive or affective, is affected by earlier (repeated) 
exposure with the attitude object. Object-evaluation and object-attribute linkages 
become stronger if evidence is consistent with prior knowledge, via a process of 
conditioning (de Houwer et al., 2001; Hofmann et al., 2010). If an attitude object 
consistently triggered positive or negative object- and attribute-evaluations (both 
affective and cognitive), which is the case for univalent attitude objects, activation 
of assocations progresses faster to evaluation. Hence, it is likely that for univalent 
attitude objects people will rely on their intuitive primary responses in many instances.
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Primary responses represent fast global object-evaluations that are activated upon 
first encounter of an attitude object and have also been labeled primary affective 
response (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), or gut feelings (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011 p. 42; Glöckner & Witteman, 2010a, 2010b). Primary responses 
are more easily accessible than the underlying detailed analytical judgements and 
associations (Crano & Prislin, 2006; Giner-Sorolla, 2004). Depending on motivation 
and availability of resources to form a stable judgement, the primary response 
can be perceived as “satisficing” or as an indicator that further processing is 
necessary (Verplanken et al., 1998; van Raaij, 1989, cited in Ye & van Raaij, 1997). 
Primary responses are more likely to be judged as “satisficing” if they are based 
in a consistent pattern of attribute-evaluation linkages, as in the case of univalent 
attitude objects. If such evidence base is less consistent primary responses may 
be judged as less satisficing and informative, triggering more elaborate retrieval 
in the network of affective and cognitive attribute-associations and evaluations 
(Petty et al., 1997). If a multitude of strong opposite attribute-evaluation linkages 
are activated ambivalence can be experienced, which also raises the motivation to 
arrive at a consistent overall attitude (van Harreveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver, 2009).
Motivation and availability of resources are central concepts in dual information 
processing theories to understand the depth of processing in attitude research 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1984; Kahneman, 2003). If motivation to arrive at a decision is 
high, elaborate processing is more likely as compared with when motivation is low. 
In addition, less elaborate processing is likely when the decision is reached based 
on a satisficing heuristic. As a consequence, attitude expression processes are likely 
to differ between univalent attitude objects (with a consistent underlying evidence 
base) and mixed attitude objects where the evidence-based is inconsistent (triggering 
both positive and negative object/attribute linkages in the network). For mixed 
attitude objects, an important distinction can be made in terms of the strength of 
the inconsistent attribute-evaluation linkages. If such attribute-evaluation linkages 
are inconsistent and strong (ambivalent attitude objects) perceived dissonance is 
assumed to increase motivation to come to an unequivocal attitude, more so than 
in the case of neutral objects, which trigger a mixed pattern of inconsistent but less 
strong attribute-evaluations. 
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Although people in principle have access to a rich memory network of both cognitive 
and affective attribute-evaluations, in the process of attitude expression for most 
daily decisions they are unlikely to access all of that information. In the present 
studies it will be shown that although both affective and cognitive attitudinal bases 
can be important in attitude expression, one of the bases takes the upper hand and 
requires a less elaborate process during retrieval of attitudes to well-know objects. 
Much of the attitude research has focused on attitude outcomes (Greifeneder, 
Bless, & Pham, 2011). There is however, still a gap in the understanding of 
psychological processes underlying attitude expression, and the extensiveness 
of underlying affective and cognitive processes for different attitude objects 
(Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, & Ranyard, 2010; Topolinski, 2011). Research 
into the underlying process of attitude expression is complicated by the fact that 
associative networks in memory constitute a dynamic phenomenon where both 
object-evaluations and attribute-evaluation linkages can be constructed on the 
spot. These linkages can either be instrumental in attitude expression, or post-
hoc rationalization and/or justification of attitudes. When studying attitudes as an 
outcome measure it is impossible to distinguish between construction and post-
hoc rationalization processes of attitude expression. This is a major complication in 
much of previous attitude research that has used self-report measures on attitude 
outcomes (Hendrick, Fischer, Tobi, & Frewer, 2013). Because of their sensitivity to 
answer format and response editing strategic processes inherent in self-reports, 
such as social desirability or self-presentation (Schwarz & Bohner, 2001), self-report 
measures tend to be imperfect indicators for the underlying processes that have 
led to the attitude outcome (Glöckner & Herbold, 2008). This is well recognized 
in an important stream of research that uses unconscious measures for attitudes 
such as implicit associations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), affective priming (Fazio, 
2001), and affect misattribution (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). Such 
measures only partially solve the problem however as they also focus primarily 
on attitude outcomes and are thus less suited to unravel the underlying attitude 
retrieval process. 
The current chapter builds on an emerging stream of research that is using eye-
tracking to provide deeper insights in underlying processes of judgement and 
decision making (Glöckner & Witteman, 2010a; Payne, 2010). A novel procedure 
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was developed that allows to trace attitude expressions during the process of 
arriving at this attitude. This was done by means of analysing eye gaze patterns 
on a specifically designed response scale (see figure 3.1), thereby circumventing 
the answer formatting and response editing strategic processes to which self-
reported outcome measures are prone. Through first eye fixation, eye gaze analysis 
provides a relevant measure for the primary response. In addition, eye gazes allow 
for tracking response speed (total dwell time on the scale units) in conjunction with 
the identification of deliberation processes both within and between the affective 
and cognitive attribute-evaluation linkages (switches in eye fixations between areas 
of interest).
This eye-tracking based procedure is applied to three sets of attitude objects, 
namely univalent, ambivalent and neutral objects, to identify the extent to which 
processes underlying attitude expression differ, in terms of (1) the extent to which 
the primary response is predictive for the overall attitude, (2) the extent to which 
elaboration on underlying attribute-evaluations differs, and (3) the extent to which 
opposing attribute-evaluations are traded off against each other. It is expected 
that the overall attitude judgements will be based on the attitude component 
that requires least elaborate processing. These aspects will be explored in three 
studies. In the first study the primary response precedes the processing of more 
specific affective and cognitive bases. In the second study, the order is reversed and 
attitudinal bases of affect and cognition are given prior to overall attitude. In the 
third study it is investigated whether the operationalization of the affect measure 
influences affective processing.
Research approach
In this chapter, insight into attitude expressions was derived from eye gaze analysis 
on the response scales, while participants were asked to rate their attitude. 
Three response scales were specifically designed for the purpose of this study: an 
affective judgement scale, a cognitive judgement scale and a combined judgement 
scale comprising both the affective and cognitive answering options (see figure 
3.1). The affective judgement scale (see left part of figure 3.1) consisted of eight 
framed pictures (cartoons), based on Desmet (2003). The pictures represented 
four positive states (joy, desire, fascination, satisfaction) and four negative states 
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(fear, boredom, sadness, disgust). The cognitive judgement scale (based on Crites 
et al., 1994; Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt, 2006) consisted of eight 
different cognitive words (see right part of figure 3.1). Four words were positive 
(useful, functional, beneficial, nice) and four negative (necessary, useless, harmful, 
disadvantageous). Each cartoon or word was placed in a 112x116 pixels square (with 
the central position empty) to represent them in a meaningful place relative to two 
dimensions. For the affective scale these dimensions were defined by positive / 
negative valence, and high / low arousal, based on the affect grid (Russell, 1980). 
For the cognitive scale these indicated positive/negative valence and hedonic/
utilitarian beliefs. A combined scale with these two scales combined into one panel 
was used to assess affective versus cognitive dominance (see figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1. Combined scale, with left part of the scale showing the emotions (clockwise starting in 
the top left corner): fear, joy, desire, fascination, satisfaction, boredom, sadness, disgust. Translations 
cognitions (clockwise starting in the top left corner): necessary, useful, functional, beneficial, nice, 
useless, harmful, disadvantageous. 
Affective scale and cognitive scale were also assessed separately. 
Note. Numbers on x and y- axes are an illustrative example, AOIs were approximately the size of the 
frames (112x116). 
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Participants were asked to indicate, through a mouse click, the response option 
that best describes their opinion towards the attitude object. During the process 
of arriving at the response option selection, eye gaze was monitored by means of 
an eye tracker, with the scale items defined as the relevant Areas of Interest (AOI). 
From the eye gaze patterns for each of the attitude objects on each of the scales, 
the following measures were derived:
The primary intuitive response was operationalized as the location of the first 
fixation of the eyes on one of the AOIs (adopted from Horstmann et al., 2009).
Elaborateness of processing was operationalized as (a) the total number of fixations 
on the AOIs of the different scales (b) total dwell time (Velichkovsky, Rothert, Kopf, 
Dornhöfer, & Joos, 2002) and (c) the length of the eye gaze pattern (in terms of 
Euclidian distance1). 
Trade-offs were operationalized as (a) the number of transitions between AOIs, (b) 
the number of transitions between the positive and negative scale elements, (c) 
the number of unique AOIs fixated on, and (d) the number of transitions between 
affective and cognitive scale dimensions (for combined scale only).
Study 1
Method
Participants and design
In the first study the immediate activation of attitudes and how this influences 
subsequent cognitive and affective associations with these attitude objects is 
investigated. The study had a 3 (attitude scale: cognitive, affective, combined) x 3 
(univalent, neutral, ambivalent) full-factorial within-subject design. Every participant 
responded three times (affective, cognitive, combined scale) to 18 stimuli, so in total 
there were 54 trials per participant. Twenty-six undergraduates from Wageningen 
University participated in the study (six male, M
age 
= 21.50 years, 
1 Each frame was given a coordinate on both dimensions (1, 2, or 3) these simple coordinates were 
used as an approximation for the coordinate of a fixation and used to calculate saccade distance 
between two relevant fixations.
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SD
age 
= 1.92). Three participants were excluded because there were problems with 
eye movement registration or data transformation. Sometimes several answer 
options are clicked by respondents, these cases are removed (on average 0.52 out 
of 54 trials per person). Leaving 1230 cases for analysis (N = 23) with an average 
number of 53.48 trials per person (SD = 2.09).
Materials 
Stimulus material.  As attitude objects 18 stimuli were selected from previous 
research (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; de Liver, van der Pligt, & 
Wigboldus, 2007; Nohlen, van Harreveld, Rotteveel, Lelieveld, & Crone, 2013; 
Sawicki et al., 2013). These were either (1) univalent (butterfly, friend, summer, 
toothache, disease, violence), (2) neutral (storehouse, pliers, tile, lamp, transport, 
meeting), or (3) ambivalent (abortion, euthanasia, exam, television, operations, 
dentist). Attitude objects were presented as a picture (left side of the screen) 
accompanied with a word describing the picture (right side of the screen). 
A pen- and paper pilot study (N = 17), where affective and cognitive ambivalence 
were measured on 7-point scales (1 = ‘not at all’, 7 = ‘very much’), confirmed that 
univalent attitude objects scored lowest on cognitive (M
cog.ambi 
= 1.95, SE = 0.14) 
and affective ambivalence (M
 aff.ambi
= 1.91, SE = 0.13). Ambivalent attitude objects 
scored most ambivalent (M
cog.ambi 
= 2.68, SE = 0.14; M
 aff.ambi
= 3.13, SE = 0.13), with 
neutral attitude objects in-between (M
cog.ambi 
= 2.48, SE = 0.14; M
 aff.ambi
= 2.35, SE 
= 0.13), with neutral attitude objects not being rated as (significantly) lower than 
ambivalent attitude objects on cognitive ambivalence. 
Tasks. Participants were seated in a separate room in front of a 19 inch LCD 
monitor with a remote 60 Hz sampling eye-tracker system (RED of SMI, see: www.
smivision.com) at approximately 60 cm distance. The eye-tracker was set at a 30 
degree angle, allowing for free movement of the participant’s head in a 40 x 40 cm 
virtual box. Fixations were defined with a minimum of 80 ms (cf. Lamme, 2003). 
Stimulus material was offered to participants via the web-based Qualtrics survey 
tool, and loaded to the eye-tracker system via Experiment Center 3.0. IViewX 2.7 
was used to record eye movements. 
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Measures
Elaborateness of processing overall attitude judgement, affect and cognition; trade-
offs and primary responses were recorded as described under research approach.
Final attitude was measured as the ultimate response option that participants 
selected by mouse click as best fitting with the attitude object, both on the affective, 
cognitive and combined scales. 
Procedure
Before starting the actual task participants received an introduction to all three 
answer scales in which scale dimensions and the position of each cartoon (affect 
scale) or word (cognitive scale) were explained, followed by a training procedure to 
familiarize them with the scales. Before the training procedure participants received 
the following instructions: “You are asked what you think of certain attitude objects 
and how you feel towards these attitude objects. A training procedure follows to 
familiarize you with the scales which are different from what you are used to”. Then, 
the affect and cognition scale were explained to participants. For the affect scale 
it was explained that this scale is used to measure how someone feels towards 
the attitude object. For the cognitive scale it was explained that this scale is used 
to measure what someone thinks about the attitude object. For both scales the 
scale dimensions were explained. Subsequently the training procedure started. 
Participants had to search synonyms for the answer scale options to familiarize 
them with the location of each cartoon or word (32 synonym trials). After that, two 
practice trials per scale followed with an attitude object not used in the present 
research (gift, spider). Then, the combined scale was explained to the participant 
and five practice trials followed (firework, spider, rainbow, grave, cake).
After the training procedure eye-movements were calibrated by asking participants 
to follow a calibration point on screen (9-point calibration), before participants 
started with the actual task. In the actual task, each trial the attitude object was 
presented on screen for 4 seconds, followed by a screen with one of the three 
judgement scales located in the middle of the screen. No additional explanation 
for the judgement scale was given, as participants received a training procedure 
and were aware what was requested from them as soon as the judgement scale 
appeared. Participants first judged all 18 attitude objects using the combined scale 
(randomized order of attitude objects), followed by answering the affective and 
cognitive scale in which both the order of the attitude objects and the affective and 
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cognitive scales were randomized (another 36 trials). For each scale, participants 
responded with a mouse click, after which the next attitude object appeared on 
screen. From the moment the actual task started, eye movements were collected until 
participants completed all questions. There was no time constraint set on responses. 
After completion, participants were debriefed and received a monetary incentive 
of €3.50 for participating lasting 20-30 minutes. Before and during the debriefing 
participants were given the opportunity to comment on the study. 
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Table 3.1 
Overall attitude judgement: Number of observations, percentage of 
total observations, adjusted residuals 
 
Variable Study  Univalent Neutral Ambivalent 
First fixation on affect (chance = 
50%) 
1  83 
68.6% 
(4.4) 
44 
36.7% 
(-4.1) 
65 
50.8% 
(-0.4) 
2  84 
75.7% 
(4.1) 
33 
71.7% 
(1.6) 
39 
40.2% 
(-5.5) 
 3  85 
62% 
(3.3) 
24 
41.4% 
(-1.7) 
54 
43.9% 
(-2.1) 
      
First fixation predictive of overall 
attitude  
(chance = 6.25%) 
1  42 
31.6% 
(.1) 
41 
30.1% 
(-0.3) 
43 
31.9% 
(0.2) 
2  29 
24.4% 
(0.4) 
12 
23.5% 
(-0.3) 
25 
24.5% 
(-0.2) 
 3  40 
26.8% 
(1.4) 
17 
26.6% 
(0.7) 
22 
17.2% 
(-2.0) 
      
Overall attitude judgement based 
on affect  
(chance = 50%) 
1  94 
70.7% 
(7.9) 
27 
19.9% 
(-6.7) 
53 
39.3% 
(-1.1) 
 2  86 
72.3% 
(4.6) 
36 
66.8% 
(2.2) 
32 
18.8% 
(-6.5) 
 3  95 
63.8% 
(7.1) 
27 
42.2% 
(0.0) 
22 
17.2% 
(-7.3) 
 
Note. Only percentages for affect are given as the percentages for cognition can be derived from here. 
Adjusted residuals appear in parentheses bellow observed percentages. 
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Data analyses
Gaze patterns on the judgement scales were analysed. Analyses were done using 
SPSS 19. Prior to analysis, all variables were examined for accuracy of data entry 
(after data transformation), missing values, and distributions. Elaborateness of 
processing for univalent, neutral, and ambivalent attitude objects (attitude object 
category) was analysed using general linear mixed model analyses (multilevel). 
Attitude object category was included at the highest level. For each attitude category 
(univalent, neutral, ambivalent) multiple stimuli were assessed and included at the 
lowest level, with a random intercept (within-subject design). 
Elaborateness of processing for overall attitude, and the underlying measures of 
total dwell time, total number of fixations, and length of eye gaze pattern, were the 
dependent measures and the attitude object category the independent variable. 
Results are reported in table 3.2, as means per attitude object category. Between 
attitude object categories means were compared with the posthoc procedure within 
SPSS’ linear mixed model (pairwise comparison of estimated marginal means, LSD).
Trade-offs for the overall attitude, and the underlying measures as number of 
transitions between AOIs, number of transitions between the positive and negative 
scale elements, number of unique AOIs fixated on, and number of transitions 
between affective and cognitive scale dimensions were analysed in the same way. 
Results are reported in table 3.3, as means per attitude object category.
Analyses for elaborateness of processing for affect and cognition were carried out in 
a similar way as for the overall attitude. Results are reported in table 3.4, as means 
per attitude object category.
Results
Overall attitude judgement
Primary response. The extent to which the primary response was predictive for 
the overall attitude judgement expressed on the combined attitude scale was 
significantly higher (31.2%) than expected by chance (p
chance
=1/16=6.25%), χ2 (1) = 
179.12, p <.001, n = 404. There was no difference in the extent to which primary 
response was predictive across the attitude object categories χ2 (2) = 0.11, p =.95, 
n = 404. A χ2-analyses showed that the first fixation being affective or cognitive 
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differed across attitude object types, χ2 (2) = 24.73, p <.001, n = 369 (table 3.1; study 
1). Adjusted residuals show that this is caused by first fixations of univalent attitude 
objects being more often affective (adjusted residual = 4.4), whereas for neutral 
attitude objects they are more often cognitive (adjusted residual = -4.1). These 
results indicate that primary responses are equally predictive of univalent, neutral 
and ambivalent objects. Furthermore, affect is more relevant when expressing an 
overall attitude towards univalent attitude objects.
Elaborateness of processing. In terms of elaborateness of processing on the combined 
scale, overall attitude judgements towards univalent and neutral attitude objects 
require less elaborate processing compared with ambivalent attitude objects (table 
3.2; study 1). This is evidenced by a lower total number of fixations (M
univalent 
= 6.20, 
M
neutral 
= 5.89 vs. M
ambivalent 
= 9.22; F = 9.95, p <.001), and a lower total dwell time (M
univalent 
= 1888.59ms, M
neutral 
= 1611.78 ms vs. M
ambivalent 
= 2710.31ms; F = 9.35, p <.001) on the 
combined scale, but not by an increased length of eye gaze patterns, where the length 
of eye gaze pattern for neutral objects (M = 1.85) is lower than for both univalent (M 
= 2.91) and ambivalent (M = 3.51) attitude objects, F = 4.25, p = .0152.
Trade-offs. For overall attitude as expressed on the combined scale (table 3.3; study 
1), univalent and neutral attitude objects as compared with ambivalent attitude 
objects show fewer trade-offs. This is manifested in ambivalent attitude objects 
triggering more (a) transitions between AOIs (M
univalent 
= 3.58, M
neutral 
= 3.26 vs. 
M
ambivalent 
= 5.50; F = 7.15, p <.001), (b) transitions between the positive and negative 
scale elements (M
univalent 
= 1.51, M
neutral 
= 1.81 vs. M
ambivalent 
= 2.72; F = 6.67, p =.001), 
(c) uniquely inspected AOIs (M
univalent 
= 3.91, M
neutral 
= 3.62 vs. M
ambivalent 
= 4.87; F = 
5.86, p =.003), and d) larger number of transitions between affective and cognitive 
scale dimensions, for the combined scale (M
univalent 
= .58; M
neutral 
= .63, vs. M
ambivalent 
= 1.06; F = 6.52, p =.002)3. This confirms that ambivalent attitude objects are less 
consistent than neutral and univalent attitude objects and require a more elaborate 
attitude retrieval process.
2 Correlations between the different measures for the elaborateness of processing construct are 
between .72 and .92.
3 Correlations between the different measures for the trade-off construct lie between .78 and .86. 
Except for ‘transitions between affective and cognitive scale dimensions’ with the other trade-off 
measures, showing correlations of .48 and .50 with other measures. 
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Drivers of overall attitude. When participants had to express their overall attitude 
judgement on the combined scale based on both affective and cognitive answer 
options, the affective attitude is more predictive in the case of univalent attitude 
objects (70.7%), whereas the cognitive attitude is more predictive for neutral 
(80.1%) and ambivalent (60.7%) attitude objects, χ2 (2) = 72.04, p <.001, n = 404 
(table 3.1; study 1).
Cognitive and affective attitude judgements
Investigating the affective scale separately (table 3.4; study 1) confirms a similar 
pattern as discussed for the overall attitude judgement. Expressing an affective 
attitude towards univalent attitude objects requires a less elaborate attitude 
retrieval process as evidenced by (a) lower number of fixations (M
univalent 
= 4.76 vs. 
M
neutral 
= 6.43, M
ambivalent 
= 7.42; F = 15.22, p <.001), (b) lower total dwell time (M
univalent 
= 1537.67 vs. M
neutral 
= 2105.32, M
ambivalent 
= 2378.10; F = 10.57, p <.001), (c) shorter 
length of eye gaze pattern (M
univalent 
= 3.51 vs. M
neutral 
= 5.19, M
ambivalent 
= 6.15; F = 
12.91, p <.001), compared with neutral and ambivalent attitude objects. 
For the cognitive scale, however, a different pattern emerges (table 3.4; study 1). 
In this case, expressing an attitude towards neutral attitude objects requires a 
less elaborate attitude retrieval process compared with univalent and ambivalent 
attitude objects as evidenced by (a) lower number of fixations (M
neutral 
= 5.28 vs. 
M
univalent 
= 6.39; M
ambivalent 
= 7.42; F = 6.79, p =.001), (b) lower total dwell time (M
neutral 
= 1558.52 vs. M
univalent 
= 1882.17; M
ambivalent 
= 2173.22; F = 6.69, p =.001, (c) shorter 
length of eye gaze pattern (M
neutral 
= 4.18 vs. M
univalent 
= 5.22; M
ambivalent 
= 5.57; F = 3.52, 
p =.03), compared with neutral and ambivalent attitude objects.
Finally, comparing the elaborateness of affect versus cognition for the different type 
of attitude objects suggests that for univalent attitude objects expressing affect 
requires less elaborate processing than cognition, as evidenced by (a) lower number 
of fixations (F = 13.45, p <.001), (b) lower total dwell time (F = 4.23, p =.041), and (c) 
shorter length of eye gaze pattern (F = 14.42, p <.001). For neutral attitude objects 
expressing cognition requires less elaborate processing than affect, (F = 6.45, p 
=.012), (b) lower total fixation time (F = 10.73, p <.001), and (c) shorter length of 
eye gaze pattern (F = 4.73, p =.031). For ambivalent attitude objects there are no 
differences in the amount of elaboration between affect and cognition.
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Discussion
For overall attitude expressions less elaborate processing is observed for univalent 
(simple) and neutral (weak object-linkages) objects compared with ambivalent 
objects, suggesting higher motivation to solve perceived inconsistencies for the 
latter category of objects. In addition univalent and neutral objects resulted in fewer 
trade-offs. This implies that the extent to which people elaborate is dependent on 
underlying attribute-evaluations in particular whether strong, opposing attribute-
evaluations are present. A similar pattern is reflected by gaze patterns when 
participants are asked to rate their affective and cognitive attitude components 
in isolation. Participants are fast in creating affect towards univalent attitude 
objects, with little elaboration, compared with neutral and ambivalent attitude 
objects. People are fast in creating cognition towards neutral attitude objects, with 
little elaboration, compared with univalent and ambivalent attitude objects. For 
expressions of ambivalent attitudes affective and cognitive attitudes require an 
equally elaborate process. 
Affect is the dominant overall attitude judgement component for univalent attitude 
objects, whereas for neutral and ambivalent attitude objects cognition is dominant. 
For univalent and neutral objects after activation of the overall attitude, the 
dominant attitude component is also the most accessible in isolation (requiring least 
elaborate processing). Although, for ambivalent objects this picture is less clear.
Since the overall attitude is activated first, it is difficult to determine whether 
participants accessed the attitude component through their object-attribute 
associations or that the response on the attitude components was reconstructed 
from the recently activated overall attitude. To investigate this, in study 2, attitude 
components (cognitive and affective) are activated first which allows unbiased 
estimates of elaboration in each component, as well as the effect of activating 
attitude components leading up to overall attitudes. 
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Study 2
Method
Participants and design
Twenty five undergraduates from Wageningen University participated in the study 
(8 male, M
age 
= 20.96 years, SD
age 
= 2.11). Five participants were excluded because 
there were problems with eye movement registration or data transformation. 
Materials and procedure
As attitude objects, 16 stimuli were selected from previous research (similar to study 
1). These were either (1) univalent (puppy, chocolate, holidays, vomit, disaster, 
garbage), (2) neutral (nature, stone, water drop), or (3) ambivalent (needle, knife, 
medicine, fast food, money, alcohol, slot machine). A pen- and paper pilot study (N 
= 15) confirmed that univalent attitude scored lowest on ambivalence (M = .33; SD 
= .94). Ambivalent attitude objects scored most ambivalent (M = 3.2; SD = .86), with 
neutral attitude objects not significantly different from ambivalent attitude objects 
(M = 3.0; SD = 1.31). Just as in study 1 the participants judged the 16 attitude objects 
on all three scales (thus in total 48 trials). In this study all affective and cognitive 
scales were presented first, in randomized order (32 trials). And were followed by 
the combined scales (in randomized order; 16 trials). The remainder of the methods 
were identical to study 1. 
Data preparation and analysis
Analyses were done using SPSS 19, in the same way as study 1. After deleting the 
missing values and multiple click cases, one participant with more than 25% missing 
cases on all variables was excluded from analyses. 907 cases were included in the 
analysis (N = 19) with an average number of 46.32 trials per person (SD = 5.04).
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Results
Cognitive and affective attitude judgements
Expressing an affective attitude towards univalent attitude objects requires a less 
elaborate process (table 3.4; study 2) as evidenced by (a) lower number of fixations 
(M
univalent 
= 5.74 vs. M
neutral 
= 9.56, M
ambivalent 
= 9.45; F = 14.39, p <.001), (b) lower 
total dwell time (M
univalent 
= 1921.44 vs. M
neutral 
= 3549.21, M
ambivalent 
= 3170.21; F = 
14.28, p <.001), (c) shorter length of eye gaze pattern (M
univalent 
= 4.84 vs. M
neutral 
= 
7.17, M
ambivalent 
= 7.66; F = 8.02, p <.001), compared with neutral and ambivalent 
attitude objects. For the cognitive scale, however, a different pattern emerges. In 
this case, expressing an attitude towards neutral attitude objects on the cognitive 
scale requires a more elaborate process compared with univalent and ambivalent 
attitude objects as evidenced by (a) higher number of fixations (M
neutral 
= 11.97 vs. 
M
univalent 
= 8.72; M
ambivalent 
= 8.11; F = 8.29, p <.001), (b) higher total fixation duration 
(M
neutral 
= 3730.57 vs. M
univalent 
= 2612.51; M
ambivalent 
= 2456.97; F = 8.42, p <.001, (c) 
higher length of eye gaze pattern (M
neutral 
= 11.67 vs. M
univalent 
= 7.85; M
ambivalent 
= 6.98; 
F = 10.94, p <.001, compared with neutral and ambivalent attitude objects.
Comparing the elaborateness of affect versus cognition for the different attitude 
objects shows that for univalent attitude objects expressing affect requires less 
elaborate processing than cognition, as evidenced by (a) lower number of fixations 
(F = 20.20, p <.001), (b) lower total dwell time (F = 10.27, p =.002), and (c) shorter 
length of eye gaze pattern (F = 17.82, p <.001). For neutral attitude objects expressing 
affect requires less elaborate processing than cognition, as evidenced by marginally 
lower number of fixations (F = 3.23, p =.08), and shorter length of eye gaze pattern 
(F = 10.92, p <.001). For ambivalent attitude objects no differences in the amount of 
elaboration between affect and cognition were observed.
Overall attitude judgement
Primary response.   The extent to which the primary response was predictive 
of the overall attitude judgement expressed on the combined attitude scale was 
significantly higher (23.2%) than expected by chance (p
chance
=1/16=6.25), χ2 (1) = 
132.77, p <.001, n = 272. There was no difference in the extent to which primary 
response was predictive across the attitude object categories, on the χ2 (2) = 0.19, p 
=.91, n = 272. A χ2-analysis showed that the first fixation being affective or cognitive 
differed across attitude object types (χ2 (2) = 30.01, p <.001, n = 254). Adjusted 
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residuals show that this is caused by first fixations of univalent attitude objects 
being more often affective (adjusted residual = 4.1), whereas for ambivalent attitude 
objects more first fixations were on cognition (adjusted residual = -5.5). These 
results indicate that primary responses are equally predictive for univalent, neutral 
and ambivalent objects. Furthermore, affect is more salient when expressing an 
overall attitude towards univalent attitude objects.
Elaborateness of processing. Results (reported in table 3.2; study 2) show that 
in terms of elaborateness of processing, overall attitude judgements towards 
univalent and neutral attitude objects require less elaborate processing compared 
with ambivalent attitude objects. This is evidenced by (a) a lower total number of 
fixations (M
univalent 
= 4.95, M
neutral 
= 5.10 vs. M
ambivalent 
= 6.95; F = 4.93, p =.008), (b) a 
marginally lower total dwell time (M
univalent 
= 1552.69, M
neutral 
= 1714.27 vs. M
ambivalent 
= 2041.10; F = 2.93, p =.055), and (c) a shorter length of eye gaze patterns, (M
univalent 
= 1.89, M
neutral 
= 1.48 vs. M
ambivalent 
= 2.95; F = 3.68, p =.027)4.
Trade-offs. In terms of underlying affective and cognitive processing when 
the overall attitude was expressed (table 3.3; study 2), trade-offs for univalent and 
neutral attitude objects as compared with ambivalent attitude objects show fewer 
trade-offs. This is manifested in ambivalent attitude objects triggering more (a) 
transitions between AOIs (M
univalent 
= 2.38, M
neutral 
= 2.35 vs. M
ambivalent 
= 3.65; F = 4.21, 
p <.016), (b) transitions between the positive and negative scale elements (M
univalent 
= .99, M
neutral 
= 1.27 vs. M
ambivalent 
= 1.79; F = 3.89, p =.022), (c) uniquely inspected 
AOIs (M
univalent 
= 3.06, M
neutral 
= 2.82 vs. M
ambivalent 
= 3.85; F = 4.62, p =.011, and d) 
a larger number of transitions between affective and cognitive scale dimensions 
(M
univalent 
= .77; M
neutral 
= .82, vs. M
ambivalent 
= 1.22; F = 2.54, p =.08)5. This confirms that 
ambivalent attitude objects are less consistent than neutral and univalent attitude 
objects and require a more elaborate process of attitude expression.
Drivers of overall attitude.  When participants had to form their overall 
attitude judgement based on both affective and cognitive answer options, the 
affective attitude is more important for univalent (72.3%) and neutral (66.8%) 
4 Correlations between constructs lie between .85 and .95.
5 Correlations between constructs lie between .85 and .87. 
Except for ‘transitions between affective and cognitive scale dimensions’ with the other trade-off 
measures, showing correlations of .28, .29 and .33 with other constructs. 
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attitude objects, whereas the cognitive attitude is more important for ambivalent 
(81.2%) attitude objects, χ2 (2) = 67.64, p <.001, n = 272.
Discussion
Using a different order of expression of attitude components, study 2 confirms 
most of the results from study 1. Attitude expression involving neutral attitude 
objects was however notably different from study 1. Cognitive attitudes for neutral 
attitude objects require more elaborate processing and the cognitive attitude 
component is less frequently dominant in overall attitudes. This suggests that for 
neutral attitude objects expressing cognitive – affective components before overall 
attitude may result in a different activated associative structure than expressing 
overall attitude first. For both univalent and ambivalent objects, on the other hand, 
a similar associative structure is activated regardless of order of expression. For 
neutral attitude objects with no strong object-evaluation linkages, it seems that 
the salience of activated information varies depending on the context, sometimes 
strongly linked with affect and sometimes more cognitive from nature. Neutral 
attitude objects combine features from memory-based processing and on the spot 
processing.
The discrepancy between the two studies could be due to the different stimulus sets 
used for neutral attitude objects. On face value, it might be argued that the neutral 
attitude objects are more cognitively based in study 1, and more affectively based 
in study 2. Additional analyses on the neutral attitude object in study 2, which was 
rated more cognitive in the pilot study than any of study 1, shows this is not the 
case. The attitude object stone, which was considered as most cognitive in the pilot 
study, and more cognitive than any of the neutral stimuli in study 1, was further 
explored. Results show that there is even extremer elaborate cognitive processing 
for total number of fixations (M = 12.32), total dwell time (M = 3910.70), length of 
the eye gaze pattern (M = 12.07). Thus, results also hold when looking at individual 
attitude objects, even if these are the most cognitively rated attitude objects and 
therefore the discrepancy in results between the two studies seems not to be due 
to the stimulus set. 
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Study 3
A confound in affective processing could be the presentation mode of the scales. 
The cognitive scale is presented in written format whereas the affective scale is 
presented pictorially. A pictorial presentation could be more arousing than written 
words, or alternatively, different mental coding schemes could be used caused by 
the representation as words or images (see e.g. Hogarth, 2002; Johnson, Paivio, & 
Clark, 1996; Kim & Lennon, 2008). As a result, pictorial presentation could trigger 
a more fluent affective processing. To exclude that the effect found for affective 
processing is due to the pictorial operationalization of affect, in study 3 the affective 
cartoons were replaced by corresponding words. Otherwise, the study was identical 
to study 2. 
Twenty nine undergraduates from Wageningen University participated in the 
study (10 male, M
age 
= 22.13 years, SD
age 
= 5.72). Six participants were excluded 
because there were problems with eye movement registration or problems with 
data transformation. After deleting missing values and multiple click cases, one 
participant with more than 25% missing cases on all variables was excluded from 
analyses, leaving 1045 cases for analysis (N = 22) with an average number of 47.50 
trials per person (SD = 2.35). 
Results and discussion
First fixation on affect, final choice on affect and predictiveness of first fixation 
for final choice showed a similar pattern as in study 2, although less pronounced 
(table 3.1; study 3). For elaborateness of processing a similar pattern across the 
attitude object categories was found as in study 2, for total number of fixations on 
the affective scale F (2,328) = 17.78, p <.001, for total dwell time, F (2,328) = 21.46, 
p < .001, and length of eye gaze pattern, (2,328) = 21.45, p <.001. It should be noted 
that the pattern for cognition measured with the same scale as in study 2, showed 
a similar pattern but with less pronounced differences between types of attitude 
object compared with study 2 (table 3.4; study 3). For overall attitude measured 
on the combined scale (tables 3.2 and 3.3; study 3) similar results were found as 
in study 2, with univalent and neutral attitude objects requiring less elaborate 
processing than ambivalent attitude objects. Although the effects in study 3 are 
less pronounced than in study 2, the patterns are similar. Hence, it is concluded that 
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preference for affective processing cannot be attributed to the presentation mode 
of the affective scale (word vs. picture).
General discussion
Despite an abundance of research on attitudes as an outcome measure, the 
underlying processes leading to attitude expression require more attention. The 
present research meets the call for research into better understanding of underlying 
processes (for instance Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2011), and adds to a growing 
research stream on primary responses and intuitive processes in judgement and 
decision making (Topolinski, 2011; Topolinski & Strack, 2009). In three studies the 
extent to which the primary response is predictive for the overall attitude, the 
extent to which elaboration on underlying attribute-evaluations differs and the 
extent to which opposing attribute-evaluations are used was explored for three 
types of attitude objects: univalent, neutral and ambivalent. Using a specifically 
developed eye-tracking based research approach, eye gaze patterns on the response 
scales during attitude expression provided additional information on the underlying 
affective and cognitive processes. This concords with an emerging stream of research 
claiming that eye-tracking research is a useful addition to the toolbox for investigating 
the commonalties between intuitive and deliberative processes in decision making, 
using process data (Glöckner & Herbold, 2008; Horstmann et al., 2009).
Eye-tracking was used to study how attitude expression differs between different 
types of attitude objects. In all three studies it is shown that in making overall attitude 
judgements less elaborate processing is required for univalent and neutral objects 
compared with ambivalent objects. Furthermore, it is shown that if attitudinal 
bases are assessed prior to the overall attitude, the attitude component that 
required least elaboration is more dominant in the overall attitude for all attitude 
object categories. In terms of affective processing it is observed that neutral objects 
behave like ambivalent attitude objects, both requiring a more elaborate process 
independent of whether attitudinal bases were assessed prior to the overall attitude, 
or the other way around. However, cognitive processing for neutral attitude objects 
was found to differ when attitude components were expressed first vs. the overall 
attitude first. Expressing the cognitive attitude for neutral attitude objects required 
least elaborate processing when the overall attitude was expressed first. 
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In study 2, where overall attitudes were expressed after the cognitive and affective 
attitude expressions, neutral attitude objects required most elaborate processing. 
Study 3 replicated these patterns albeit less pronounced, which may be because 
of variation between the samples. Future research should shed further light on 
such differences in order to establish robustness of these findings. Nevertheless 
these findings suggest that for neutral attitude objects cognitive attitudes are 
constructed rather than retrieved even for well-known objects. For both univalent 
and ambivalent objects a similar associative structure is activated regardless of 
whether attitudinal bases or overall attitudes were assessed first. 
The results suggest that for strong attitude objects, such as univalent attitude objects, 
attitude expression always goes smoothly, with limited need to elaborate. For 
strong but mixed object-evaluations attitude expression requires more elaboration 
and typically in the domain of cognitive attribute-evaluation processing. This is in 
line with studies on ambivalence showing that the reduction of ambivalence over 
time is often the result of an effortful cognitive process (Jonas, Broemer, & Diehl, 
2000; van Harreveld et al., 2009). For neutral attitude objects with inconsistent, 
but weak object-associations and evaluations, the results are mixed. As in the 
absence of a strong automatic attitude an attitude needs to be created, cognition is 
most indicative for an evaluation and initially dominant in determining the overall 
attitude. Reconstruction of the cognitive component subsequently requires less 
effort (study 1). However, when both cognition and affective attitude components 
are expressed prior to the overall attitude (study 2 & 3), affect is expressed faster. 
In that case, affect, the component requiring least elaborate processing is the 
dominant component in the subsequent overall attitude. 
In order to investigate elaborations and trade-offs as well as primary affect, a new 
eye-tracking procedure was developed with affective and cognitive scales, suitable 
for an eye-tracking approach. For the cognitive scale cognitive words were used which 
were arranged on a positive/negative and hedonic/utilitarian dimensions. Besides 
a two-dimensional scale for cognition a two-dimensional affect scale was used. The 
affect scale consisted of positive/negative and high/low arousal dimensions. The 
affective pictures (study 1 & 2) that were used show emotional gestures. Pictures 
may relate to a different evaluation mode and therefore might be more specific 
and arousing than the cognitive words that were used for the cognitive scale. 
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In study 3 it is shown that affective processing is not different when the affective 
scale is operationalized with words, thus that the difference between cartoons 
and words is no alternative explanation for these findings. When operationalizing 
affect with emotion gestures and equivalent words the differences between affect 
and emotion need to be considered. The affective component of attitude is often 
used as an umbrella term covering primary affect, feelings, and emotions (Edwards, 
1990). At the same time, emotion and affect are seen as different constructs (Eagly 
& Chaiken, 1993), where affect is a relatively straightforward positive or negative 
feeling while emotions are considered more developed than affect and contain 
cognitive appraisals (Clore & Schnall, 2005). In the presents research a measure 
was needed that could record both primary affect and more developed affective 
judgement. Primary affect as used in the study, also called “gut feeling”, fits with 
what Russell (2003) labels “core affect”. Core affect can be consciously experienced, 
but is not cognitive or reflective. Affective judgement fits with what Russell (2003) 
labels “attributed affect”. Attributed affect covers many topics such as affective 
reactions, liking, displeasure motives, and empathy. Attributed affect like emotions 
include some cognitive appraisals, albeit less specific than fully-fledged discrete 
emotions. Emotional pictures can easily be interpreted (Desmet, 2003) and allow 
registration of both core and attributed affect. Nevertheless by imposing emotional 
gestures this may have introduced additional complexity to the research approach. 
It should be noted that cognitive evaluations like ‘useful’ also introduce higher 
order contexts, and that this is not unique to affective components. The exact level 
at which affective and cognitive scales need to be constructed, to be both accurate 
measures and able to pick up primary and more elaborate responses should be 
investigated further. 
Many scholars emphasize the importance of primary responses in decision making 
(see Edwards, 1990; Glöckner & Witteman, 2010a, 2010b; Mikels, Maglio, Reed, & 
Kaplowitz, 2011). In the present research it was shown that the primary response 
predicts overall attitudes at a level above chance. However, it was also shown that 
in most cases the primary response is revised during a process of more elaborate 
processing preceding the expression of final overall attitude judgement. The 
predictiveness of the primary response for overall attitude judgement does not 
differ across univalent, neutral or ambivalent attitude objects. This may indicate 
that no clear differences in predictiveness of the primary response exist between 
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attitude objects. More answer options are considered while expressing judgements 
for all types of attitude objects regardless of whether these are simple univalent 
or complex neutral or ambivalent objects. Alternatively, the current measure for 
primary response may need improvement as it is possible that participants needed 
more fixations to localize the exact position of their preferred answer option. Future 
research using eye tracker data on scoring scales should take these considerations 
into account in further refining the method. 
A possible limitation is that presentation of the combined judgement scales was 
not counterbalanced. The affective part of the overall attitude scale was always 
presented on the left side of the screen. Hence, response options were not controlled 
for people’s tendencies to look left or right which may favour first fixations to be on 
the left part of the scale (affect), based on reading order. Another limitation is that 
there were no masks provided before the scales appeared on screen. It should be 
noted that first fixations were operationalized as first fixations on the scales. This 
was done to avoid methodological artefacts that come along with first fixations on 
the screen (instead of the scale), which are determined by a variety of low level 
factors (Horstmann et al., 2009; Tatler, 2007). By taking into account the first fixation 
on the scale and not the first fixation on the screen, at least some of the bias of not 
presenting a mask could be overcome. There was no predisposition to first focus 
on the left-positioned affective scale, as about half of all first fixations were on the 
affective part of the overall attitude scale, and the other half on the cognitive part. 
In addition, there were no predispositions to only take into account the middle of 
the screen as about half of all first fixations were in the middle of the screen, and 
the other half of fixations on the outer parts of the overall attitude scale. It thus 
seems that although the scale was not counterbalanced and no mask was provided, 
the first fixations on the scale are not biased. Additional evidence to this is that it is 
shown that for ambivalent attitude objects cognition is more important, and there 
is a difference in cognitive processing for neutral attitude objects across the studies. 
Nevertheless for future development of this new approach systematic investigation 
of such effects would be welcomed. 
The present research approach raises an interesting direction for future research. 
While attitude expression towards familiar attitude objects, with existing associations 
and knowledge structures, was measured, attitudes towards unfamiliar objects 
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are non-existent (Fazio, 2007; Fazio et al., 2004; Zajonc, 1980). Measuring attitude 
expression of non-attitudes in similar fashion as the current study may help shed 
light in how attitude formation towards unfamiliar attitude objects occurs.
The use of eye tracking to follow eye gaze patterns during scale completion provides 
valuable insights into elaborations people make when judging attitude objects. A 
first important finding is that for attitude objects with strong univalent or mixed 
object-evaluations order of attitude expression (overall attitude first vs. separate 
attitude components first) does not lead to different outcomes and underlying 
processes. For weak object-evaluations attitude expression processes differ 
however, depending on whether the attitude is constructed prior to the overall 
attitude or after the overall attitude is constructed. A second important finding 
is that both affective and cognitive attitude may require substantial elaboration, 
albeit differently for different attitude objects. This shows that people unobstructed 
in their attitude expression process will sometimes think through all alternatives in 
order to form attitude judgements, but for some objects may actually need to “feel 
through” their affect as well.
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Attitude formation towards 
unfamiliar attitude objects
This chapter is submitted for publication as: Giesen, R.I. van, 
Fischer, A.R.H. & Trijp, J.C.M. van. Attitude formation towards 
unfamiliar attitude objects.
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Abstract
Attitude formation when people lack knowledge about the attitude object 
is an under researched area in attitude research. In this chapter, the role 
of affect and cognition in attitude formation towards such objects where 
individuals lack knowledge was studied in three ways applying this to 
familiar and unfamiliar technologies. In study 1 technology descriptions 
were provided without context, in study 2 these technology descriptions 
were placed in a product context addressing the benefit of the technology. 
In study 3 underlying affective and cognitive processes on the products from 
study 2 were studied by means of eye-tracking. It is shown that for a familiar 
technology attribute, which fits existing knowledge structures, both affect 
and cognition support attitude formation. For unfamiliar attributes attitude 
formation is context dependent. If the context provides cues the unfamiliar 
attribute is ignored and people rely on affect; if not people need to cognitively 
solve the incongruency. The component that is decisive in expressing overall 
attitudes (affect or cognition), later on requires less processing. People thus 
choose the attitude path of least resistance, and rely on affect or cognition 
depending on how easily it leads to attitude construction. 
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Attitude formation towards unfamiliar attitude objects
In daily life we perceive all sorts of attitude objects, which we can often evaluate on 
the basis of previous experiences. Sometimes we encounter a new and unfamiliar 
attitude object where we do not have previous experience with, for instance, a 
nanotechnology application. Still, people are able to form an attitude towards 
such an attitude object. Attitudes are evaluations people have about attitude 
objects, which can be positive or negative and help people to make sense of their 
environment (Eagly & Chaiken 1993, Fazio, 2007). Attitudes are often based on 
earlier experiences, however if earlier experiences are not available people still 
can construct an attitude (Schwarz, 2007), for example, by relying on retrieved 
associations related to the unfamiliar attitude object. In this chapter it is investigated 
how people construct attitudes, based on underlying affect and cognition when 
existing knowledge structures fall short. More specifically, the extent to which 
affective and cognitive processes differ in terms of predictivity for the overall 
attitude and the amount of elaboration necessary to form the affect and cognition 
will be investigated. This is done by comparing unfamiliar and familiar attributes 
(technologies) without and within a product context.
In terms of structure, attitudes represent summary evaluations and can be viewed 
as “associations in memory between a given object and one’s evaluation of that 
object” (Ajzen, 2001; Fazio, 2007). An attitude-object can in itself be viewed as a 
collection of object-associated attributes from which people derive utility (Lancaster, 
1966). Attitudes have a layered structure, consisting of multiple object-associated 
attributes, attribute-evaluations, and object-evaluation linkages (van Overwalle & 
Siebler, 2005). At the higher-order level, attitude objects represent a collection of 
integrated attribute-evaluations that are summarized in an overall attitude towards 
the object. At the lower-order level, attitude objects represent separate evaluations 
of all attributes related to the attitude-object (Ajzen, 2001). 
Expressing evaluations requires knowledge about the attitude object as a point 
of reference for evaluation. Individuals’ knowledge structures are organized in 
categories, represented by schemata in the brain (Pavelchak, 1989). Schemata 
are like databases of stored, related information, that are used to interpret new 
experiences. Schemata are built up in the course of interaction with a product, 
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as small units of information combine to make more meaningful complexes of 
information (Mandler, 1982). Schemata cover both lower-order level attributes 
as well as more general categories related to the attitude object, from where 
evaluations are derived.
Evaluations can be based in affective responses, cognitive beliefs, one’s past 
behaviour and experience with the object, or a combination of all of these (Fazio, 
2007). To understand attitudes in full it is important to distinguish between those 
evaluation linkages which draw on cognitive and those which draw on affective 
knowledge structures (Chaiken et al., 1999). Several theorists emphasize that 
attitudes find their base in object-attribute affect linkages (including feeling and 
emotions) and object-attribute cognition linkages (including beliefs and thoughts) 
(Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Chang & Pham, 2013; Crites et al., 1994; Verplanken 
et al., 1998). These linkages can be summarized in affective and cognitive attitude 
components of the overall attitude (Edwards, 1990; Giner-Sorolla, 2004). Depending 
on the familiarity of the attribute or attitude object an attitude will be based more 
in affect than cognition, or the other way around. In this study the affective and 
cognitive processes that follow mental categorization of attitude objects are studied. 
Attitude formation is relatively straightforward when it concerns familiar attitude 
objects with familiar attributes. Individuals can then easily infer self-relevant 
benefits from the familiar attribute constellation of the attitude object (for instance, 
in the present research the benefit of having a specific technology within a product). 
These constellations are available due to repeated exposure and experience with 
the attitude object (Fazio, 2001; van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005). When perceiving 
the attitude object, these constellations are easily activated from memory, together 
with the associated knowledge structure, producing an overall positive or negative 
attitude (Ajzen, 2001). Any attitude object which fits with the existing schema is 
considered as a variation on a familiar object, and the stage is set for a fast and easy 
evaluation, which will often be based on affect (Fiske et al., 1987; Mandler, 1982). 
When the attitude object is unfamiliar or when it contains attributes that the 
consumers find unfamiliar, attitude formation becomes more challenging. In this 
case there can be no close fit between the existing schema or category and the 
attribute that needs to be incorporated. Hence, the attitude object will consist of 
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an unfamiliar attribute constellation which does not link to existing knowledge 
structures. As a consequence, no relevant representations are available in memory 
as evaluation-linkages are not established yet. In this case individuals lack a priori 
evaluative associations (Fazio, 2007), and evaluations towards the attitude object 
need to be constructed right away (Schwarz, 2007). People can do this by fitting 
the unfamiliar attributes of the unfamilar attitude object within the knowledge 
structure of a largely familiar attitude object (Peracchio & Tybout, 1996). While 
trying to incorporate the unfamiliar attribute, the existing knowledge structure 
needs to be adjusted (Mandler, 1982). The evaluation that follows is then based 
on resemblance to a schema for which one already has attitudes represented in 
memory (e.g. Duckworth et al., 2002; Fazio et al., 1995). After a while, when people 
become more familiar with the unfamiliar attitude object, the newly established 
object-attribute-evaluation linkages can evolve to strong object-evaluation linkages 
that can immediately be retrieved from memory (van Overwalle & Siebler, 2005). 
For instance, when presenting an unfamiliar attribute (e.g. nano-enhanced) to a 
well-known object (phone), the attribute-evaluation linkage does not exist or is 
weak, and is not part of the schema. Understanding of the unfamiliar attribute-
evaluation then becomes important as a precursor to the attribute-object connection 
(nano-enhanced phone). The specific unfamiliar attribute-evaluation linkage will 
determine whether incorporation is successful. If unsuccessful, then frustration 
will be experienced, and cognition needs to take over to fit the unfamiliar attribute 
constellation in existing schemas. More mental effort is likely to be required as 
the individual may deliberate extensively about the specific attributes and the 
favourability of the attribute constellations in a piecemeal approach (e.g. Mandler, 
1982; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990). 
Existing schemata can be adjusted in both affective and cognitive ways. If adjustment 
is based on affect, than feelings are used as information inputs in the judgement 
(Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). In addition, the unfamiliar attribute can be integrated 
in the knowledge structure on the basis of repeated stimulus exposure which leads 
to increased liking of the unfamiliar instance on the basis of affect (mere exposure) 
(Zajonc, 1980). Affective responses do not necessarily require conscious elaboration 
and can therefore be created more quickly (Bornstein, 1989; Hansen & Wänke, 
2009; Zajonc, 1980). For people it is therefore usually easier to access the broader 
86 | Chapter 4
range of affective feelings than to access their cognitive beliefs (Clore & Huntsinger, 
2007; Clore & Schnall, 2005). On the other hand, schemata can also be updated on 
the basis of cognitive inferences. Cognitive connections can, for instance, be derived 
from imagined experience with the attitude object or attribute, or from analogical 
reasoning (Cohen & Reed II, 2006). It can be expected that there are differences 
in reliance on affect and cognition between somewhat unfamiliar and completely 
unknown attributes, as for somewhat unfamiliar attributes at least some exposure 
has occurred and some, possibly weak, associations have been built up.
The present research investigates how consumers form overall attitudes towards 
attitude objects based on underlying affective and cognitive structures, when 
they are confronted with a novel version of a well known attitude object. More 
specifically, the attribute combination is unfamiliar, which makes the novel 
combination incongruent with their existing schema. A distinction is made between 
attitude objects with familiar attributes added, largely unfamiliar attributes added, 
and completely unfamiliar attributes added. Attitude objects with familiar attributes 
added are largely congruent with existing knowledge structures and schema (i.e. 
conventional technology). Attitude objects with largely unfamiliar attributes added 
are incongruent to individuals’ existing knowledge structure and schema (i.e. 
nanotechnology). Attitude objects with completely unfamiliar attributes added 
are incongruent to any schema or knowledge structure (i.e. unrealistic unfamiliar 
technology). 
In study 1 affective and cognitive information processing are explored, at the level 
of attribute evaluations in isolation (i.e. the technology), without any reference to 
the benefits they will deliver. Thus, no context or relation to a specific product is 
given. In study 2 a context is provided, (by including a benefit of the technology 
relating this to a relevant product schema), in order to explore whether the link 
to existing object knowledge and the support of attribute-evaluation linkages 
affects information processing in attitude formation. In the second study, two 
additional important reference points are therefore made available to participants 
in order to foster attitude formation. In the third study, the underlying mechanisms 
were explored, taking a process approach using eye-tracking. This is in line with 
research using eye-tracking to provide deeper insights into underlying processes 
of judgement and decision making (Glöckner & Witteman, 2010b; Payne, 2010). 
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The attitude formation process was monitored during attitude response formation 
from eye gaze patterns on a response scale. Eye gazes allow for tracking response 
speed (total fixation time on the scale units) in conjunction with the identification 
of deliberation processes both within and between the affective and cognitive 
attribute-evaluation linkages (switches in eye fixations between areas of interest).
Study 1: Attribute in isolation
In the first study, the attributes in isolation (i.e. the technology) are investigated 
without any reference to the benefits they will deliver. Nanotechnology, an existing 
yet little known technology, was used comparing this to a familiar conventional 
variant. Nanotechnology provides a good research context to operationalize 
unfamiliar realistic attitude objects, as at the time of the study, people had limited 
knowledge about nanotechnology and its applications (Stijnen et al., 2011). 
Nanotechnology is about the manipulation of materials at the smallest possible 
physical levels (molecular or atomic levels), and enables the creation of a large range 
of new products and the improvement of existing products (Borisenko & Ossicini, 
2012). An unrealistic unfamiliar (non-existing) technology was added as a true novel 
condition. Attribute descriptions were presented without context and without 
relation to any product. For instance, for the attribute description active ingredient, 
“yeast extract” was used as conventional technology description; “nano-grinding” 
as nanotechnology description, and “ethylene ripening” as unrealistic unfamiliar 
technology description.
Method
Participants and design 
The study had a 3 (technology: conventional technology, nanotechnology, 
unrealistic unfamiliar technology) x 4 (attribute description: active ingredient, 
packaging technology, coating, fibres) incomplete design. Participants always rated 
three attributes, one from each technology selected in such a way they always 
rated three different technology attribute-description combinations (see table 4.1 
for the assignment of attributes to the conditions). A total of 137 students from 
Wageningen University participated in the study (40 male, M
age 
= 20.84 years, SD
age 
= 2.95). One (non-Dutch) participant was removed before data analyses because of 
insufficient understanding of Dutch language.
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Materials
Stimulus material.  Participants judged attribute descriptions of conventional, 
nano, or unrealistic unfamiliar technology. A pilot study with students from 
Wageningen University (N = 39; 16 males, M
age 
= 21.10, SD = 1.89) was conducted 
in which different attribute descriptions were assessed on familiarity, realism, 
fear, positivity, credibility and comprehensibility. Each respondent judged several 
attribute descriptions, without knowing the product context or additional attribute 
benefit. For all of the attribute descriptions the conventional technology was 
perceived as most familiar, and the nanotechnology and the unrealistic unfamiliar 
technology were significantly less familiar. 
Measures1
Affective attitude. The affective attitude component was measured with an 
affective semantic differential scale using four item pairs on a seven-point scale 
(‘satisfaction/fear’, ‘sadness/desire’, ‘boredom/joy’, ‘disgust/fascination’) (based 
on Crites et al., 1994). Items were averaged to form a qualified reliable affective 
attitude scale (α = .80).
Cognitive attitude. The cognitive attitude component was measured with 
a cognitive semantic differential scale using five item pairs on a seven-point 
scale (‘necessary/nice’, ‘useful/useless’, ‘disadvantageous/functional’, ‘harmful/
beneficial’) (based on Crites et al., 1994). Items were averaged to form a qualified 
reliable cognitive attitude scale (α = .67). 
Overall attitude. Overall attitude was measured with two items on a seven-
point scale: ‘My overall attitude towards the technology-attribute is…’, (1 = ‘very 
negative’ and 7 = ‘very positive’), and ‘Do you like the technology-attribute?’ (1 
= ‘not at all’ and 7 = ‘very much’) (based on Crites et al., 1994). Items were then 
averaged to form a qualified reliable attitude scale (α = .83). 
Familiarity. Familiarity with the attribute was measured as: ‘To what extent 
have you heard of this attribute?’, on a 7-point scale (1 = ‘not at all’ and 7 = ‘a lot’). 
1 In the present chapter, affective, cognitive and overall attitudes were measured in a different way 
than chapter 2. Overall reliabilities are comparable to the measures used in Chapter 2. 
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Procedure 
The experiment was programmed in Qualtrics. An online survey link to the study was 
distributed to students of Wageningen University via email. In addition, participants 
were asked in person to participate in the study in a computer room on campus. 
Participants were told that they would judge different attribute descriptions of 
technological innovations. In total, participants judged three different attribute 
descriptions (one for each technology type), and were randomly assigned to one 
of four conditions. Attribute descriptions were shown for 5 seconds, after which 
participants reported their affective, cognitive and overall attitude and familiarity 
with the attribute. The order of affective, cognitive, and overall attitude scales was 
randomized. This process was also repeated for all three attribute descriptions in 
random order. At the end of the questionnaire some demographic information was 
assessed. Participants were given the opportunity to comment on the study and 
could participate in a lottery to win one of five gift vouchers of €25. One week 
later, participants were debriefed by e-mail. In debriefing, it was told that most of 
the technologies were unrealistic or still under development and therefore non-
existent at this time.
Data analysis
To assess the impact of affect, cognition, and technology on overall attitude, 
attitude scores were subjected to a repeated-measures mixed linear model using 
SPSS 19. Mixed linear models can deal with incomplete repeated measure designs 
(respondents rated three out of twelve attribute descriptions). Attribute description 
was entered as a repeated variable in the model. Scores on the continuous 
independent variables (affective and cognitive attitude) were mean centred. The 
variance-covariance matrix was set at a simple structure. A model was estimated 
with all main effects (affect, cognition, technology, attribute description), and the 
two-way interactions of interest (affect and technology, cognition and technology, 
attribute description and affect, attribute description and cognition). Unstandardized 
regression coefficients are reported in the results.
Results 
Participants were more familiar with conventional technology attributes (M = 3.08) 
than nanotechnology (M = 2.10) and unrealistic unfamiliar technology attributes (M 
= 1.87), F (1, 405) = 20.95, p < .001. Both affect and cognition had a positive main 
effect on overall attitude, F
affect 
(1, 389) = 148.21, p < .001, b=0.48; F
cognition 
(1, 389) 
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= 106.94, p < .001, b=0.77. Technology had no main effect on overall attitude, F (1, 
389) = .09, p = .92. Attribute description showed a main effect on overall attitude F 
(1, 389) = 2.92, p = .03.
The interaction between technology and affect did not have an effect on overall 
attitude, F (1, 389) = .75, p = .48. The interaction between technology and cognition 
had an effect on overall attitude, F (1, 389) = 3.74, p = .03, showing that cognition has 
a higher association with overall attitude towards unrealistic unfamiliar technology 
compared with familiar technology. In addition there was an interaction effect 
between attribute description and affect on overall attitude, F (1, 389) = 5.07, p = 
.002, and between attribute description and cognition on overall attitude, F (1, 389) 
= 4.71, p = .003. The unstandardized regression coefficients for affect and cognition 
for the different technologies are reported in table 4.2, corrected for attribute 
description. For unrealistic unfamiliar technology, there is a relatively strong 
association between cognition and overall attitude compared with conventional 
technology and nanotechnology. In conclusion, there is a relatively stronger 
association between cognition and overall attitude, instead of affect, for unrealistic 
unfamiliar attitude objects. However, for conventional and nanotechnolgoy there 
are similarly strong associations between cognition and overall attitude, and affect 
and overall attitude.
ATTITUDES (UN)FAMILIAR ATTITUDE OBJECTS 12
 
 
Table 4.2 
Regression coefficients for familiar and unfamiliar technology 
descriptions 
 
Variable 
Study 1 Study 2 
Affect Cognition Affect Cognition 
Conventional .63 .42 .58 .55 
Nanotechnology .63 .43 .25 .76 
Non-existing .49 .76 .69 .45 
 
Note. Non-existing refers to unrealistic unfamiliar technology. 
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Discussion
When a technology attribute is completely unfamiliar (unrealistic unfamiliar) and no 
product context is provided, cognition is more predictive than affect for the overall 
attitude. Nanotechnology parallels conventional technology in overall attitudes, 
being relatively more based on affect. It seems that when people need to make 
sense of non-existing technological attributes they do this in a cognitive manner. 
Also, it seems that people are familiar enough with nanotechnology attributes to 
construct their attitudes more on affect similar to conventional technologies. 
In practice, technology is always part of a product. Therefore in study 2 the same 
attributes as in study 1 are studied in a product context. Adding a new attribute to 
an existing attitude object (e.g. product), should change the evaluation towards the 
product as this addition brings new attribute beliefs and evaluations into play (e.g. 
following Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
Study 2: Attributes in a realistic product context
In this study the attribute is investigated within a product context. When the 
attribute is placed in a familiar product context, consumers perceive a combination 
of various product characteristics and various technology characteristics. Some of 
these characteristics might be evaluated in a more affective or a more cognitive 
way. When keeping the product context constant, any differences in affective and 
cognitive processing between products can only be assigned to the differential 
influence of the technology attribute. To ensure internal validity the benefit of each 
technology was the same across conditions. For instance, an attribute added to 
yogurt was presented as a flavour enhancer and a benefit. This was the same both 
for a familiar technology based flavour enhancer and a flavour enhancer based on 
nanotechnology. 
Method
Participants and design 
The study had an incomplete 3 (technology: conventional technology, 
nanotechnology, unrealistic unfamiliar technology) x 4 (product type: yogurt, bread, 
window, phone) design; where, similar to study 1, all participants rated different 
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product types for each technology. A total of 140 students from Wageningen 
University participated in the study (57 male, M
age 
= 21.28 years, SD
age 
= 2.66). 
Materials and procedure
Attitude objects were advertisements for: yogurt with a (new) flavour enhancer, 
bread with (new) packaging technology, a window with (new) coating technology, 
and a smartphone screen based on (new) fibre technology. Three versions of each 
advertisement were created reflecting the different attributes for conventional 
technology, nanotechnology, and unrealistic unfamiliar technology (as used in 
study 1). For instance, participants received the yogurt advertisement with one 
out of three different claims: a) contains flavour enhancers based on yeast extract 
for additional flavour, b) contains flavour enhancers based on nano-grinding for 
additional flavour, c) contains flavour enhancers based on ethylene ripening for 
additional flavour. All advertisements were specifically designed for the experiment 
and do not exist in the market (see table 4.1 and Appendix 4.1). 
A pilot study with students and employees from Wageningen University (N 
= 40; 19 males, M
age 
= 22.73, SD = 6.85) in which each participant judged three 
attributes in a product context on familiarity, realism, fear, positivity, credibility 
and comprehensibility, confirmed that the attributes displayed in a product 
advertisement context were equally realistic, credible, comprehensible, positive 
and non-fearful. The familiar technology attribute-description was considered 
as more familiar than the other technology attribute-descriptions. However, 
familiarity with the technologies was low overall. Therefore, the advertisements 
were slightly adjusted to make the familiar claim even more familiar (instead of a 
“new technology” claim, an “improved technology” claim was used).
The rest of the methods were identical to study 1. Scales had acceptable to good 
reliabilities (α
affect
 = .80; α
cognition
 = .75; α
overall
 = .87).
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Results 
In a product context participants were similarly familiar with conventional 
technology (M = 2.54), nanotechnology (M = 2.50) and unrealistic unfamiliar 
technology attributes (M = 2.23), F (1, 393) = 1.45, p =.24. Both affect and cognition 
had a positive main effect on overall attitude, F
affect 
(1, 371) = 69.43, p < .001, b=0.75; 
F
cognition 
(1, 371) = 105.26, p < .001, b=0.28. Technology had no main effect on overall 
attitude, F (1, 371) = .31, p = .74. Product type showed a main effect on overall 
attitude F (1, 371) = 4.11, p = .007.
The interaction between technology and affect on overall attitude was significant, 
F (1, 371) = 6.59, p = .011, showing that affect has a higher association with overall 
attitude towards unrealistic unfamiliar technology as compared with conventional 
technology. The interaction between technology and cognition had a marginally 
significant effect on overall attitude, F (1, 371) = 2.67, p = .07, suggesting that 
cognition has a higher association with overall attitude towards nanotechnology 
compared with unrealistic unfamiliar technology. There were no interaction effects 
between product type and affect or cognition on overall attitude, F
affect
 (1, 371) = .25, 
p = .86; F
cognition
 (1, 371) = 1.60, p = .19. Unstandardized regression coefficients for 
affect and cognition across technologies corrected for product type are reported in 
table 4.2. For unrealistic unfamiliar technology there is a relatively high association 
between affect and overall attitude, compared with conventional and nano-
technology. In table 4.2 it is also shown that for nanotechnology there is a relatively 
high association between cognition and overall attitude, compared with unrealistic 
unfamiliar and conventional technology, although this is only marginally significant. 
In conclusion, there is a relatively stronger association between affect and overall 
attitude for unrealistic unfamiliar attitude objects, whereas for nanotechnology a 
strong association between cognition and overall attitude was observed. 
Discussion
For conventional technology affect and cognition are comparably important in 
overall attitude expression in a product context, which resembles the evaluation 
of the technology attribute in study 1. When a technology is completely unfamiliar 
(unrealistic unfamiliar) and placed within a product context, affect is more predictive 
for the overall attitude. Between study 1 and study 2 the process apparently shifts 
from cognitive (without product context) to affective (within product context), 
Attitudes (un)familiar attitude objects | 95
4
possibly because affect associated with the product takes over in the lack of any 
knowledge. For nanotechnology, adding a product context, makes cognition more 
predictive for the overall attitude. The process apparently shifted from a more 
affective process when only attributes are provided (study 1), to a more cognitive 
process when attributes are provided in a product context (study 2). Expressing 
attitudes when an unfamiliar nanotechnology attribute is integrated into a well-
known product may thus be more difficult than expected, especially if it needs to 
be done without any additional information. 
Although finding which attitude component is more predictive for the overall 
attitude hints at shifts in underlying processes, further investigation of that process 
approach is needed for better understanding of the ease with which attitudes are 
constructed. In study 3 the focus is on the elaborateness of underlying affective and 
cognitive processes that determine whether people rely on affect or cognition. As 
in study 2, attributes within a product context are studied, but this time while using 
an eye-tracking approach. 
Study 3: Underlying processes
In the third study affective and cognitive processes were compared in terms of 
elaborateness on underlying attribute-evaluations for the products used in study 
2. Insight into the attitude formation process is derived from eye gaze analysis 
during attitude expression. In addition to study 1 and 2, it is investigated whether 
first reporting an overall attitude influences subsequent affective and cognitive 
processing, and, vice versa, whether first reporting affect and cognition influences 
how people answer when reporting an overall attitude. 
Method
Participants and design
The present study followed the procedure as described in Chapter 3. The study 
had a 3 within (technology: conventional technology, nanotechnology, unrealistic 
unfamiliar technology) x 3 between (attitude object: yogurt, bread, phone) 
incomplete block design; chosen in such a way that each participant received all 
three technologies applied to three different products similar to study 2. To present 
the attitude objects the same advertisements as in study 2 were used. Half of the 
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participants were instructed to report their overall attitude, after which affect and 
cognition were assessed (condition A in table 4.3, 4.4, 4.5). The other participants 
assessed affect and cognition prior to overall attitude (B in table 4.3, 4.4, 4.5). In 
total, ninety six undergraduates from Wageningen University participated in the 
study (33 male, M
age 
= 21.46 years, SD
age 
= 2.71); who recorded affect, cognition and 
overall attitude for three product technology combinations. Twelve participants 
were excluded because there were problems with eye movement registration 
or data transformation, leaving 84 participants with a total of 756 trials for data 
analysis.
Materials 
Tasks. Participants were seated in a separate room in front of a 19 inch LCD 
monitor with a remote 60 Hz sampling eye-tracker system (RED of SMI, see:www.
smivision.com) at approximately 60 cm distance. The eye-tracker was set at a 30 
degree angle, allowing for free movement of the participant’s head in a 40 x 40 cm 
virtual box. Fixations were defined as a stationary eye-gaze position of at least 80 
ms (cf. Lamme, 2003). Stimulus material was offered to participants via the web-
based Qualtrics survey tool, and loaded to the eye-tracker system via Experiment 
Center 3.0. IViewX 2.7 was used to record eye movements. 
Measures
Three response scales were specifically designed for this purpose (as described 
in Chapter 3): an affective judgement scale, a cognitive judgement scale and a 
combined scale comprising both the affective and cognitive answering options (see 
figure 4.1). Participants were asked to indicate, through a mouse click, the response 
option that best described their opinion towards the attitude object. During the 
process of response option selection, eye gaze was monitored by means of an eye-
tracker, with the scale items defined as the relevant Areas of Interest (AOI). From 
the eye gaze patterns for each of the attitude objects on each of the scales, the 
following measures were derived:
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Figure 4.1. Combined scale, with left part of the scale showing the emotions (clockwise starting in 
the top left corner): fear, joy, desire, fascination, satisfaction, boredom, sadness, disgust. Translations 
cognitions (clockwise starting in the top left corner): necessary, useful, functional, beneficial, nice, 
useless, harmful, disadvantageous. 
Affective scale and cognitive scale were also assessed separately. 
Note. Numbers on x and y- axes are an illustrative example, AOIs were approximately the size of the 
frames (112x116). 
Elaborateness of processing was operationalized as (a) the total number of fixations 
on the AOIs of the different scales (b) total dwell time (Velichkovsky et al., 2002) and 
(c) the length of the eye gaze pattern (in terms of Euclidian distance2). 
Trade-offs were operationalized as (a) the number of transitions between AOIs, and 
(b) the number of unique AOIs fixated on.
Final attitude was measured as the response option that participants selected by 
mouse click as best fitting with the attitude object, both on the affective, cognitive 
and combined scales. 
2 Each frame was given a coordinate on both dimensions (1, 2, or 3). These simple coordinates were 
used as an approximation for the coordinate of a fixation and used to calculate saccade distance 
between two relevant fixations.
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Procedure
Before starting the actual task participants received an introduction to all three 
answer scales in which scale dimensions and the position of each cartoon or word 
were explained, followed by a training procedure to familiarize them with the scales. 
Practice trials were provided with attitude objects not used in this study. 
After the training procedure and before participants started with the actual task, 
eye-movements were calibrated by asking participants to follow a calibration 
point on screen (9-point calibration). In the actual task for each trial the attitude 
object was presented on screen for 7 seconds, followed by a screen with one of 
three judgement scales located in the middle of the screen. Participants judged 
for each type of attitude object (yogurt, bread, phone) one type of technology 
(conventional, nanotechnology, unrealistic unfamiliar). Participants either judged 
all advertisements using the combined scale first (randomized order of attitude 
objects), followed by answering the affective and cognitive scale, or the other 
way around (starting with affective and cognitive scale). Participants thus judged 
three attitude objects on each of the three scales. For each scale, participants 
responded with a mouse click, after which the next attitude object appeared on 
screen. From the moment the actual task started, eye movements were collected 
until participants completed all the questions. Only eye–gaze fixations on the scales 
were analysed. There was no time constraint set on responses. 
After completion, participants were debriefed and received a lunch voucher of €2 
for 10 minutes of participation. Before and during the debriefing participants were 
given the opportunity to comment on the study. 
Data analyses
Analyses were conducted with SPSS 19. Prior to analysis, all variables were examined 
for accuracy of data entry, missing values, and distributions. Number of fixations, dwell 
time, length of the eye gaze pattern, number of transitions, and number of unique 
AOIs were analysed for conventional, nanotechnology, and unrealistic unfamiliar 
technology, using general linear mixed model analyses (multilevel). Product type 
was included at the highest level. For each product, multiple technologies were 
assessed and included at the lowest level, with a random intercept (within-subject 
design). 
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Elaborateness of processing for affective attitude compared with cognitive attitude, 
and the underlying measures of total fixation duration, total number of fixations, 
and length of eye gaze pattern, were the dependent measures and technology the 
independent variable. Results are reported in table 4.3, as means for affect and 
cognition per technology, for the two different orders (A = overall attitude first; 
or B = affect and cognition first). Between technologies means were compared 
with the posthoc procedure in SPSS’s linear mixed model (pairwise comparison of 
Estimated Marginal means, LSD). Trade-offs for cognitive and affective attitude, and 
the underlying measures as number of transitions between AOIs, number of unique 
AOIs fixated on were analysed in the same way (table 4.3).
Results 
Elaborateness of processing for affect and cognition
For each technology, the elaborateness of processing and the trade-offs for the 
affective and cognitive scale are compared. Without taking into account the order 
of judgement, there are no differences in affective and cognitive processing for 
each technology (see table 4.3, total). Also, when investigating the different order 
of judgement, for conventional and unrealistic unfamiliar technology, affective 
and cognitive processes do not differ (see table 4.3, condition A and B). For 
nanotechnology however, there were differences on several measures when overall 
attitude was expressed prior to affect and cognition (see table 4.3, condition A). For 
nanotechnology, cognition requires less elaborate processing than affect as shown 
by (a) a lower number of fixations on AOIs (M
affect 
= 7.49 vs. M
cognition 
= 5.61; F = 4.3, 
p = .04), and (b) a lower total dwell time (M
affect 
= 2326.38 vs. M
cognition 
= 1581.68; F 
= 6.43, p = .02), but not by a shorter length of the eye gaze pattern (M
affect 
= 6.35 
vs. M
cognition 
= 4.77; F = 1.85, p = .18). These results suggest that, for nanotechnology 
attributes in a product context, less elaborate processing is necessary to express 
cognition compared with affect when the overall attitude has been expressed first. 
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Overall attitude
In general, for all technologies, the overall attitude is about equally frequently 
based on affect and cognition. When comparing whether affect or cognition was 
more decisive for the overall attitude, conventional technology and nanotechnology 
are insensitive to order of attitude scales (see table 4.4). For unrealistic unfamiliar 
technology affect is least frequently chosen when overall attitude was assessed first 
(34.9%), whereas when the order of scales is reversed affect is most frequently 
chosen (61.0%). 
Although affect and cognition were about equally decisive for the overall attitude 
for the different technologies, it can be expected that people who rely on cognition 
while forming overall attitudes, later on have a less elaborate cognitive process. 
Similarly people who chose affect on the overall attitude scale are expected to 
have a less elaborate affective process later on. Therefore, the elaborateness of 
processing for the affective and cognitive judgements, after the overall attitude 
was reported, are investigated in more detail. MANOVAs were conducted with the 
ATTITUDES (UN)FAMILIAR ATTITUDE OBJECTS 16
Table 4.4 
Overall attitude judgement based on affect (chance = 50%) 
 
Condition Measure Conventional 
technology 
Nanotechnology Unrealistic unfamiliar 
technology 
Total Count 34 36 40 
Percentage 40.5% 42.9% 47.6% 
Adjusted residual -.7 -.2 .9 
     
A Count 17 18 15 
Percentage 39.5% 41.9% 34.9% 
Adjusted residual .1 .5 -.6 
     
B Count 17 18 25 
Percentage 41.5% 43.9% 61% 
Adjusted residual -1.1 -.8 1.9 
 
Note. A indicates that overall attitude is assed prior to affective and cognitive attitude, and B indicates that 
affective and cognitive attitude are assessed prior to overall attitude. Only percentages for affect are given as the 
percentages for cognition can be derived from here.  
Statistical tests: Total: χ2 = .90, df = 2, p = .64; Condition A: χ2 = 3.71, df = 2, p = .16; Condition B: χ2 = .46, df = 2, p 
= .80 
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process measures for affect and cognition as dependent variables (within) and the 
response on the overall attitude scale (affect or cognition) as independent variable. 
A significant interaction effect indicates that there are differences in underlying 
affective and cognitive processes, depending on whether the overall attitude 
response was based on affect or cognition (see table 4.5, interaction). 
It is shown that for products with conventional technology, when overall judgement 
is based on cognition, there is less extensive cognitive processing later on, compared 
with when the overall attitude is based on affect. There are no differences in affective 
processing independent whether the overall atittude judgement was based on 
affect or cognition. Similarly, for products with unrealistic unfamiliar technology it 
is shown that when overall judgement is based on cognition there is less extensive 
cognitive processing later on, compared with when overall attitude is based on 
affect. For products with nanotechnology, however, it is shown that when overall 
attitude judgement is based on affect, later on there is less extensive affective 
processing, as compared with when the overall attitude is based on cognition. 
There are no differences in cognitive processing, independent whether the overall 
attitude judgement was based on affect or cognition. 
Although affect and cognition were about equally decisive for conventional and 
nanotechnology, the affective and cognitive processing that follows differ. In the 
case of conventional technology, when cognition was decisive for the overall 
attitude, later cognitive processing was less elaborate, independent of affect. For 
nanotechnology, on the other hand, whether affect or cognition was decisive for 
the overall attitude scale seems to be related to less elaborate processing of affect, 
independent of cognition. For unrealistic unfamiliar technology similar patterns as 
for familiar attributes were found although interpretation is less obvious because 
there is a much smaller group of people choosing cognition than affect on overall 
attitude. All together these results could indicate that, as respondents have formed 
their attitude already on the overall attitude scale, they later on quickly scan the 
answer options without too much effort until the most suitable answer option has 
been found.
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Discussion
By means of eye-tracking this study showed that for nanotechnology cognition 
required less elaborate processing than affect, but only after the overall attitude 
had been expressed. This finding aligns with the results from study 2 where people 
relied relatively more on cognition for nanotechnology. Study 3 provides evidence 
that people rely relatively more on cognition for nanotechnology, because cognition 
is probably the easier process. This may be because it is relatively difficult to 
integrate a nanotechnology attribute in an affective way into existing knowledge 
structures. This is supported by additional analyses where it was shown that it is 
probably the ease of affective processing that determines the choice for affective 
option for nanotechnology on the overall scale. In contrast, it appears that it is the 
ease of cognitive processing that determines which option is chosen most often for 
conventional and unrealistic unfamiliar technologies.
General discussion
The current chapter provides new insights into how attitudes are formed when 
people lack sufficient knowledge about an attitude object with a novel attribute. 
More specifically the role of affect and cognition in attitude formation towards (un)
familiar technologies was investigated in three complementary ways. In study 1 only 
technology descriptions were provided, in study 2 these technology descriptions 
were placed in a product context addressing the benefit of the technology. In study 
3 underlying affective and cognitive processes on the products from study 2 were 
studied by means of eye-tracking. 
When expressing attitudes people in principle have access to a rich network 
of affective responses and cognitive beliefs. In some cases, the attitude is more 
grounded in affect and in other cases more in cognition. Attitudes towards well 
known objects are embedded in extensive knowledge structures, composed of 
beliefs, feelings, behaviors, and prior experiences (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995). The 
present research shows that for such well known objects, in this case conventional 
technology, affect and cognition are equally predictive for the overall attitude. This 
is the case for attribute-evaluations as well as attribute-product-evaluations, which 
suggests that conventional technology attributes and their embedding in products 
are part of established knowledge structures (Marks & Olson, 1981). 
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When product knowledge is incomplete, in this case because of the addition of an 
unknown technology attribute, incomplete associations towards the attitude object 
exist. Hence, attributes of the attitude object will be encountered that can not easily 
be associated with existing knowledge structures and schemata (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
Whether overall attitudes are subsequently based on affect or cognition depends 
on people’s ability to interconnect the unfamiliar attribute into existing schemata 
and knowledge structures (Peracchio & Tybout, 1996). The present research shows 
that when asked to judge an unrealistic unfamiliar technology attribute on its own, 
guidance is found in cognition. These results are in line with research by Sujan 
(1985), who describes that when the match between incoming information and 
category knowledge is low, more analytical processes would be needed to arrive at 
the attitude. This in turn suggests that when there is no association with existing 
knowledge, cognitive analytical processes can be used to construct the evaluation. 
However, when the unrealistic unfamiliar technology attribute was embedded in 
a product, the results show that evaluation is based more on affect. A possible 
explanation could be that the multitude of known product associations are salient 
and inform the final attitude. This could indicate that people search for an easy 
solution by relying on affect associated with the product. This is consistent with 
previous research that suggested that if the task of fitting an unknown attribute is 
too difficult, people give up and seek a simple solution (Bettman & Park, 1980). 
A different outcome is found when people have some, but limited, knowledge 
about an attribute, as is the case for nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is perceived 
as unfamiliar, but because people might already have encountered nanotechnology, 
or at least heard of it before (Ho, Scheufele, & Corley, 2013), it is more familiar than 
a non-existing (unrealistic unfamiliar) technology. This explains the observation 
that when a nanotechnology attribute is evaluated on its own, affect is relatively 
more important compared with evaluation of a completely unknown attribute. 
An explanation consistent with previous research could be that recognition of the 
technology (in this case the word ‘nano’) allows affect stored with the technology 
category to be triggered, leading to an affective reaction towards the technology 
attribute (Sujan, 1985). However, when the somewhat familiar nanotechnology is 
included into a product context, it seems that the new attitude object becomes 
incongruent with existing schemata. This seems to be solved by integrating the 
technology attribute rather than disregarding the attribute. Although it could not 
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be confirmed whether the unfamiliar attribute indeed was integrated within the 
existing knowledge structures, it seems that people search for guidance that can be 
provided by cognitive construction of a product attitude. It is also relatively easier 
to solve this incongruency cognitively (study 3). Future research should take this a 
step further and address how unfamiliar technologies and technology attributes 
relate to respondents existing schemata, for example, by means of think-out-loud 
protocols involving discussion with respondents. 
The extent to which the results for nanotechnology can be generalized for the larger 
population can also be doubted, as the samples consisted of university students 
who are probably more familiar with technological applications than the average 
member of the population and are better able to draw on cognitive inferences. 
Therefore, in future research, attitude formation towards (un)familiar technologies 
should be investigated with a more diversified sample (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless 
at a theoretical level, it is expected to find a similar shift from fully unfamiliar through 
somewhat familiar to fully familiar and the effect on the relative influence of affect 
and cognition on attitude in the population at large. 
Together, the results imply that both with extensive (conventional technology) 
and no knowledge levels (i.e. nanotechnology attributes; unrealistic unfamiliar 
technology in a product context) affect is relatively more important in attitude 
formation. With intermediate levels of knowledge cognition is relatively more 
important. This follows a pattern similar to the use of intuitive strategies influenced 
by an individual’s expertise level (Baylor, 2001). When individuals are true novices 
they do not possess the ability to address the attitude object analytically and 
therefore rely on an immature form of intuition (Baylor, 2001). Experts, on the other 
hand, often lack the motivation and need to evaluate the attitude object extensively 
and therefore rely on information from memory and prior experience, often in an 
affective, intuitive manner (Bettman & Park, 1980). 
The current research follows an emerging stream of research claiming that 
eye-tracking research is a useful addition to the toolbox for investigating the 
commonalties between intuitive and deliberative processes in decision making, 
using process data (Glöckner & Herbold, 2008; Horstmann et al., 2009). More 
particularly in the current studies, the use of eye-tracking to follow eye gaze 
108 | Chapter 4
patterns during scale completion provides further insights into the process of 
elaboration whilst judging attitude objects. The eye-tracker study showed that 
the attitude component that is decisive in expressing overall attitudes (affect or 
cognition), later also requires less processing when the attitude components are 
separately assessed. People who rely relatively more on cognition over affect more 
easily arrive at a cognitive attitude. Whereas those who tend to prefer affect over 
cognition more easily arrive at an affective attitude. People thus choose the path 
of least resistance, which is consistent with the ideas behind most dual process 
models (Evans, 2008). Interestingly, the results show that affect is not always the 
easiest path but that in specific situations cognition may be easier. This aligns 
with the results of Chapter 3 that found that expressing the cognitive attitude for 
neutral attitude objects required less elaborate processing compared with affect, 
when the overall attitude was expressed first . Neutral attitude objects can also 
be considered objects with weak object-evaluations. Hence, this provides evidence 
that for weak attitude objects the order of processing matters, as it seems that 
attitudes for attitude objects with less developed knowledge structures need to 
be constructed, instead of being immediately retrieved from memory. By means of 
eye-tracking it was possible to go beyond investigating attitude outcomes, and also 
examine underlying processes in attitude formation. The eye-tracker data support 
the interpretation of the study with technologies placed in context, which gives 
more confidence in the current interpretation of the underlying processes. 
Respondents were presented with realistic advertisements of products. 
Advertisements and claims (benefits) were kept constant for each product, 
except the technology was varied. Whilst keeping everything the same except the 
technology, differences in affect or cognition being more decisive for the overall 
attitude can solely be explained by difference in the technology attribute. Products 
were chosen in such a way that three different technologies could be applied 
within the same product. At the same time, it could be that by doing so an artificial 
product context was created, for instance by providing a yogurt with ‘yeast extract’ 
as flavour enhancers. By choosing the current product set (yogurt, bread, phone) 
other evaluative processes could have played a role as well, such as evaluating the 
products (unconsciously) in a more hedonic or utilitarian way (Voss, Spangenberg, 
& Grohmann, 2003). In the current research there was controlled for this by 
introducing the technologies and objects as random repetitions, to control as much 
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as possible for such effects. However, if there are systematic effects these might 
have influenced the results. Hence future research should substantiate the current 
findings using different product and technology attribute sets. 
By systematically studying attitude formation towards (un)familiar technologies 
without reference to any context, within a context, and exploring underlying process 
mechanisms, valuable insights in attitude formation processes were derived. A 
first important finding is that if the technology attribute can be integrated within 
existing knowledge structures, both affective and cognitive processes can be 
addressed. For unfamiliar attributes attitude formation is context dependent. If the 
context provides cues the unfamiliar attribute is ignored and people rely on affect, 
and if not, people need to solve the incongruency using cognition. It is therefore 
important to integrate unfamiliar attribute constellations within existing affective 
and cognitive knowledge structures. A second important finding is that in attitude 
formation the component that is decisive in expressing overall attitudes (affect or 
cognition), later on also requires less processing. People thus choose the attitude 
path of least effort, and rely on the component that is easier to construct, be it 
affective or cognitive. 
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Appendix 4.1. Examples of stimulus material
Examples of advertisements for different product characteristics: a smartphone ad 
with realistic familiar technology, a bread ad with nanotechnology and a yoghurt 
ad with unrealistic unfamiliar technology. Text is translated from Dutch language. 
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Abstract 
Insights into how consumer attitudes towards nanotechnology are formed 
and  develop are crucial for understanding and anticipating possible barriers 
in consumer acceptance of nanotechnology applications. In this study the 
influence of affect and cognition on overall opinion is investigated longitudinally 
for emerging nanotechnologies, and compared with conventional 
technologies. Overall, in attitude formation towards nanotechnology 
applications, people rely relatively more on affect than cognition. Over time, 
reliance on affect decreases whereas reliance on cognition increases for 
nanotechnology. This suggests that over time nanotechnology applications 
have become somewhat more integrated within people’s already existing 
knowledge structure. However, for conventional technologies the influence 
of affect and cognition on overall attitude remains stable over time. The 
current study shows that it is essential to address both affective and cognitive 
aspects of public opinion of nanotechnology. 
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Changes in the influence of affect and cognition over time on 
consumer attitude formation towards nanotechnology: A 
longitudinal survey study
Nanotechnology is a promising yet little known novel technology. Nanotechnology 
enables the creation of completely new products, as well as  substantial improvement 
of properties of existing products. Consumers lack knowledge about and experience 
with nanotechnology, which makes it difficult for them to understand the full range 
of possible risks and benefits associated with nanotechnology and nano-based 
products  (Siegrist, 2010). Previous technologies, such as genetic modification, 
biotechnology and nuclear energy have met with much resistance from the public, 
leading to rejection of these technologies by the public at large (Currall et al., 2006; 
Einsiedel & Goldenberg, 2004). Certain applications of nanotechnology hold the 
risk of running into similar issues (Frewer, et al., 2011; Gupta, et al., 2012; Siegrist, 
Stampfli, Kastenholz, & Keller, 2008). Consumer response may thus significantly 
influence the development of nanotechnology. Therefore, it is important to 
understand public attitudes, and particularly how these develop over time (Schenk 
et al., 2011).
Currently, knowledge about nanotechnology among the general public is very 
limited (Gupta, Fischer, & Frewer, 2015; Stijnen et al., 2011), which could be 
attributed to low media attention and exposure (Fischer, van Dijk, de Jonge, Rowe, 
& Frewer, 2013). Even though  knowledge on nanotechnology is low, people seem 
to be able to form opinions about nanotechnology anyhow (Cobb, 2005; Scheufele 
& Lewenstein, 2005; Siegrist, 2010). Nanotechnology, in general, is perceived more 
positive in the United States than in Europe (Cobb, 2005; Gaskell, Eyck, Jackson, 
& Veltri, 2005). The question is how consumer opinions towards nanotechnology 
arise. Previous research has identified that value predispositions, religious beliefs, 
and heuristic cues are important in shaping consumer perception of nanotechnology 
applications (Cacciatore, Scheufele, & Corley, 2011; Scheufele, Corley, Shih, 
Dalrymple, & Ho, 2009). Also, it has been shown that consumer opinion as well as 
acceptance  are dependent on the specific domain of nanotechnology applications 
under evaluation (Pidgeon, Harthorn, & Satterfield, 2011). For instance, food-
related nanotechnology applications are perceived as less positive than applications 
in other domains, such as energy (Siegrist, Cousin, Kastenholz, & Wiek, 2007; 
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Siegrist, et al., 2008). By and large, most of these studies have focussed more on 
comparison between different applications of nanotechnology but not comparison 
of nanotechnology with its conventional counterparts. In addition, it is not clear how 
the attitude structure of nanotechnology develops and changes over time (Pidgeon 
et al., 2011). Understanding attitude development over time requires longitudinal 
studies facilitating the tracking of opinions and their determinants over time, and to 
shed light on what causes potential changes in attitudes over time (George, 2000; 
Vandermoere, Blanchemanche, Bieberstein, Marette, & Roosen, 2011). Monitoring 
attitude formation for nanotechnology longitudinally can provide insights into how 
the attitude structure, in terms of underlying affect and cognition, evolves over 
time. 
The present study aims to investigate  whether the influence of affect and cognition 
on the overall opinion of nanotechnology will change over time, and if so, whether 
changes can be explained by knowledge growth. This is done by means of a 
longitudinal survey study in which attitudes for nanotechnology applications and 
conventional applications are compared. 
Attitudes
Consumer opinions are studied by attitudes, which represent summary evaluations. 
Attitudes can be viewed as “associations in memory between a given object and 
one’s evaluation of that object” (Ajzen, 2001; Fazio, 2007). In attitude research a 
distinction is made between affect-based (feelings and other affective factors) and 
cognition-based (cognitive beliefs) attitude expressions (Edwards, 1990). In many 
situations prior knowledge towards the attitude object is available, so that attitudes 
are based on earlier affective and cognitive experience with the attitude object 
(Fazio, 2007). Depending on the context with the attitude object, overall attitude 
expressions will find their base more in cognition or more in affect. 
Having an established knowledge base, which is likely to be the case for applications of 
conventional technologies, means that relevant affective and cognitive information 
and experiences are available (Edwards, 1990; Plessner & Czenna, 2008). As people 
can draw on both affective and cognitive associations with the conventional attitude 
object, the attitude formation process is relatively straightforward.
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Attitude formation becomes more challenging when the attitude object contains 
attributes that the consumer is unfamiliar with, which is the case when evaluating 
nanotechnology applications. When individuals lack a priori evaluative associations 
(Fazio, 2007), evaluations towards the attitude object need to be constructed on 
the spot (Schwarz, 2007). New connections between unfamiliar attitude objects 
and existing knowledge structures will have to be created to reach a better 
understanding (Peracchio & Tybout, 1996). 
In cases with a lack of concrete factual information, attitudes are often based on 
affect (Kahan et al., 2007; Satterfield, Kandlikar, Beaudrie, Conti, & Harthorn, 2009; 
Slovic et al., 2004), which compared with cognitive weighing of pros and cons 
requires less formal information in decision making (Slovic et al., 2002). Affective 
responses do not necessarily require conscious elaboration and can therefore be 
created more quickly (Bornstein, 1989; Hansen & Wänke, 2009; Zajonc, 1980). In 
addition, people can more easily access the broader range of affective feelings, 
further contributing to the heavier weighting of affective information compared 
with factual information (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Clore & Schnall, 2005). Affect 
experienced at the moment of evaluation thus plays an important role in people’s 
early judgments of unfamiliar applications (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 
2001). It is likely that for nanotechnology, in contrast to conventional technologies, 
people cannot access all relevant representations as evaluation-linkages are not 
established yet, and no fully-fledged evaluation is stored in memory. It is therefore 
expected that:
• H1: For nanotechnology compared with conventional technology there are 
differences in the influence of affect and cognition on overall attitude, with 
affect being relatively more influential for nanotechnology.
Prior knowledge influences information search and information processing and 
is also expected to influence the attitude formation process. Having a knowledge 
base of relevant information about a technology, allows the formation of informed 
attitudes (Edwards, 1990; Plessner & Czenna, 2008). People with higher domain 
knowledge and expertise, are better able to use recalled evidence and are influenced 
by content (Ofir, 2000). 
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When prior knowledge is however limited, as is the case with nanotechnology, 
it tends to be structured in a rudimentary fashion involving few linkages among 
its elements. The new (nanotechnology) information is not yet integrated with 
previous knowledge (Peracchio & Tybout, 1996). Compared with initial attitudes 
towards nanotechnology applications when knowledge is low and attitudes are 
based more in affect, as people learn more about the technology attitudes should 
become influenced more by values and cognitive beliefs (Reisch, Scholl, & Bietz, 
2011). When knowledge starts to expand, previously unfamiliar nanotechnology 
applications will be increasingly interconnected within knowledge structures, and 
incongruities may be resolved with a minimum of effort (Peracchio & Tybout, 1996).
 
As knowledge towards conventional technology is more developed than towards 
nanotechnology, the attitude structure of conventional technological applications 
is expected to be more stable over time compared with nanotechnology. With 
increasing knowledge growth about nanotechnology it will be easier to integrate 
information and connect it in an already existing knowledge structure. People 
are then able to access and use this knowledge to supplement their attitudes in 
a cognitive way. In the case of nanotechnology it can therefore be expected that 
knowledge growth over time leads to a decrease of the influence of affect on the 
overall attitude over time. This leads to the following hypotheses:
• H2a: The influence of affect and cognition on overall attitude towards 
conventional technology is stable over time.
• H2b: For nanotechnology, affect becomes relatively less predictive for the 
overall attitude over time.
In the present study both objective and subjective knowledge about nanotechnology 
will be taken into account, and changes in both are monitored  over a time span 
of 2.5 years. Objective knowledge refers to accurate stored information, whereas 
subjective knowledge refers to self-beliefs about one’s own knowledge (Carlson, 
Vincent, Hardesty, & Bearden, 2009). Although subjective knowledge might give 
a biased view, there are also some drawbacks in using objective knowledge. It is 
difficult for people to develop objective knowledge around nanotechnology because 
nanotechnology applications are not widely available on the market yet, and 
because there is little consensus on what constitutes fundamental nanotechnology 
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knowledge (Dyehouse, Diefes-Dux, Bennett, & Imbrie, 2008), or what knowledge is 
relevant for consumers to learn. Together, objective and subjective knowledge might 
provide a more accurate view on consumer knowledge towards nanotechnology. 
The present study
The main aim of this study is to examine to what extent the relative influence 
of affect and cognition on overall attitude change over time for nanotechnology 
and conventional technologies. A shift in importance between different modes 
of attitude formation has not been studied over time, but may provide useful 
guidelines for developing communications about new technology applications. For 
instance, on balancing affective and cognitive information in communication to 
better connect to consumers instead of only providing factual information (Slovic et 
al., 2002). In addition, the influence of subjective and objective knowledge is taken 
into account as possible explanation for observed changes in affective and cognitive 
influence over time.
Monitoring on the basis of longitudinal data brings advantages over cross-sectional 
data, as consumer attitudes can be compared with the “base level” measurement of 
the first time point (de Jonge, van Trijp, Renes, & Frewer, 2010).  At first, respondents 
are expected to not have much previous experience with nanotechnology, compared 
with conventional technology. It must therefore reflect the information and 
conditions present at the time of attitude formation (Glasman & Albarracín, 2006). 
Later on, changes in knowledge about nanotechnology applications are monitored 
and are expected to converge more towards conventional technology knowledge, 
as with maturation of nanotechnology and its applications more information and 
knowledge becomes available to the consumer (Maynard, 2006).
In this study, changes in the influence of affect and cognition on the overall opinion 
of nanotechnology over time are investigated using structured approaches such as 
confirmatory factor analyses and path analyses. Structured approaches allow for 
formal comparisons of the construct measures over time to check if the constructs 
have the same content and meaning across different measurement occasions. 
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Method
Sample
Consumer attitudes towards nanotechnology and its applications were assessed in 
three surveys, about 10-11 months apart. The first round of data collection took 
place during a three-week period in October-November 2012. The second and third 
data collection round took place during a three-week period in September 2013 
and July 2014 respectively. Data were collected through a market research agency 
(GfK; see www.gfk.com), with a standing panel of individuals. The research complies 
with the Netherlands Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice and the Social Sciences 
Ethics Committee of Wageningen University waived the need for ethical consent. 
GfK anonymized and de-identified all data prior to author access, so there was no 
access to any identifying information about participants. In-depth analyses of the 
first data collection round are reported in Chapter 2. 
As socio-demographic information of panel members is known, the panel allowed 
for stratified random sampling of a nationally representative sample on gender, age, 
and education level of the Netherlands. The GfK panel consisted of approximately 
12,000 participants, who were repeatedly invited to participate in studies. Through 
a range of sampling techniques, the panel is maintained such that it remained 
representative for the population. In the first data collection round the research 
agency approached a gross sample of 2500 respondents from their panel, out of 
which 1907 participated (response rate of 76%). In the first round, there were 37 
respondents who indicated that they did not want to be part of the follow up study, 
or were not serious in their replies. Therefore in the second data collection round 
the research agency approached 1870 people of whom 1335 responded (response 
rate of 74%), and in the third round 856 from 1297 invited responded (response 
rate of 66%). The socio-demographic make-up of the samples, regarding gender, 
age, and education level can be found in table 5.1.
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RUNNING HEAD: ATTITUDE FORMATION LONGITUDINAL 
 
 
Table 5.1 
Sample Characteristics 
 
Data collection 
period 
2012 (N = 1907) 
October 16- 
November 6 
2013 (N = 1335) 
September 5 – 
September 16 
2014 (N = 856) 
June 5 – June 17 
Population statistics 
(CBS, 2014) 
(January 1, 2014) 
Response rate 76% (of 2500) 74% (of 1870) 66% (of 1297) - 
     
Gender     
Male 50.7% 51.7% 55.6% 49.5% 
Female 49.3% 48.3% 44.4% 50.5% 
     
Age     
18-35 34.9% 29.0% 26.4% 34.7% 
36-49 30.6% 30.0% 29.7% 31.2% 
50-65 34.5% 41.0% 43.9% 34.1% 
     
Education level     
Low 27.8% 27.1% 27.9% 28.1% 
Average 44.4% 44.4% 42.7% 43.1% 
High 27.8% 28.5% 29.4% 28.8% 
 
Note. There were 37 people in the first data collection round who indicated that they did not want to be part of the 
follow up study, or were not serious in their replies. Therefore in the second data collection round the research 
agency approached 1870 people instead of 1907. Over time there is a higher drop out among females, χ² (2) = 9.34, p 
=.009, Cramer’s V =.048, and among the young age group, χ² (4) = 33.70, p <.001, Cramer’s V =.064. There are no 
differences in dropout across education levels, χ² (4) = 1.17, p =.88. 
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Materials
Measures to assess the key constructs of the influence of affect, cognition, and 
knowledge on overall attitude are reported in appendix 5.1 (all measures were 
7-point scales unless indicated). In the second and third wave, questions related 
to media exposure were added. Respondents were asked whether they have read, 
watched television programs, and accessed the internet, for more information 
about nanotechnology and its applications (see appendix 5.1).
Respondents judged a familiar (conventional) and an unfamiliar (nanotechnology) 
application, from the same application domain. This was repeated for two application 
domains (either water and energy, or medicine and food) to limit response fatigue. 
In addition, the design was replicated with two different target products for each 
application domain to make sure effects were not due to the choice of product. 
Each respondent therefore judged in total four of the sixteen available applications, 
representing an incomplete repeated measures factor across four domains. During 
the three annual surveys respondents saw the same applications. The structure of 
the longitudinal design can be found in appendix 5.2. 
Attitude objects
Stimuli were 16 descriptions of technological applications. For each domain 
two specific applications were selected: food additives and food supplements; 
water purification and water quality monitoring; medical home tests and drugs; 
solar energy and batteries. In addition, for each application type a conventional 
and a nano-based technology was used to manipulate familiarity between the 
applications. For example, water purification using a nano-membrane versus water 
purification using a sand-filter were used, where it was expected that people would 
be more familiar with the sand-filter compared with the nano-membrane. 
Respondents received a short description of an application, consisting of: a) 
information about the technology behind the application, b) examples in which the 
application can be used, and c) advantages and disadvantages of the application. 
Descriptions were checked by an expert on nanotechnology and pilot tested. 
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Data analysis
First, the measurement model was tested using confirmatory factor analysis with 
maximum likelihood estimation in the R package Lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). Goodness 
of fit index (GFI) and comparative fit index (CFI) values above .95 and root mean 
square error of estimation (RMSEA) below .07 were adopted as indication of 
good fit. χ² is reported as customary, but not indicative of model fit with large 
samples (Kline, 2005). The three waves of data were analysed using multigroup 
modelling, where each wave of data collection was considered as a separate group. 
By simultaneously estimating the model for the different time points it could be 
established whether the properties of the measurement model were stable over 
time. In the establishment of the measurement model, the relationships between 
the determinants (affect, cognition) and the dependent variable (overall attitude) 
for conventional and nanotechnologies were not estimated because testing group 
differences between the structural parameters was part of the second step of 
analyses.
 
After fitting the measurement model, path analyses on the latent constructs were 
conducted. The first step involved the analysis of a model with affect and cognition 
on overall attitude for nanotechnology and conventional technology, taking into 
account the three different time points. The model was trimmed by constraining 
parameters until the model with the least number of parameters was reached 
that showed no worse fit compared with the full model by comparing Δχ², with 
a significance level smaller than .10. In the second step knowledge level and its’ 
interaction with affect and cognition was added to the model, to check whether 
changes in affective and cognitive b’s were due to changes in knowledge. 
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Results
Measurement model
The latent variables for affect and cognition were both defined by seven indicators, 
including positive and negative items. Overall attitude was measured with one item 
in the first data collection round (T1) and three items in the second and third data 
collection round (T2 and T3). Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were conducted on 
all key concepts (affect, cognition, overall attitude) taking into account the different 
time points, and negative versus positive wording of items (see figure 5.1) (Lattin, 
Carroll, & Green, 2003). The CFA showed an acceptable to good fit across time 
points, χ² (1122) = 1246.27, p < .001; RMSEA = .054; SRMR = .077; CFI = .920; and 
TLI = .916, supporting the assumption that the measurement model is robust across 
time periods. Items were then averaged to form affective, cognitive and overall 
attitude scales.
positive
negative
P
P
P
P
N
N
N
P
P
P
N
N
N
N
affect 2
affect 1
affect 3
cognition 2
cognition 1
cognition 3
overall 2
overall 1
overall 3
ATT1
ATT2
ATT1
ATT3
ATT2
ATT1
ATT3
Figure 5.1. Measurement model
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Path models
Subsequently, the relative influence of affect and cognition on overall attitude, 
over time was investigated in a multi-group model (conventional technology and 
nanotechnology), starting with the full model and subsequent trimming the model. 
The overall model fit was good for the full model where only the covariances 
between the overall attitudes were constrained to be equal at the different time 
points, Model A in table 2, χ² (28) = 145.91, p < .001; RMSEA = .042; SRMR = .029; 
CFI = .990; and TLI = .986 (see figure 5.2). 
A first  step tested whether the same relations hold for conventional technology 
and nanotechnology, by constraining all path coefficients to be equal for 
nanotechnology and conventional technology, as well as the covariances between 
the overall attitudes (Model B). The chi-square difference between model A and 
Model B, shows a decrease in model fit when constraining technology, Δχ² = 
13.08, Δdf = 7, p = .070 (see table 5.2). This shows that it is meaningful to address 
differences between nanotechnology and conventional technology when predicting 
the influence of affect and cognition on overall attitude, which is in line with H1. 
Next, the time effects for affect and cognition were estimated for nanotechnology 
and conventional technology. This allowed to test the hypothesis that for 
nanotechnology affect becomes less predictive for the overall attitude over time. 
First, a more restricted model was estimated where for conventional technology 
the relations for affect and cognition on overall attitude were constrained to be 
equal over time (all b’s equal), while there were no restrictions on nanotechnology 
over time (Model C). This model shows no worse fit than the unconstrained model, 
Δχ² = 3.20, Δdf = 4, p = .52 (Model C versus A, see table 5.2). This indicates that for 
conventional technology the effects of affect and cognition on overall attitude are 
stable over time. Next, for nanotechnology the relations for affect and cognition on 
overall attitude were constrained to be equal over time (all b’s equal), while there 
were no restrictions on conventional technology over time (Model D). 
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This model showed a decrease in model fit, Δχ² = 9.16, Δdf = 4, p = .057 (Model D 
versus A, see table 5.2), indicating that for nanotechnology there are differences 
in the effect of affect and cognition on overall attitude over time. Therefore, 
it is meaningful to take into account the time effect of affect and cognition for 
nanotechnology, but not for conventional technology, in line with H2a and H2b. For 
further model comparisons the model with unconstrained affect and cognition over 
time for nanotechnology, and constrained affect and cognition for conventional 
technology, is taken as baseline model (Model C). 
In the next step it was further investigated whether the differences in affect 
and cognition change across specific time points for nanotechnology, keeping 
conventional technology constrained. Constraining the relations for affect and 
cognition on overall attitude to be equal at T1 and T2 (Model E1) resulted in no 
worse model fit, Δχ² = 1.86, Δdf = 2, p = .395 (Model E1 versus C, see table 5.2). 
A model where the relations for affect and cognition on overall attitude were 
constrained to be equal at T2 and T3 for nanotechnology resulted in a decrease 
in model fit compared with Model C, Δχ² = 6.06, Δdf = 2, p = .048 (Model E2, table 
5.2). A model where the relations for affect and cognition on overall attitude were 
constrained to be equal at T1 and T3 showed a decrease in model fit compared 
with Model C, Δχ² = 5.86, Δdf = 2, p = .053 (model E3, table 5.2). This shows that 
differences in affect and cognition over time exist for nanotechnology, and mainly 
between T3 and earlier waves. 
Interpreting the results based on empirical relations shows that for nanotechnology 
the influence of affect decreases after T2 and stabilizes at T3 (b
T1
 = .63, b
T2
 = .58, bT3= 
.59), which provides support for H2b (see figure 5.2). Furthermore, the influence of 
cognition increases at T2 and drops again at T3 (b
T1
 = .50, b
T2
 = .54, bT3= .48). The b’s 
for conventional technology are relatively stable across time points for affect (b
T1
 = 
.54, b
T2
 = .54, bT3= .54) and also for cognition (bT1 = .55, bT2 = .55, bT3= .55) (see figure 
5.2), which provides support for H2a. The correlations between the constructs over 
time are low for affect, cognition and overall attitude (figure 5.2). Low correlations 
indicate that attitudes towards nanotechnology as well as conventional technology 
are not stable yet. 
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cognition
affectaffect
cognition
T1 T2 T3
affect
cognition
.46 .51
.45 .49
.36 .35
.55
.56
.55
.54
.55
.52
conventional
overall overall overall
BA1_C
BC1_C BC3_C
BA3_C
BC3_C
BA2_C
Figure 5.2. Path models for nanotechnology and conventional technology. Straight lines represent b’s. 
Curved lines represent correlations of the construct across time points.
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Knowledge
In the final step the moderating effect of subjective knowledge and objective 
knowledge on the influence of affect and cognition on overall attitude for 
nanotechnology is investigated. In general, subjective knowledge is low, but there 
is a small growth over time, F (1, 5135) = 22.96, p < .001, M
T1
 = 2.12, M
T2
 = 2.26, 
M
T3
 =2.47. Similarly, objective knowledge is low, but increases over time, F (1, 4413) 
= 138.39, p < .001, M
T1
 =1.39, M
T2
 =2.33, M
T3
 = 2.58 (objective knowledge was 
measured on a scale from -2 t/m 9, see appendix 5.1). 
A model was estimated where the main effects of affect, cognition, subjective 
knowledge as well as the interactions of subjective knowledge with affect and 
cognition were allowed to differ over time for nanotechnology. The model fit was 
good, χ² (72) = 207.69, p < .001; RMSEA = .033; SRMR = .018; CFI = .989; and TLI 
= .985. A model where the interactions were not taken into account and the main 
effect of subjective knowledge was constrained to be equal over time did not fit the 
data worse, Δχ² = 11.95, Δdf = 8, p = .150. This shows that there is no moderating 
effect of subjective knowledge. 
For objective knowledge a similar approach was used, which led to the same 
conclusions: there was a good model fit χ² (72) = 124.18, p < .001; RMSEA = .027; 
SRMR = .015; CFI = .992; and TLI = .989, and the model with no objective knowledge 
interactions at all fits the data equally well, Δχ² = 11.23, Δdf = 8, p = .186. Together, 
this shows that taking subjective and objective knowledge into account does not 
affect changes in the influence of affect and cognition on overall attitude over time. 
One reason that subjective and objective knowledge do not have a moderating effect 
on the influence of affect and cognition on overall attitude might be that knowledge 
did not grow enough. Related to this is that respondents’ exposure to different 
media sources is low. Respondents did not read much about nanotechnology, and 
even less at T3 compared with T2, F (1, 5135) = 10.18, p < .001, M
T2
 = 1.87, M
T3
 = 
1.81, measured on a seven-point scale. The same is true for watching documentaries 
about nanotechnology, F (1, 5135) = 18.30, p < .001, M
T2
 = 1.78, M
T3
 = 1.70. Also, 
in general people almost did not search on the internet for more information 
about nanotechnology (M = 1.50). Thus, over time people did not acquire more 
information on nanotechnology via the media. 
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Discussion
This study showed that the attitude formation process evolves differently for 
nanotechnology compared with conventional technology. For conventional 
technologies, the influence of affect and cognition on overall attitude stays stable 
over time. In attitude formation towards unfamiliar nanotechnology attitude objects, 
people rely relatively more on affect than cognition. Over time, for nanotechnology, 
reliance on affect decreases whereas reliance on cognition increases. At time point 
2 the effect of cognition is higher for nanotechnology. Knowledge growth, neither 
objective nor subjective, does explain these changes. 
Knowledge did not moderate the lower reliance on affect and the increase in 
reliance on cognition in attitude formation towards nanotechnology. People with 
higher knowledge levels did not rely differently on affect and cognition in attitude 
formation towards nanotechnology compared to people with lower knowledge 
levels. Over time knowledge increased somewhat, but this has not been reflected 
in changes in attitude. This could be because, knowledge towards nanotechnology 
and its applications is still low and within the 2.5 years of this study there has been 
no large increase in knowledge levels, which is in line with results from previous 
studies (Reisch et al., 2011). A possible explanation why knowledge changed 
relatively little may be that respondents did not take up the information reported 
through different media sources. 
Even though knowledge growth was limited the results suggest that, over time, 
people start to think in a more cognitive way about nanotechnology. This suggests 
that nanotechnology applications have become somewhat more integrated within 
people’s already existing knowledge structures. This in turn indicates some learning 
effects, consistent with previous research that suggested than when people start 
to learn more about nanotechnologies, their reactions are more heavily influenced 
by their values and beliefs (e.g. cognition) (Kahan et al., 2007; Reisch et al., 2011). 
Compared with conventional technology, for which no learning should be assumed, 
this also makes sense, as it is shown that the influence of affect and cognition on 
overall attitude stays stable over time. 
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An unexpected finding is that, for nanotechnology, the relative influence of 
cognition increases between time 1 and time 2, and decreases again between time 
2 and time 3. This can be understood by assuming that at time 1, nanotechnology 
applications are newest to consumers, who then mostly need to rely on affect even 
though there are only few crystallised affective associations available (Slovic et al., 
2007). The second time (T2) that people are exposed to the same applications, 
some cognitions of the now less unfamiliar nanotechnology applications emerged. 
One suggestion why people rely on cognition, even without learning much about 
nanotechnology, may be because they make some analogies with more familiar 
technologies that people can relate to nanotechnology (Kahan et al., 2007). Drawing 
analogies allows people to classify and integrate unfamiliar nanotechnology into 
existing (technology) schemata (Davies, 2011; Kearnes, Macnaghten, & Davies, 
2014). Once people have classified products, subsequent attitudes may be based 
more on heuristics and affect associated with that class (Pavelchak, 1989; Sujan, 
1985), which may explain that between time 2 and time 3, reliance on cognition 
slightly decreases. The current study did however not assess whether, and if so 
into which categories, nanotechnology was classified. In future research, a better 
understanding should be derived of the reasons behind changes in affect and 
cognition over time. For instance, in experimental studies it could be investigated 
how nanotechnology and products with added nanotechnology are categorized and 
integrated within people’s schemata and knowledge structures. 
In the current study objective knowledge was measured and shown to be low. This 
might be because some of the items covered required highly advanced levels of 
nanotechnology knowledge. Even though objective knowledge is low, it might be 
that people think they understand much about nanotechnology. It was however 
shown that subjective knowledge was also low, which indicates that people do not 
overestimate their knowledge levels of nanotechnology. 
Attitudes towards both conventional and nanotechnology applications vary 
considerably over time (i.e. low correlations across time points). For conventional 
technology attitudes are anyway more crystallized than for nanotechnology, as for 
conventional technology the internal weighing structure of affect and cognition 
remains stable over time. The lack of a stable long-term attitude for nanotechnology 
is an indication that attitudes are not strongly established yet and sensitive to 
change, which in turn makes it difficult for policy makers and stakeholders to predict 
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consumer behaviour (Petty et al., 1997). This also indicates that in case of negative 
incidents associated with nanotechnology it can lead to negative consumer opinion 
about the technology, and one single incident can trigger public backlash for other 
domains in which nanotechnology is utilized (Siegrist, 2010). 
The fact that consumer attitudes towards nanotechnology are not strongly 
established also means that attitudes still can develop in different ways and 
directions. One option is that knowledge will continue to grow while affect does 
not become dominant, in which case people rely most on cognitive cues. This does 
require motivation of consumers to inform themselves (Petty et al., 1997), which 
seems unlikely given that respondents in the current study indicated to not have 
searched for additional information on nanotechnology. So, it can be expected that 
besides cognition, affect will continue to play a major role. If a positive affective 
response develops, the technology perception will also be positive. Alternatively, 
a negative affective response may develop, which might lead to a general fear-
response or aversion towards the technology. The fear of a fear-responses is a 
scenario that is often reported when nanotechnology is paralleled to GMO (Einsiedel 
& Goldenberg, 2004; Macoubrie, 2006; Sandler & Kay, 2006). 
For policy makers and stakeholders, to better connect with the general public, the 
design of information about nanotechnology and its applications is important. The 
results of this study show that currently public response is largely driven by affect. 
To align with this current dominance on affect, and at the same time contribute 
to a factual knowledge base, communication to the general public should be both 
cognitive and affective by nature. This combination seems important since it has 
been shown that factual information on its own is often of limited value in influencing 
consumer attitudes (Kahan et al., 2008). One way of designing this information 
is to provide people with information that connects to their existing knowledge 
structures, so that it becomes easier for people to integrate that unfamiliar instance 
in their current knowledge structure (Gregan-Paxton & John, 1997). For instance, 
the usefulness of nanotechnology applications in consumers’ daily life can be 
emphasized to increase their understanding. In the end, effective communication 
requires stepping back, assessing the extent of prior knowledge, and deciding how 
to communicate the basics of nanotechnology in such a way that it can be relevantly 
learned (Castellini et al., 2007). The media might operate as a primary source of 
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science information for the public (Su, Cacciatore, Scheufele, Brossard, & Xenos, 
2014). Effective communication strategies may lead to more consistent consumer 
opinions, which helps policymakers to anticipate trends that will dictate how the 
general public might react to new technology developments (Currall et al., 2006). 
Conclusion
This longitudinal study investigated the attitude formation process for 
nanotechnology as an emerging technology, comparing this to conventional 
technologies. The affective-cognitive attitude structure for conventional technology 
was stable over time, whereas for nanotechnology this was not the case. This shows 
that consumer attitudes towards nanotechnology are not well established yet, 
which in turn means that consumer attitudes are vulnerable to external impact. 
Therefore, the current study underlines the importance of addressing  both affective 
and cognitive aspects of public opinion towards nanotechnology.
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Appendix 5.1 
Questionnaire items 
Subjective knowledge questions (based on Klerck & Sweeney, 2007) 
Have you heard of nanotechnology before? (yes / no) 
Do you know what nanotechnology means? (yes / no) 
How much do you know about nanotechnology in general (not at all – very much) 
The third item was recoded such that 1 reflects no knowledge (not heard of the technology, not 
knowing the meaning of the technology) and 7 reflects expertise. 
 
Objective knowledge questions (based on Klerck & Sweeney, 2007) 
Indicate whether these concepts have anything to do with nanotechnology (yes/no): 
A nanometer is one billionth of a meter Developing new materials 
Nanomaterials are not visible for the naked eye Different features of particles 
Moving of individual atoms Product improvement 
Natural nanoparticles Microscale 
Robots Buckyball 
Deliberate production nanoparticles Nanotubes 
Items were added so that a summary knowledge index was created. Penalties were assigned for 
items not related to nanotechnology, so that an index between -2 and 9 emerged. 
 
Per application 
Affect: to what extent do you experience the emotion when reading about the application (not at all 
– very much); (based on Desmet, 2003; Russell, 1980) 
Joy Fascination 
Desire Satisfaction 
Fear Sadness 
Boredom Disgust 
  
Cognition: to what extent do you think the cognitions apply when reading about the application (not 
at all – very much); (based on Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994) 
Useful Useless 
Functional Harmful 
Beneficial Disadvantageous 
Nice Unusable 
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ATTITUDE FORMATION LONGITUDINAL
  
Overall attitude: (based on Crites et al., 1994; Lee & Scheufele, 2006) 
What is your overall opinion towards the application? (negative – positive) 
To what extent do you think this application is good? (bad – good) 
To what extent do you support the technology behind the application? (not at all – very much) 
 
Media exposure (never, once again, quarterly, every month, every week) (based on Cacciatore, 
Scheufele, & Corley, 2011) 
How often have you read during the past year about nanotechnological applications (e.g. in 
newspapers)?  
How often have you watched during the past year tv programs / documentaries about 
nanotechnological developments? 
How often did you surf the internet during the past year to search for information about 
nanotechnological applications? 
 
Note: all items were rated on 7-point scales, unless something else was indicated. 
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The aim of this thesis was to understand how people form attitudes toward unfamiliar 
attitude objects. To do so, both affective and cognitive attitude components as well 
as underlying mental processing strategies were studied and compared between 
familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects. Three key themes were addressed: (1) the 
relative influence of affect and cognition in attitude formation, (2) the elaborateness 
of processing of the affective and cognitive attitudes components, and (3) the 
changing influence of affect and cognition over time. Moreover, across different 
studies, several factors that impact the relative influence of affect and cognition 
were explored: individual differences (Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition), 
the amount of available context information, and growing awareness. Differences 
in elaborateness of processing of affect and cognition were investigated for attitude 
objects differing in strength of underlying object-associations.
Overview of main findings
The relative influence of affect and cognition
Chapter 2 contributes to a better understanding of the attitude formation process 
of unfamiliar compared to familiar attitude objects. It is shown that, compared 
with familiar attitude objects, for unfamiliar attitude objects people rely more on 
affect than on cognition. In addition, for familiar attitude objects the influence of 
individually preferred thinking styles (Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition) is 
reflected, whereas for unfamiliar attitude objects preferred thinking style is less 
influential. Individuals with high Need for Cognition did rely relatively more on 
cognition also for unfamiliar attitude objects. Thus, in addition to previous research 
which showed that when it regards unfamiliar attitude objects people often rely 
on affect instead of more cognitive evaluations (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & 
Johnson, 2000; Slovic et al., 2007), it is shown here that people are able to draw 
on cognitive inferences, even for unfamiliar attitude objects. By taking into account 
faith in intuition in relation to unfamiliar attitude objects, this chapter contributes 
to the literature on individual thinking styles (see for instance Epstein et al., 1996), 
in showing that even people with low faith in intuition use affect as default for 
unfamiliar attitude objects. 
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Reliance on affect or cognition also depends on the amount of available context 
information. In chapter 4 it is shown that for a familiar technology attribute which 
fits to existing knowledge structures, both affect and cognition support attitude 
formation about equally. For unfamiliar attributes, attitude formation is context 
dependent. If the context provides enough cues, the unfamiliar attribute is ignored 
and people rely on affect. If this is not the case people solve the incongruency of 
perceiving an unfamiliar attribute in a familiar product in a more cognitive way. 
Along with chapter 2, this chapter shows that people do not exclusively rely on 
affect in attitude formation toward unfamiliar attitude objects, but can draw on 
cognitive inferences. In addition, by varying the level of familiarity within and 
without a product context, new insights are derived about the conditions when 
affect is relatively more important in attitude formation. The use of affect in attitude 
formation appears to follow a pattern similar to the use of intuitive strategies 
influenced by an individual’s expertise level (Baylor, 2001). People rely on affect 
when extensive or no knowledge is available, while at intermediate levels people 
are able to draw cognitive inferences. 
To answer the research question how attitude formation toward familiar and 
unfamiliar attitude objects differs in terms of the relative influence of affect and 
cognition, it can be concluded that for familiar attitude objects both affective and 
cognitive object-evaluation linkages are available and can be used. For unfamiliar 
attitude objects, the default is to rely on affect. This does however not mean that 
people always rely on affect toward unfamiliar attitude objects, as it is shown that 
people can also use cognitive linkages if there are enough cues available that trigger 
cognitive attitude formation (e.g. high need for cognition, or solving an incongruency 
in a cognitive way). Hence, it appears that affect can only partially explain the 
findings for unfamiliar attitude objects, and a closer look at underlying processes is 
warranted. In the next section it will be explained how underlying processes while 
expressing an attitude play a role in determining whether affect or cognition is the 
preferred attitude component to rely on.
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Underlying processes
Chapters 3 and 4 followed an emerging stream of research which focusses on 
mapping underlying processes in judgment and decision making research and 
attitude formation research (Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2011). In these chapters 
a novel eye-tracking procedure was developed and used that allowed to trace the 
attitude process itself. In this way, further understanding is derived of the role of the 
amount of processing in determining which attitude component (affect or cognition) 
is decisive in attitude formation, taking into account both intuitive-deliberative and 
affective-cognitive processing. 
In chapter 3 it is shown that expressing affective as well as cognitive attitudes may 
require substantial elaboration. This is dependent on the strength of underlying 
object-associations with the attitude object (with univalent and ambivalent attitude 
objects having strong object-associations). Especially for neutral attitude objects, 
typified by weak object-associations the order in which affective, cognitive and 
overall attitudes are expressed is decisive for the amount of elaboration in attitude 
expression. These results are in line with research showing that for familiar attitude 
objects with strong object-evaluations a fast evaluation process reflects greater 
attitude certainty, as people have previously evaluated the object and stored 
associations can be retrieved (Tormala, Clarkson, & Henderson, 2011). 
In chapter 4, a different category of weak object-evaluation linkages was studied, 
namely unfamiliar attributes and attitude objects. It is shown that the incongruency 
evoked by adding an unfamiliar nanotechnology attribute to a product, is solved in 
a cognitive way as this is the relatively easier process. In addition, it is shown that 
the component that is decisive in expressing overall attitudes (affect or cognition), 
later on requires less processing. People thus rely on the attitude path that requires 
relatively less effort, which is also reflected in dual process models and domains 
such as persuasive communication (Chaiken, 1980; Evans, 2008).
To answer the research question to what extent underlying processes of affective and 
cognitive attitudes differ between attitude objects with varying strength of object-
evaluations, it can be concluded that the stronger the object-evaluation linkages 
the lower the need to elaborate on the attitude object to arrive at an evaluation. 
The weaker the object-evaluation linkages (e.g. for neutral attitude objects or for 
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unfamiliar nanotechnology attitude objects) the more influential the context is. 
The type of attitude object and the strength of its’ underlying object associations 
determine whether affect or cognition is the easier process. In addition, the attitude 
component that is decisive in expressing overall attitudes (affect or cognition), later 
on requires less processing. This shows that affect does not necessarily have to be 
the more intuitive and easier process, as is often assumed (Hansen & Wänke, 2009; 
Topolinski & Strack, 2009). People choose the attitude path of least resistance, and 
rely on affect or cognition depending on how easily it leads to the overall attitude. 
Changes over time
In chapter 5 the question is answered how affect and cognition in attitude formation 
toward unfamiliar attitude objects evolve over time (across 2.5 years), taking into 
account knowledge growth of consumers. It can be concluded from chapter 5 that 
for conventional technologies, the influence of affect and cognition on overall 
attitude remains stable over time. For unfamiliar nanotechnology attitude objects, 
reliance on affect decreases over time whereas reliance on cognition increases. 
Knowledge growth does not have an effect on changes in the influence of affect and 
cognition on overall attitude over time. It should be noted that, in line with previous 
research, knowledge growth was minimal (Reisch et al., 2011). At this point in time, 
affect is still relatively more important in attitude formation toward nanotechnology, 
which might be because affect-based attitudes produce greater certainty (Barden 
& Tormala, 2014). This could well be because affective associations and knowledge 
structures are more accessible. 
Chapter 5 thus brings insights on how the affective-cognitive attitude structure 
changes, each time people become somewhat more familiar with an unfamiliar 
technology. It shows that although knowledge does not increase over time, 
people are able to integrate the unfamiliar applications in their existing knowledge 
structures. As people think more about an attitude object, stronger affective and 
cognitive object-association linkages are acquired, which strengthens people’s 
attitudes (Barden & Tormala, 2014). However, as the attitude structure is still subject 
to change it shows that attitudes toward unfamiliar attitude objects are at this point 
still less accessible, as people only have weak object-evaluation linkages when it 
regards nanotechnology and its applications. 
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Implications: Contributions to theory
By studying both affective and cognitive attitudes and elaborateness of the 
underlying processes leading to these attitudes, and using several methodologies, 
this thesis contributed to the attitude literature in a number of ways. First of all, 
a special case of attitude objects was studied by investigating unfamiliar attitude 
objects, in this case nanotechnology applications. Attitude formation toward 
unfamiliar attitude objects is different from familiar attitude objects since the 
starting point is a knowledge deficit situation. By comparing attitude formation 
between familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects a better understanding is derived 
of how the attitude structure between these types of attitude objects differs. For 
known attitude objects both affective and cognitive object-evaluation linkages are 
available and accessible, whereas for unfamiliar attitude objects object-evaluation 
linkages are less strong and affect is easily used as the default option. In addition, 
the current thesis extends previous research by using realistic unfamiliar attitude 
objects. In previous attitude research on unfamiliar attitude objects, often a 
meaningful reference point is lacking by using fictitious attitude objects, such as 
Chinese characters (e.g. Edwards, 1990; Hansen & Wänke, 2009; Peters, Slovic, & 
Gregory, 2003; Zajonc & Markus, 1982). In such situations it is often the feelings of 
familiarity and fluency that activate affect (Topolinski, 2011). This thesis confirms 
that also in the situation of realistic unfamiliar attitude objects the default is to 
rely on affect. It also extends previous research by showing that for unfamiliar 
realistic attitude objects attitude formation is not exclusively reserved to affect, as 
at least some context information can be derived. Hence, people are able to draw 
on cognitive inferences, and will sometimes do so. 
A second contribution of this thesis is the development of a unique and innovative 
eye-tracking methodology, which considers eye-gazes on scales during the judgment 
process. This allowed studying the processes required to arrive at the attitude 
expression, instead of only reporting the outcomes of the attitude process. In 
addition, this eye-tracking approach allowed to simultaneously study the affective-
cognitive and the deliberative-intuitive dimension as no boundary conditions were 
imposed on the processes. The approach developed here, complements the more 
common approach to trace eye-gazes during stimuli presentation (see for instance 
Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Orquin & Mueller Loose, 2013). In this way the current 
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eye-tracking approach contributes to further process understanding, taking the 
perspective from the attitude formation process itself.
The third contribution of this thesis comes from the integration of both the 
affective-cognitive and intuitive-deliberative dimensions. Where dual process 
theories focus on the processes underlying judgment and decisions, and much 
attitude research focused on outcomes (Sinclair, 2010), this thesis combined both 
perspectives. By constraining the intuitive or the deliberative process only partial 
insight in underlying processes can be derived as the attitude process will not 
evolve naturally. As a consequence, a large proportion of the underlying processes, 
between the extremes of the dimensions, remains unstudied (Hogarth, 2010). In 
practice, intuitive and deliberative processes work in conjunction and rely on similar 
principles (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Therefore, 
instead of making a strict distinction between intuitive and deliberative processes, 
hybrid processes deserve more attention. This more closely resembles how attitude 
formation occurs in real life situations. This thesis has made a first step to investigate 
non-constrained processes in attitude formation, by means of a novel eye-tracking 
procedure. 
The results of the eye-tracker studies show that people use different strategies to 
arrive at their attitudes. Which strategy people use is dependent on the strength 
of underlying object-evaluation linkages. First of all, it is shown that affect is not 
necessarily more informative for the overall attitude towards attitude objects 
with weak object-evaluation linkages. This implies that people do not necessarily 
use an affect heuristic or rely only on feelings as information to arrive at their 
attitude (Chaiken, 1980; Schwarz, 2012; Slovic et al., 2007), even though there 
are no strong object-evaluation linkages available. Second, it is shown that affect 
does not always equate intuitive processing because in some cases a considerable 
amount of elaboration is required to arrive at the affective attitude (compared with 
the cognitive attitude). This shows that affect can also be deliberated. Similarly, 
cognition does not have to be a deliberate process, but has shown to be an intuitive 
process as well. The current thesis suggests that both intuitive and deliberative 
processes underpin judgments and that people rely on the process that brings them 
to a satisfying outcome. Often this is an intuitive process, based in either affect or 
cognition. 
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A fourth contribution of this thesis regards understanding of the stability of 
underlying attitude structures, providing insights on the strength and development 
of attitudes in a realistic context. The affective-cognitive attitude structure for 
conventional technology was stable over time, whereas for nanotechnology this 
was not the case. A strong and stable attitude structure is often based on direct 
experience with the attitude object, is persistent over time, resistant to change, 
and has a strong impact on behaviour (Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & 
Carnot, 1993; Prislin, 1996). The lack of a stable long-term attitude structure for 
nanotechnology is an indication that attitudes are not strongly established yet and 
sensitive to change. 
Limitations and future research
In this thesis, the implicit assumption was made that people form attitudes when 
the attitude object is unfamiliar. There is however no evidence that this is necessarily 
only an attitude formation process, as next to construction, retrieval processes may 
take place. In determining whether construction or retrieval processes are at work, 
the strength of underlying object-evaluation linkages plays a role. With strong object-
evaluation linkages people do not have to recompute their overall attitude, as they 
can retrieve this from memory (van Harreveld & van der Pligt, 2004). In this way 
familiar objects more likely call for attitude expression based on retrieval processes 
because they have been encountered before. Attitudes toward unfamiliar attitude 
objects, on the other hand, are more likely based on attitude formation because 
these objects have never been encountered or evaluated, and require a process 
of integrating and constructing the attitude (Bargh et al., 1992). It is however also 
likely that, when it regards unfamiliar attitude objects, there will be some common 
grounds with more familiar counterparts so that part of the attitude can be based 
on retrieval. This thesis hints on both construction and retrieval processes regarding 
unfamiliar attitude objects. Eye-tracking seems to be a promising tool to further 
examine and disentangle construction and retrieval process in attitude formation. 
At the same time however, the current methodology requires further development 
as in the current set-up there was a time gap between stimulus exposure and eye-
gaze registration on the scale. Although it was assumed that the eye gazes reflect 
an attitude formation process, it cannot be ruled out that the attitude was already 
formed at the very moment that the attitude object was displayed. In future 
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research the time gap could be reduced by presenting the attitude object and the 
scale simultaneously.
In this thesis conventional and nanotechnology applications were compared. The 
conventional – nanotechnology distinction was assumed to be an operationalization 
of the familiar – unfamiliar distinction. Conventional – nanotechnology however 
does not necessarily have to reflect familiar – unfamiliar. For nanotechnology 
applications it was clear that they reflected unfamiliar attitude objects. However, 
the conventional counterparts were not completely familiar either. Nevertheless 
the affective-cognitive attitude structure was stable for conventional technology 
and differed over time for nanotechnology, even though the differences in 
familiarity were limited. Future research can investigate differences in attitude 
formation between familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects further, by using other 
pairs of realistic familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects. For example by comparing 
attitudes toward (unfamiliar) products from other cultures against familiar products 
from own culture, or by manipulating the familiarity of advertisements. 
Some of the ideas tested in this thesis were inspired by categorization literature, 
where it is assumed that in the case of low knowledge, people draw on analogies 
with more familiar attitude objects in order to integrate the unfamiliar instance 
into existing knowledge structures. The results from this thesis are consistent 
with categorization research, however rely on indirect evidence. Future attitude 
research could gain from integrating categorization and attitude formation insights 
(Ranganath, Spellman, & Joy-Gaba, 2010), by specifying how the integration of 
an unfamiliar attribute in existing knowledge structures proceeds. This requires 
studying existing knowledge schemata and how new attitude objects are linked to 
those (Tourangeau et al., 1991). A mix of judgmental, associative, and attentional 
approaches may help to unlock this. For instance, the current research can be 
extended with judgmental and associative approaches in which it studied how well 
the unfamiliar attitude object represents a category and how well it is linked to 
existing schema structures, using typicality ratings. Methodologies such as means-
end chain laddering or think-out-loud protocols could provide useful insights in 
categorization of unfamiliar instances. In addition, attentional approaches may 
help to understand whether unfamiliar attributes are integrated within the existing 
knowledge structure or are entirely ignored in the attitude process. Future research 
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could look into how much attention is given to unfamiliar attributes while perceiving 
the attitude object, for instance by means of eye-tracking methodologies.
Practical relevance
As the public has little knowledge about nanotechnology, attitudes are still malleable. 
The affective-cognitive attitude structure changes over time for nanotechnology 
and its applications, in contrast to the attitude structure of conventional technology 
applications. The findings in this thesis have implications for communication around 
nanotechnology and its applications, and for communication toward different 
groups of consumers. 
In this thesis it is shown that attitudes toward nanotechnology without context are 
formed in a different way than attitudes toward specific nanotechnology attributes 
in context, for instance a yogurt product with nanotechnology. Attitudes toward 
nanotechnology without context are formed in a more affective way, whereas 
attitudes toward specific nanotechnology attributes in context were formed in a 
more cognitive way. This also implies that communication about nanotechnology 
as a generic technology needs to be positioned differently than communication 
about specific nanotechnology applications. As people often rely on affect toward 
nanotechnology it would be helpful for people’s understanding to address them 
in affective ways, for instance by providing them with visual information. It is also 
important to simplify information and not introduce too many new concepts, and 
to avoid jargon (Castellini et al., 2007). For unfamiliar applications within a product 
context it is important to design information in such a way that it connects to 
peoples’ existing knowledge structure, so that the unfamiliar technology application 
can be embedded herein (Cobb, 2005). For instance, the unfamiliar application can 
be explained in terms of a more familiar one, so that the familiar one can be used 
as reference point for comparison. In general, it is important to keep in mind the 
other’s point of view and design information that speaks to peoples’ imagination, 
affectively as well as cognitively. 
In addition, the results of this thesis show that a large group of consumers rely on 
affect in attitude formation toward unfamiliar nanotechnology applications. There 
is however also a group of consumers who do rely more on cognition (people with 
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high Need for Cognition). So even when there is little information available, there 
are people who still draw on cognitive inferences in attitude formation. The vast 
majority of consumers however relies, and probably remains to rely, on affect. 
The findings in this thesis also show that, at this point in time, attitudes toward 
nanotechnology applications are still relatively more based on affect. Thus, in 
communication towards consumers it is important to address both affective and 
cognitive aspects. This implies that only factual information will not suffice, as 
people need to integrate the unfamiliar application within their existing knowledge 
structures in both affective and cognitive ways. Affective integration can be 
increased by providing visual and vivid cues to consumers, for instance explaining 
the usefulness of a nanotechnology application to consumers in a short movie. In 
written media affective communication can be increased by working with appealing 
visuals. Cognitive integration could take place by drawing on analogies and 
experiences relating to everyday life, thus enabling a discussion on nanotechnology 
and its applications (Burri, 2009). 
Final conclusion
The research presented in this thesis contributed to understanding how people 
form attitudes toward unfamiliar attitude objects. Situations in which affect or 
cognition is the better predictor of overall attitudes were investigated, as well as the 
underlying processes in attitude formation, and how the attitude structure evolves 
over time. 
In general the following conclusions can be drawn:
• People often rely on affect when forming attitudes toward unfamiliar 
attitude objects. People are however able to draw on cognitive inferences 
provided that there are enough cues available (e.g. product context or 
being more often exposed) or there is a disposition to rely on cognition 
(high Need for Cognition). 
• Whether people rely on affect or cognition depends on which process is 
the easiest. 
• The relative influence of affect and cognition in attitude formation for 
nanotechnology, as an example of unfamiliar attitude objects, is not 
crystallized yet which makes such attitudes malleable.
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Summary
Attitudes play a major role in everyday life, determining how people make 
judgments and decisions. The evaluation of unfamiliar attitude objects, such as 
nanotechnologies, can be quite challenging as people have limited knowledge 
available. Therefore, a better understanding of the factors and processes leading to 
attitude evaluation is required. The aim of this thesis was to understand how people 
form attitudes toward unfamiliar attitude objects. 
Attitudes are defined as summary evaluations, and are multi-faceted with a 
complex layered structure. Attitude evaluation stems from affect and cognition 
associated with the attitude object. In addition, the attitude process can be the 
result of a more intuitive (automatic and unconscious) or deliberative (conscious 
and controlled) process. Along these lines, this thesis takes a multidimensional view 
on attitudes, with one dimension covering affect-cognition and the other dimension 
intuitive-deliberative processing. A combination of these dimensions results in 
different strategies for people to arrive at attitudes. Which strategy people take 
is also dependent on the familiarity with the attitude object. For familiar attitude 
objects, attitude expression is relatively straightforward as people can draw upon 
established affective and cognitive knowledge structures that have been built up 
over time. For unfamiliar attitude objects, such as nanotechnology applications, 
knowledge structures fall short and attitude formation is more challenging. This 
thesis addressed three key themes while comparing the attitude formation process 
between familiar and unfamiliar attitude objects: (1) the relative influence of affect 
and cognition in attitude formation, (2) the elaborateness of processing of affective 
and cognitive attitudes, and (3) the changing influence of affect and cognition over 
time.
A survey study with a cross-section of Dutch consumers provided insight into the 
relative influence of affect and cognition on attitudes (chapter 2). For unfamiliar 
compared to familiar attitude objects, people rely more on affect than on cognition. In 
addition, for familiar attitude objects the influence of individually preferred thinking 
styles (Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition) is reflected, whereas for unfamiliar 
attitude objects preferred thinking style is less influential. Individuals with high 
Need for Cognition did rely relatively more on cognition also for unfamiliar attitude 
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objects. Also, the amount of available context information influences the relative 
influence of affect and cognition (chapter 4). For a familiar technology attribute 
which fits existing knowledge structures, both affect and cognition support attitude 
formation. For unfamiliar attributes attitude formation is context dependent. If the 
context provides enough cues, the unfamiliar attribute is ignored and people rely on 
affect. If this is not the case people solve the incongruency in a cognitive way. This 
shows that affect is often the default option in attitude formation toward unfamiliar 
attitude objects. However people do not exclusively rely on affect as they are also 
able to draw on cognitive inferences when it regards unfamiliar attitude objects. 
A process method to explore underlying process mechanisms, such as eye-tracking, 
helps in understanding why affect or cognition is the preferred attitude component 
to rely on (chapter 3 and 4). In chapter 3, familiar attitude objects differing in 
strength of underlying object-evaluations (i.e. univalent, neutral, ambivalent) were 
investigated. In chapter 4 familiar attitude objects (with strong object-evaluations) 
were compared to unfamiliar attitude objects (with weak object-evaluations). 
These chapters show that the stronger the object-evaluation linkages the lower the 
need to elaborate on the attitude object to arrive at an evaluation. The weaker 
the object-evaluation linkages (e.g. for neutral attitude objects or for unfamiliar 
nanotechnology attitude objects) the more influential the context is. This shows 
that affect does not necessarily have to be the more intuitive and easier process. 
Rather this is dependent on the type of attitude object and the strength of its’ 
underlying object associations. The component that is decisive in expressing overall 
attitudes (affect or cognition), later on requires less processing. People thus choose 
the attitude path of least resistance, and rely on affect or cognition depending on 
how easily it leads to the overall attitude.  
Monitoring attitudes longitudinally helps in understanding how the influence of 
affect and cognition on overall attitude might change over time. For conventional 
technologies, the influence of affect and cognition on overall attitude remains stable 
over time (chapter 5). For unfamiliar nanotechnology attitude objects reliance on 
affect decreases over time whereas reliance on cognition increases. Knowledge 
growth, had no effect on changes in the influence of affect and cognition on 
overall attitude over time. This shows that although knowledge does not increase 
over time, people are able to integrate the unfamiliar attribute constellation into 
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their existing knowledge structures. However, the attitude structure of affect and 
cognition for unfamiliar nanotechnology attitude objects is not crystallized yet and 
subject to change. 
 
Together, the chapters in this thesis show that although the default is to rely on 
affect, in attitude formation toward unfamiliar attitude objects, people are able 
to draw on cognitive inferences provided that there are enough cues available 
(e.g. product context, high Need for Cognition, or being more often exposed). In 
addition, whether people rely on affect or cognition depends on which process is the 
easiest. The attitude component which is decisive in the attitude formation process 
requires the least elaborate process. This thesis contributes to a better process 
understanding as both affective-cognitive and deliberative-intuitive dimensions 
were simultaneously studied. Finally, it is concluded that attitudes toward unfamiliar 
attitude objects, in this case nanotechnology applications, are still subject to change. 
This has implications for communication about new technologies, as it is important 
to address both affective and cognitive aspects. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary)
Affect en cognitie in attitudevorming van bekende en onbekende 
attitude objecten: De casus nanotechnologie
Attitudes zijn belangrijk in ons dagelijks leven omdat ze bepalen hoe mensen 
oordelen vormen en beslissingen maken. Het evalueren van onbekende attitude 
objecten, zoals nanotechnologie toepassingen, is een uitdaging omdat mensen 
maar beperkte kennis over die objecten beschikbaar hebben. Een beter begrip 
van de factoren en processen die leiden tot evaluaties is nodig. Het doel van dit 
proefschrift was om te begrijpen hoe mensen attitudes vormen ten aanzien van 
onbekende attitude objecten. 
Attitudes worden gezien als een soort gewogen gemiddelde van kleinere evaluaties. 
Attitudes zijn complex en hebben een gelaagde structuur. Attitude evaluaties 
vinden hun basis in affect en cognitie geassocieerd met het attitude object. Qua 
proces is een attitude het resultaat van een intuitief (automatisch en onbewust) 
of deliberatief (bewust en gecontroleerd) proces. Dit proefschrift bekijkt attituden 
vanuit een multidimensionaal perspectief, met als dimensies (1) affect-cognitie en 
(2) intuitief-deliberatieve verwerking. Combinaties van deze dimensies resulteert 
in verschillende strategieën om tot een attitude te komen. Voor bekende attitude 
objecten is het uiten van een attitude relatief eenvoudig. Dat komt omdat mensen 
dan kunnen putten uit zowel affectieve als cognitieve kennisstructuren, welke ze 
al door de tijd heen hebben opgebouwd. Voor onbekende attitude objecten, zoals 
nanotechnologie toepassingen, zijn dergelijke kennisstructuren niet voorhanden en 
is het vormen van een attitude moeilijker. In dit proefschrift zijn drie kernthema’s 
ten aanzien van de vorming van attitudes nader bestudeerd en vergeleken tussen 
bekende en onbekende attitude objecten: (1) de relatieve invloed van affect en 
cognitie in attitudevorming, (2) de uitgebreidheid van mentale verwerking van 
cognitieve en affectieve attitudes, en (3) de veranderende invloed van affect en 
cognitie over de tijd.
Een survey-onderzoek, onder een doorsnede van de Nederlandse bevolking, 
verschafte inzicht in de relatieve invloed van affect en cognitie in attitudes 
(hoofdstuk 2). Voor onbekende, ten opzichte van bekende, attitude objecten bleek 
dat mensen meer op affect dan cognitie afgaan. Daarnaast bleek dat voor bekende 
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attitude objecten de invloed van verschillende denkstijlen (need for cognition en 
faith in intuition) terug te zien was, terwijl dit voor onbekende attitude objecten 
veel minder het geval was. Mensen met een hoge Need for Cognition baseerden 
hun attitudes relatief meer op cognitie, ook bij onbekende attitude objecten. 
Daarnaast is de hoeveelheid context-informatie van invloed op de relatieve invloed 
van affect en cognitie (hoofdstuk 4). Voor een bekend technologie attribuut, met 
raakvlakken met bestaande kennisstructuren, ondersteunen zowel affect als 
cognitie de attitudevorming. Voor onbekende attributen is dat context-afhankelijk. 
Als de omgeving voldoende bruikbare cues verschaft dan wordt het onbekende 
attribuut genegeerd en gaan mensen op affect af. Als dat niet het geval is, dan wordt 
de incongruentie op een cognitieve manier opgelost. Dit laat zien dat affectieve 
verwerking vaak de standaardoptie is wanneer het gaat om attitudevorming ten 
aanzien van onbekende attitude objecten. Het is echter niet zo dat mensen alleen 
maar op affect afgaan, want zoals blijkt zijn mensen in staat om ook cognitieve 
gevolgtrekkingen te maken zelfs wanneer het gaat om onbekende attitude-objecten.
Door de onderliggende mentale processen te bestuderen, in dit geval door 
gebruik te maken van eye-tracking, wordt een dieper begrip verkregen waarom 
affect of cognitie de voorkeurscomponent is in attitudevorming (hoofdstuk 3 en 
4). In hoofdstuk 3 werden bekende attitude objecten geëvalueerd die varieerden 
in sterkte van onderliggende object-evaluaties (namelijk univalente, neutrale, 
ambivalente attitude objecten). In hoofdstuk 4 werden bekende attitude objecten 
(sterke object-evaluaties) vergeleken met onbekende attitude objecten (zwakke 
object-evaluaties). Uit deze studies blijkt dat hoe sterker de object-evaluatie 
connecties zijn hoe minder de noodzaak er is voor uitgebreide mentale verwerking 
om tot een evaluatie van het attitude object te komen. Hoe zwakker de object-
evaluatie connecties zijn (bv. voor neutrale attitude objecten of voor onbekende 
nanotechnologie attitude objecten) hoe invloedrijker de context is. Dit toont aan 
dat affect niet noodzakelijkerwijs het meer intuitieve en gemakkelijkere proces is. 
In plaats daarvan is dit afhankelijk van het type attitude object en de sterkte van 
onderliggende object associaties. De component die doorslaggevend is in het uiten 
van een attitude (affect of cognitie) vraagt later ook minder mentale verwerking. 
Mensen kiezen dus voor het pad van de minste weerstand en vertrouwen op affect 
of cognitie afhankelijk van hoe gemakkelijk dit tot hun attitude leidt. 
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Het volgen van attitudes in de tijd helpt in het beter begrijpen hoe de invloed 
van affect en cognitie op de algemene attitude verandert over tijd. Voor bekende 
technologieën blijkt dat de invloed van affect en cognitie op de algemene attitude 
stabiel blijft over de tijd (hoofdstuk 5). Echter, voor onbekende attitude objecten 
blijkt de invloed van affect af te nemen over tijd, terwijl de invloed van cognitie 
toeneemt. Kennisgroei had geen effect op de veranderingen in de invloed van affect 
en cognitie over tijd. Dit laat zien dat zelfs zonder noemenswaardige toename 
in mensen hun kennisniveau, ze na verloop van tijd toch in staat blijken om de 
onbekende attribuut samenstelling in hun bestaande kennisstructuur te integreren. 
Voor onbekende nanotechnologie attitude-objecten is de affectieve-cognitieve 
attitude structuur nog niet uitgekristalliseerd en nog steeds aan verandering 
onderhevig. 
Samen laten de hoofdstukken in het proefschrift zien dat, hoewel affectieve 
verwerking de standaardoptie is, mensen in attitudevorming ten aanzien van 
onbekende attitude objecten toch in staat zijn om cognitieve gevolgtrekkingen 
te maken op voorwaarde dat er in de omgeving voldoende cues beschikbaar zijn 
(bv. de productcontext, hoge Need for Cognition, of er vaker mee in aanraking zijn 
geweest). Bovendien blijkt dat of mensen op affect of cognitie afgaan afhangt van 
welke van de twee attitudecomponenten de minst uitgebreide mentale verwerking 
vraagt. De attitudecomponent die bepalend is in het attitudevormingsproces 
is vaak ook de component die de minst uitgebreide verwerking vraagt. Hiermee 
draagt dit proefschrift bij aan een beter procesbegrip omdat de affectief-
cognitieve en intuitief-deliberatieve dimensies tegelijkertijd zijn bestudeerd. 
Daarnaast kan geconcludeerd worden dat onbekende attitude objecten, in dit 
geval nanotechnologie toepassingen, nog steeds aan veranderingen onderhevig 
zijn. Dit heeft implicaties voor de communicatie over nieuwe technologieën. Het is 
namelijk belangrijk om in communicatie zowel affectieve als cognitieve aspecten in 
ogenschouw te nemen.
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